Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: BC719301, Date: 2024-12-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: BC719301, Date: 2024-12-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC719301 Hearing Date: December 31, 2024 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Hill v. Cedars-Sinai Marina Del Rey Hospital, Case no. BC719301

Hearing date: December 31, 2024

Plaintiff Hill’s Motion for New Trial

Plaintiff Hill sued defendants Cedars-Sinai Marina Del Rey Hospital and physician assistant Adams for medical negligence and battery arising from Adams’ treatment of Hill following an injury at Equinox Athletic Club. Plaintiff fell; the glass bottle she was holding shattered, cutting her hand. She alleged Adams, a PA at Cedars’ facility, failed to remove all the glass, causing injury.

After trial, the jury returned a defense verdict on both claims. Judg. 2:1-11. Hill moves for a new trial, arguing counsel and jury irregularities, jury misconduct and verdicts not supported by the evidence, supported by declarations of counsel Lenze and jurors Margolin and Larson. Cedars and Adams each oppose.

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

Cedars-Sinai objections to Margolin’s declaration. OVERRULED. Cedars-Sinai objections to Larsen’s declaration. OVERRULED.

Adams’ objection to Margolin’s declaration. OVERRULED. Adams’ objections to Larsen’s declaration. OVERRULED. Adams’ objections to Lenze’s declaration and attached exhibits. OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §657 requires trial courts to grant a new trial where any irregularity or misconduct by the adverse party or jury prevented either party from having a fair trial. Jury misconduct that prejudices a fair trial materially affecting the substantial rights of the moving party creates grounds for ordering a new trial. See Enyart v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 499, 507; Hassan v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 417.

Where jury misconduct is alleged as a basis for a new trial, the court performs a three-step inquiry: (1) is there admissible evidence in support of jury misconduct; (2) do the facts establish actual jury misconduct; and (3) was the misconduct prejudicial. Sierra View Local Health Care Dist. v. Sierra View Med. Plaza Assocs., LP (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 478.

Hill first argues irregularity in the proceedings based on a question by Cedars’ counsel Mosley, who asked about Hill’s lawsuit against Equinox, despite the court having granted a motion in limine preventing mentioning of that suit. Decl. Lenze para. 4. The court sustained an objection, and the question was not answered. Outside the jury’s presence, the parties and court discussed whether to give a curative instruction; it was decided not to, so as not to draw attention to a question that was asked but not answered.

Jurors Margolin and Larsen state some jurors discussed Mosley’s question and the Equinox lawsuit. Decl. Margolin paras. 4-5; decl. Larsen paras. 3-4. Hill argues Mosley’s question constitutes misconduct which prejudiced the jury against Hill.

Mosley’s asking of the question despite the MIL constitutes misconduct. It was error to ask the question; the jury should not have heard that there was a suit against Equinox. Though there was no specific curative instruction, the jurors were read CACI 106, which cautions “You should not think that something is true just because an attorney’s question suggests that it is true.”

The juror declarations establish that the issue was discussed, in violation of CACI 106. However, Hill fails to establish whether the discussion was in any way prejudicial. Hill merely established some jurors discussed the lawsuit; no evidence of resulting prejudice was presented. Absent admissible evidence of prejudice, Hill failed to meet the threshold for a new trial.

Hill next argues there was juror misconduct via two jurors who introduced outside information during deliberations. Per the declaration of juror Larson, Juror 4 stated “a hand surgeon wouldn’t do surgery right away because of the blood loss.” Decl. Larsen para. 5. Another unspecified juror shared the required blood hemoglobin number for a transfusion after allegedly learning it from a friend. Decl. Larsen para. 7. Hill argues this constitutes prejudicial juror misconduct. See Tapia v. Barker (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 761, 766.

The jurors should not have brought this outside information into deliberation, and doing so constitutes misconduct and violates CACI 106 (“You must decide what the facts are in this case only from the evidence you see or hear during the trial.”).

However, Hill again fails to establish that this information was prejudicial or the verdict would have otherwise been more favorable to Hill absent the outside information. Hill offers no declarations as to when these disclosures of outside information occurred, nor any evidence establishing whether jurors voted or changed their votes based on this information. This is insufficient to establish prejudice.

Hill further argues the verdict was unsupported by evidence per Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §657(6). Hill asserts the jury was read CACI 508 “Duty to refer to a specialist.” She argues the question the jury was supposed to answer was “Did Adams act with as much skill and care as a reasonable hand surgeon would have,” but the jury merely determined Adams stopped Hill’s arterial bleeding and acted reasonably in referring Hill to a PCP. Decl. Margolin para. 6; decl. Larsen paras. 5-6. Hill argues the jury failed to fully consider CACI 508, rendering the verdict against law and unsupported.

“Most judges grant a new trial [for verdicts against law] only after finding that the verdict was obviously and clearly wrong. In other words, most judges give great deference to the jury’s verdict and rarely interfere with it.” The Foundation for Judicial Education, California Judges Benchbook (2009) Ch. 2, § 2.27.

Hill’s argument is unavailing. The verdict form correctly states the questions the jury was to answer. The jury determined Adams’ decision to refer Hill to her PCP after stopping the bleeding constituted appropriate care. Decl. Margolin para. 6. Hill’s arguments regarding contrary evidence offered by plaintiff’s experts are unavailing; defendants offered expert testimony, and the jury is free to accept whichever evidence it finds more persuasive. The jury answered the question of whether Adams acted with reasonable skill and care.

Even accepting the declarations, there is no basis under which this court can grant a new trial on the evidence presented. See Cal. Evid. Code §1150(a); Continental Dairy Equip. Co. v. Lawrence (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 378, 385; Bell v. BMW (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124-1126. DENIED.