Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 24SMCV01901, Date: 2024-09-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV01901 Hearing Date: September 12, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Springman v. Cleanslate
Medical Group of California, P.C., et al., Case No. 24SMCV01901
Hearing Date:
September 12, 2024
Defendants Natella and Tigran Petrosyan’s Demurrer
to the Complaint
Plaintiff Springman sues for negligence, premise
liability and other intentional torts, alleging repeated sexual assaults from
May-September 2021 by employee defendant Pontius at defendant Solstice, an inpatient
mental health/substance abuse treatment facility. Doe defendants Natella
and Tigran Petrosyan are alleged to be owners/operators of the facility and
employers of defendant Pontius. Suit was filed April 22, 2024. The Petrosyan
defendants demurrer to the first and second causes of action on statute of
limitations, failure to state facts, and uncertainty grounds.
Defendants Petrosyan contented the negligence and
premises claims are time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations under
CCP §335.1. In opposition, Springman argues the claims are not time-barred, citing
CCP §340.16, which creates a 10-year statute of limitation for civil actions
for damages stemming from a sexual assault that occurs after plaintiff’s 18th
birthday.
Defendants argue plaintiff does not cite authority that
CCP §340.16 applies to the negligence and premises liability claims. The Code
clear states it applies to “any civil action for recovery of damages
suffered as a result of sexual assault…” (emphasis added). There is no
limitation as to the specific causes of actions or claims to which the Code
applies.
Though the causes of action alleged are for negligence
and premises liability, the damages stem from the multiple alleged rapes
between May and September 2021. Compl. ¶¶1, 10, 26, 37. CCP §340.16 applies to
any civil action for recovery of damages suffered due to alleged sexual assault,
so the claims are not time-barred. Plaintiff filed his complaint well within
the ten year statute running from 2021.
The Petrosyans assert the negligence claim fails
because it does not properly allege a duty. To state a claim for negligence, plaintiff
must allege duty, breach, causation and damages. See, e.g. McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.
The complaint alleges a duty under Civil Code
§1714(a). Compl. ¶17. Springman further claims moving defendants owed a duty to
take reasonable steps to protect vulnerable residents suffering from emotional
and/or substance abuse issues, such as plaintiff, by employing sufficiently and
adequately trained personnel, including security personnel. Id. ¶20.
Defendants are alleged to have breached that duty by
failing to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of residents, such as
plaintiff, and to prevent them from being exposed to dangerous conditions and
criminal activities, including the repeated alleged sexual assaults on
plaintiff. Id. ¶¶4, 11, 18. Plaintiff alleges defendants failed to prevent
the assaults from occurring (Id. ¶21) and damages. Id. ¶ 23. On
demurrer, this is sufficient to state a negligence claim.
The Petrosyans argue the premises liability claim
fails because the allegations are based on “information and belief.” Various
allegations were made against Doe defendants, including moving parties. This
would be an improper basis for a demurrer, as the court must take the
allegations as true for a demurrer. Aubry
v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967. As
previously discussed, the complaint adequately alleges a premises liability
action to put the Petrosyans on notice, which is all that is required. Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998. OVERRULED. Defendants Petrosyan to
answer within ten days.