Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 24SMCV02330, Date: 2024-10-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV02330 Hearing Date: October 29, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Aquino v. Martinez, Case no. 24SMCV02330
Hearing date October 29, 2024
Defendant
Monica Martinez’s Demurrer to the FAC
Plaintiffs
Rubi Aquino, Guadalupe Gomez and Domingo Gomez sue defendant Monica Martinez in
her capacities as executor of Magdalena Gomez’s estate (“Magdalena”) and
trustee of the 2021 Magdalena Gomez Separate Property Trust dated 10/21/2021,
and in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs allege intentional interference with
inheritance expectancy, wrongful claims of title, constructive trust created by
wrongful act, treble damages and Probate Code §1061 accounting. Defendant
demurs to all COAs, arguing failure to state a claim against defendant in her
individual capacity, failure to state facts sufficient to constitute COAs and
lack of standing regarding the accounting claim.
“The
function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter
of law.” Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
1413, 1420. A complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than
evidentiary facts” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531,
550, but plaintiff must allege essential facts “with reasonable precision and
with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature,
source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners
Ass’n., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.
Allegations against Defendant in
her Individual Capacity
Defendant
Martinez argues plaintiffs failed to allege claims against her in her
individual capacity. Plaintiffs allege defendant improperly collected rents
alongside Magdalena Gomez. FAC para. 26. Plaintiffs allege defendant knowingly
received and accepted property that rightfully belonged to plaintiffs. FAC
para. 30. Plaintiffs allege defendant has and is misappropriating rental
income. Id. This is sufficient to state a claim against defendant in her
individual capacity.
First COA: Intentional Interference
with Expected Inheritance
Defendant
argues plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient under Cal. Code Civ. Proc
430.10(e) to constitute a COA for intentional interference with expected inheritance.
Citing Gomez v. Smith (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1016, defendant argues plaintiffs
must allege facts showing: "(a) the plaintiff had an expectancy of
receiving an inheritance; (b) the defendant knew of the expectancy; (c) the
defendant engaged in intentional conduct to interfere with the expectancy; (d)
the interference was conducted by independently tortious means; (e) the
plaintiff was damaged as a result; and (f) the defendant's conduct was directed
at someone other than the plaintiff." Id.
Plaintiffs
allege they had a reasonable expectation of inheriting from their father based
on the familial relationship and his repeated expressions of his desire to
provide for his children. FAC paras. 6, 19. Plaintiffs allege Magdalena knew of
plaintiffs’ expectancy (FAC paras. 7, 20, 21) and intentionally interfered with
plaintiffs’ expectancy by refusing to take decedent to an attorney to prepare
estate planning documents. Id. Plaintiffs allege this conduct constituted
independently tortious means via fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence (FAC
paras. 7, 19-22), which caused damages via losing the expected inheritance. FAC
para. 23. Plaintiffs allege Magdalena’s conduct was directed at their father
and not plaintiffs. FAC paras. 7, 20.
These
allegations are sufficient to survive demurrer. Whether they constitute
sufficiently extreme behavior is a question of fact, which the court cannot determine
on demurrer.
Second COA: Probate Code §§850-859
Claims
Defendant
argues plaintiffs failed to establish improper claims or bad faith conduct as
required by Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066. Plaintiffs
alleged Magdalena acted in bad faith by severing joint tenancies to
intentionally deprive plaintiffs of the inheritance, contrary to their father’s
wishes. FAC paras. 7, 19-22. Whether Magdalena acted in bad faith is a question
of fact; plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient.
Third COA: Constructive Trust
Defendant
argues plaintiffs fail to establish grounds for constructive trust. "A constructive
trust may only be imposed where three conditions are satisfied: (1) the existence
of a res (property or some interest in property), (2) the right of a
complaining party to that res, and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention
of the res by another party who is not entitled to it." Burlesci v.
Petersen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1069.
The
existence of property interests is uncontroverted. Plaintiffs asserted a right
to the property, which defendant allegedly wrongfully acquired and detained.
FAC paras. 7, 19-22. These allegations are sufficient.
Fourth COA: Treble Damages and
Attorney’s Fees under Penal Code 496(c)
Defendant
argues plaintiffs have not alleged theft or criminal intent as required under Siry
Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333 (holding that
for §496(c) to apply, there
must be a theft, which requires proof of criminal intent beyond mere
nonperformance or actual falsity).
Plaintiffs
do not allege defendant or Magdalena acted with criminal intent. Plaintiffs
argue they alleged Magdalena willfully engaged in wrongful conduct (FAC paras. 7,
19-22), and the conduct constitutes theft for purposes of Penal Code §496(c).
This argument is unavailing. Falsity is not theft, and absent allegations of
theft and criminal intent, plaintiffs’ fourth COA for treble damages and
attorney’s fees fails. Sustained with leave to amend.
Fifth COA: Accounting
Defendant
argues plaintiffs are not beneficiaries of the 2021 Magdalena Gomez Separate
Property Trust dated 10/21/2021, so lack standing to bring a COA for accounting
under Probate Code §17200; Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
517, 524. Prob. Code §17200 grants standing to trust beneficiaries to petition
for an accounting. Prob. Code §24 defines a beneficiary as “a person who has
any present or future interest, vested or contingent.” Id.
Plaintiffs
allege they possess a direct interest in the assets of their father’s estate, which
were improperly transferred to the 2021 Magdalena Gomez Separate Property Trust
dated 10/21/2021. FAC paras. 7, 19-22. Plaintiffs assert an accounting is
necessary to trace the improperly transferred assets. Thus, plaintiffs allege an
interest in the assets now held by the 2021 Magdalena Gomez Separate Property
Trust dated 10/21/2021. This is sufficient.
Defendant’s
demurrers to the first, second, third and fifth COAs are OVERRULED. Defendant’s
demurrer to the fourth COA is GRANTED with leave to amend.