Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: SC126502, Date: 2022-10-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC126502    Hearing Date: October 6, 2022    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling
Sycamore Park v. MRCA, Case No. SC126502
Hearing date October 6, 2022
Cross-Defendants’ Motion to Strike Dismissal without Prejudice

Plaintiffs/cross-defendants residents/property owners sued to stop defendants/cross-complainants from inviting the public into Sycamore Park. On February 5, 2020, the court granted summary adjudication of Coastal Act claims as to cross-defendant individual homeowners. Phase 1 of trial included quiet title claims and some “overlap” issues raised by MRCA. After commencement of trial MRCA filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of its Coastal Act claims, entered August 18, 2022. Cross-defendants move to strike “without prejudice” and seek to have the court deem the dismissal with prejudice, per Code Civ. Proc. § 436.

Cross-defendants’ request for judicial notice of four court filings: (1) February 5, 2020, tentative ruling; (2) March 25, 2020 ruling on submitted matter; (3) February 14, 2022 minute order on statement of decision; and (4) August 18, 2022 request for dismissal without prejudice is GRANTED per Evid. Code § 451.

Cross-defendants argue the dismissal was filed after trial commenced and after summary judgment was entered against individual cross-defendants, so must made be with prejudice. 

Procedurally, MRCA argues the relief requested may not be made via a motion to strike. Code Civ. Proc. § 436 allows courts to strike portions of “pleadings,” and a request for dismissal is not a pleading. MRCA also argues the Coastal Act claims were to be litigated during phase 2, so the dismissal without prejudice was still proper.

VRMA and the Tennis Court Association were not parties to the phase 1 trial. MRCA’s request to dismiss the Coastal Act claims without prejudice was filed after the court granted summary adjudication in favor of the individual homeowners; the dismissal was aimed only at VERMA and SPTCA. MRCA has no objection to an order limiting dismissal of the Coastal Act claims without prejudice to VERMA and SPTCA.

Cross-defendants argue the relief requested is authorized by Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d), which allows the court to set aside any void judgment. They argue the request for dismissal is void because Code Civ. Proc. § 581 allows for dismissal without prejudice only before trial has commenced.

“A plaintiff may dismiss his or her complaint, or any cause of action asserted in it, in its entirety, or as to any defendant or defendants, with or without prejudice prior to the actual commencement of trial…After the actual commencement of trial, the court shall dismiss the complaint, or any causes of action asserted in it, in its entirety or as to any defendants, with prejudice….” Code Civ. Proc. § 581(c-d).

Cross-defendants fail to provide statutory authority to grant their motion under sections 435 and 436. These sections apply to pleadings; a request for dismissal is not a pleading. However, the court does have authority to grant the relief requested under sections 473 and 581.

The court finds the Coastal Act claims were not litigated in phase 1 such that trial had commenced on those claims. Coastal Act claims were explicitly reserved for phase 2. No specific testimony was taken on those issues. VRMA and the Tennis Courts Association were not cross-defendants in phase 1. Trial had not commenced as to those issues or those parties when MRCA filed its request for dismissal. Dismissal by MRCA without prejudice is proper as to VRMA and the Tennis Courts Association.

Regarding the individual cross-defendants, on February 5, 2020, the court granted summary adjudication of the Coastal Act claims in their favor. Per case law, for purposes of section 581, trial commenced as to the individuals when summary adjudication was entered in their favor. Therefore, MRCA could only dismiss the Coastal Act claims against the individual cross-defendants with prejudice.

The dismissal will be with prejudice as to all individual cross-defendants. The dismissal is without prejudice as to VRMA and the Tennis Courts Association.

MRCA Motion to Strike/Tax Costs

On August 23, 2022, cross-defendants VRMA and the individual homeowners filed a memorandum of costs seeking $3,617.12 for filing/motion fees, $13,828.97 for deposition costs and $909.42 for electronic filing/service fees. MRCA moves to tax costs in its entirety or, in the alternative, to tax costs.

Cross-defendants’ request for judicial notice of: (1) MRCA’s August 31, 2018, request for dismissal without prejudice; (2) MRCA’s May 6, 2019 request for dismissal without prejudice; (3) the second amended cross-complaint; (4) March 25, 2020 ruling on motion for summary adjudication; and (5) MCRA’s August 18, 2022 request for dismissal without prejudice is GRANTED.

Cross-defendants seek costs as the prevailing parties and argue the requested costs are necessary and reasonable.

MRCA argues the cost bill is premature as there are still claims in dispute, and costs related to the individual cross-defendants should be stricken because the request for dismissal without prejudice was not aimed at the individual cross-defendants. MRCA argues prevailing party is determined by net monetary gain, and there are remaining nuisance claims. Further, MRCA notes many of the claimed costs result from defending against still-remaining nuisance claims.

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b). “‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery….” Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(a).

The court cannot determine prevailing party at this time. The cost bill is premature. GRANTED.