Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 24SMCV01953, Date: 2024-08-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV01953 Hearing Date: August 5, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Arnold, et al. v.
Netflix, Inc, et al., Case No. 24SMCV01953
Hearing Date:
August 5, 2024
Defendants Netflix
Inc. and Netflix Streaming Services Special Motion to Strike
Plaintiff Arnold in
pro per brings this unfair business practices action based on defendants’
release of an animated reboot of the 1970’s sitcom “Good Times.” Defendants Netflix,
Inc. and Netflix Streaming Services (collectively “Netflix”) move to strike all
claims and dismiss with prejudice under CCP § 425.16.
Netflix’s request
no. 1-9, hereinafter referred to as Exhibits A-I respectively, are granted
under Evid. Code § 452(h) as they are facts not reasonably subject to dispute.
In ruling on an
anti-SLAPP motion, a trial court uses a “summary-judgment-like procedure at any
early stage of the litigation.” Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005)
35 Cal.4th 180, 192. This two-step process first requires defendant to show the
acts of which plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the
[defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States of
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Code Civ. Proc.
§425.16(b)(1). If defendant carries that burden, the burden shift to plaintiff
to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. Code Civ. Proc.
§425.16(b)(3). In making both determinations, the trial court considers “the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.” Code Civ. Proc. §425.16(b)(2); Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.
A court does not weigh credibility or the comparative strength of
the evidence – the court considers a defendant’s evidence only to determine if
it defeats a plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law. Soukup v. Law Office of
Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. If plaintiff fails to
establish that its cause of action meets the minimal merit standard, it is
subject to be stricken under the statute as a SLAPP. Navellier v. Sletten
(2003) 29 Cal.4th at 89.
Netflix contends that, given the public interest in the series and the
contemporary social, racial, and economic issues it addresses, the claims stem
from actions related to the exercise of constitutional free speech on matters
of public concern. Plaintiff filed late opposition to the motion, in violation
of CCP § 1005(b). However, the court exercises discretion under CRC rule
3.1300(d) to consider the merits below.
a.
Protected Activity
Netflix argues the complaint is predicated on protected activity
under subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4) of section 425.16. The anti-SLAPP
statute defines protected activities as: “…(3) any written or oral statement or
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with
an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise
of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” Code
Civ. Proc. §425.16(e)(3)-(4).What constitutes a statement made in
connection with an issue of public interest is the same under subdivisions
(e)(3) and (4). Du Charme v. Int’l. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107, 115-119.
There is a two-step test to determine this issue. “First, we ask
what ‘public issue or [ ] issue of public interest’ the speech in question
implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech. Code
Civ. Proc § 425.16(e)(4). Second, we ask what functional relationship exists
between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public
interest.” FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133,
149–150.
Netflix meets its
initial burden by demonstrating the series addresses public issues, focusing on
racial and socioeconomic topics. There is
public interest in the show, indicated via significant media attention, with
numerous articles discussing its content, both positive and negative.
Silberberg Decl. ¶ 11; Exh. C, D, G, & I. A functional relationship exists
between the show and public conversation because the creative decisions for the
show revolve around public discussions on race and other societal issues.
Arnold argues Netflix fails to meet its burden because Yvette
Nicole Brown’s social media postings were not speech attributable to Netflix.
However, this distinction is merely a re-characterization of the claims. In
opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, plaintiffs are required to submit admissible
evidence Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788; the
admissible evidence controls, not their characterization of it. Arnold’s
opposition does not submit admissible evidence, such as a declaration, showing
the complaint is not predicated on the show. Netflix meets its initial burden in
showing that the complaint is predicated on protected activity under CCP
§425.16(e)(3)&(4).
b.
Likelihood of Prevailing
After a defendant
meets the burden of showing the gravamen of the complaint involves protected
activity, plaintiff must “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to
sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.” Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548. A defendant
meets the burden by establishing plaintiff cannot overcome an affirmative
defense. Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 285.
“[A] plaintiff
cannot simply rely on his or her pleadings, even if verified. Rather, the
plaintiff must adduce competent, admissible evidence.” Grenier v. Taylor
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 480. “Legally sufficient” means the cause of action
would satisfy demurrer. Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400,
1421. The evidentiary showing must be made by competent and admissible
evidence. Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 1424, 1444. The question is whether plaintiff presented evidence
that, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a judgment in
plaintiff’s favor. Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965.
To set forth a claim for a violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200, plaintiff must establish defendant
was engaged in an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and certain specific acts.
A cause of action for unfair competition “is not an all-purpose substitute for
a tort or contract action.” Cortez v.
Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.
Arnold has not
provided evidence to support a favorable judgment because she alleges only various
causes of action not alleged in her complaint. For example, Arnold alleges a
fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which
is not alleged in her complaint. The complaint only alleges causes of action
for violation §17200 et seq. and injunctive relief.
Arnold does not
provide evidence indicating she has lost money or property as a result of the
series; her complaint and opposition allege that her injury stems from
embarrassment, humiliation, shame, and emotional sickness as a result of the
show.
Moreover, Arnold’s claim fails because
she has not provided required notice under Civil Code §1782(a). Section 1782(a) provides
that, thirty days or more prior to the commencement of an action for damages, a
consumer must “[n]otify the person alleged to have employed or committed
methods, acts, or practices declared unlawful by Section 1770 of the particular
alleged violations of Section 1770” and “[d]emand that the person correct,
repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or services alleged to be in
violation of Section 1770.” (Civ. Code, § 1782(a).) This notice must be in
writing and be sent by certified or registered mail with return receipt
requested. (Id.) Here, the complaint does not indicate any such notice
was given to defendants. Thus, Arnold’s claims are legally deficient. GRANTED.