Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: SC126806, Date: 2024-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC126806    Hearing Date: December 16, 2024    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Doe v. Olson, Case no. SC126806

Hearing date December 16, 2024

Plaintiff May Doe’s Motion for Reconsideration

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Curtis Olson’s Motion for Relief from Attorney’s Fees

Defendant Chateau Colline Homeowners Association’s Motions for Terminating Sanctions

Defendant Chateau Colline Homeowners Association’s Motions to Deem RFAs Admitted

Plaintiffs Jane and May Doe, in pro per, and plaintiff John Doe sue defendants Curtis Olson, Nexus Development Corporation, Chateau Colline Homeowners Association (“Chateau”) and 13 others for 38 COAs arising out of alleged sexual assault, battery and harassment. The court ruled 9/5/24 granting a protective order as to May Doe. Min. Order 9/5/24. Plaintiffs move for reconsideration. Defendants oppose. The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees 9/5/24 pursuant to a successful anti-SLAPP motion. Id. Olson moves for relief from attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs oppose. The court granted Chateau’s 9/5/24 motion to compel discovery and granted $1,867.26 in sanctions against plaintiffs. Id. Chateau alleges noncompliance and moves for terminating sanctions and deem RFAs admitted, as well as for monetary sanctions. Plaintiffs oppose.

Plaintiff May Doe’s Motion for Reconsideration

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1008(a) states that: “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.”

The court granted a protective order for May Doe limiting disclosure of her personal information, allowing only her name to be released to defendants. Min. Order 9/5/24. Plaintiffs argue the court should reconsider its order and prevent even May Doe’s name from being disclosed. Plaintiffs argue new facts have been produced, specifically that plaintiffs were able to hire private investigators that identified May Doe using only her first and last name. Plaintiffs assert defendants could also identify May Doe and may intimidate or otherwise threaten her. Plaintiffs offer the declarations of counsel Aaronoff and of private investigators Petee and Woldford in support.

These are not new facts. Plaintiffs have already argued this same speculated risk at the hearing 9/5/24. Min. Order 9/5/24. The court ordered May Doe’s name not to be disclosed outside the course of litigation. This is sufficient protection, in addition to the existing protective order. If plaintiffs become aware of any violations of the court’s orders, they may seek redress at that time. DENIED.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Curtis Olson’s Motion for Relief from Attorney’s Fees

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §473(b) provides: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

Olson asks the court to vacate its 9/5/24 order granting plaintiffs $231,606.25 in attorney’s fees and requests the court revisit its 4/19/23 order for the parties to jointly confer and present an order of remaining outstanding issues. Olson argues the court’s 9/5/24 grant of fees arose from Olson’s counsel’s mistake, whereby Olson switched counsel between the 4/19/23 order and the 9/5/24 hearing, resulting in new counsel failing to prepare a joint order of outstanding issues. Olson additionally argues surprise arising from the court’s inability to access transcripts from 4/19/23 at the 9/5/24 hearing and the court’s subsequent “inability to follow” Olson’s counsel’s arguments. These arguments are unavailing.

Olson’s contention that counsel’s misunderstanding of the court’s orders is reasonable has no merit. If counsel was confused, a request for clarification could have and should have been made. Relief is not appropriate when a party allegedly fails to understand and fails to ask for clarification. Olson cannot argue counsel did not know of the court’s order, as the declaration of counsel demonstrates. See Decl. Eballar generally. That counsel misunderstood the court’s order and prepared an incorrect filing is not grounds for relief. Decl. Eballar para. 13.

Olson’s argument that the court’s lack of 4/19/23 transcript constitutes surprise is equally unavailing. It is incumbent on the parties to lodge supporting evidence prior to hearings. DENIED.

Defendant Chateau Colline Homeowners Association’s Motions for Terminating Sanctions

Where a party willfully disobeys a discovery order, courts have discretion to impose terminating, issue, evidentiary or monetary sanctions. E.g., Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(g), 2030.290(c); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495. Terminating sanctions are authorized where the evidence shows less severe sanctions will not be successful in compelling responses. Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280. Courts may require financial reimbursement for expenses incurred as to misuse of the discovery process. Code Civ. Proc., §2023.030; Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 789, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Guzman v. General Motors Corp. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 438, 444; In re Marriage of Niklas (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 28, 37.

Chateau served form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and request for production on plaintiffs on 9/6/23 and 9/7/23. Min. Order 9/5/24. May Doe served responses 10/16/23; Jane Doe failed to respond. Id. The court ordered further responses from both plaintiffs. Id. The court granted monetary sanctions totaling $1,867.26. Id. Chateau moves for terminating sanctions, arguing further responses were never produced. Decls. Partida paras. 3-5. Chateau seeks $1,050 in additional sanctions.

Plaintiffs argue their failure to produce responses was not willful, and they will have complied with the court’s orders before hearing on the instant matter. Plaintiffs argue withdrawal of previous counsel Martinez-Senftner delayed production. Decl. Martinez-Senftner paras. 4-6. Plaintiffs declare they intended to serve responses prior to the original 12/5/24 hearing date on this matter. Decl. Doe para. 4.

Terminating sanctions are a drastic measure and ought to be employed sparingly. Deyo, supra. Plaintiffs provided evidence the failure to comply was not willful and will be rectified. This is sufficient to survive a motion for terminating sanctions. Chateau is entitled to monetary sanctions for expenses incurred by bringing this motion. Id.; R.S. Creative, Inc., supra. Chateau incurred fees at $220/hour for 6 hours plus $60 in costs totaling $1,320 but only seeks $1,050. Decl. Parida para. 6. Motion DENIED; sanctions awarded as above.

Defendant Chateau Colline Homeowners Association’s Motions to Deem RFAs Admitted

When a party fails to timely respond to written discovery requests, including interrogatories and requests for production of documents, propounding party can move for an order compelling a response without objections. Code of Civ. Proc. §2023.290. If a party fails to serve timely responses to requests for admission, the requesting party can move for an order deeming the truth of any matter specified in the requests admitted. Code of Civ. Proc. §2033.280.

Chateau served requests for admission, set one, on plaintiffs 9/5/24. Decl. Partida exh. A. Plaintiffs failed to respond. Decl. Partida para. 5. Chateau moves to deems RFAs admitted and for monetary sanctions totaling $690. Plaintiffs argue Jane Doe was improperly served via electronic mail and May Doe was not served at all. Jane Doe asserts she communicated with Chateau’s counsel that electronic mail was not working and requested service via U.S. mail multiple times. Decl. Doe paras. 3-10. May Doe asserts neither she nor her counsel, Aaronoff, were served. Decl. Aaronoff paras. 3-5. Plaintiffs argue they provided compliant responses to the RFAs. Decl. Doe para. 12; Decl. Aaronoff para. 6.

Chateau argues plaintiffs have not provided sufficient responses as they included objections, which Chateau argues are improper due to the untimeliness of the responses. “A motion to have the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests for admission deemed admitted should not be granted when (1) proposed responses to the requests are served before the hearing date and (2) those responses are in substantial compliance with CCP Sections 2033.210-2033.240.” Tobin v. Oris (1992) 3 Cal. App. 4th 814. A party has the right to partially denial and partially admit a request, as well. Chodos v. Superior Court (1963), 215 Cal.App.2d 318, 322. Chateau’s argument is unavailing; while tardy, plaintiffs’ responses are sufficient despite their inclusion of objections.

Monetary sanctions are mandatory against a party whose failure to respond to requests for admissions necessitates a motion. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §2033.280(c). It is undeniable that plaintiffs were tardy in their responses, necessitating the instant motion. Chateau claims $220/hour for 4 hours plus $60 in costs totaling $940, but requests only $690 in sanctions.

Motion is DENIED; sanctions are awarded as above.

Summary