Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: SC126958, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: SC126958 Hearing Date: February 9, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
David Houck
v. James L. Barber, Case No. SC126958
Hearing Date
February 9, 2024
Defendant Barber’s
Motion to Strike or Tax Costs; Briefing Regarding Costs after Trial
Defendant Barber
moves to tax or strike plaintiff Houck’s memorandum of costs after trial. At
the initial hearing, the court asked the parties to brief the following threshold
questions: (1) who was prevailing party under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §1032 and
(2) what is the basis for Houck’s claim to fees/costs.
Cal. Code of Civ.
Proc. §1032 provides the prevailing party entitled to recover costs. A
prevailing party includes “the party with a net monetary recovery.” Cal. Code
of Civ. Proc. §1032(a)(4). If no party prevailed according to the statute, the
court “may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the
parties.” Id.
In its judgment
the court awarded Houck a prescriptive easement, an injunction preventing
Barber from interfering with the easement and damages of $11,000. Houck argues
the damages award makes him the prevailing party under §1032.
DeSaulles v.
Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula held a plaintiff who obtains a net
monetary recovery is prevailing party under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §1032, even
if the recovery was partial or most of plaintiff’s causes of action were
defeated. DeSaulles, supra, (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1157,
citing Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198-1199
(“[A]lthough 11 of the plaintiff’s causes of action were not successful,
plaintiff’s success on the 12th cause of action for a jury award of
$63,000 entitled a plaintiff to costs.”). Subsequent cases adhered to that
ruling and concluded a trial court has no discretion to deny costs under §1032
to a party obtaining a net monetary recovery, regardless of any gap between the
party’s litigation objectives and the amount ultimately obtained. See, e.g.,
Vought Construction, Inc. v. Stock (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 622, 635.
The court has
discretion, however, to deny all or a portion of the prevailing party’s costs where
the “prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a
limited civil case.” Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §1033.
The judgment for $11,000
was for trees and nuisance. Barber was awarded nothing. Houck is the party with
a net recovery. Under DeSaulles, it is immaterial that Houck failed on ten
of his eleven causes of action and received a significantly smaller monetary
award than he sought. As Houck obtained a net monetary award, he is the
prevailing party.
Barber argues the
court should exercise discretion under §1033 and award no costs, since Houck’s
$11,000 award is beneath the $25,000 jurisdictional ceiling for limited civil court.
This ignores the other categories of relief Houck obtained. In addition to
$11,000 in damages, the court awarded a prescriptive easement over a portion of
Barber’s land adjacent to the driveway. A limited civil court cannot determine
existence of an easement or issue injunctive relief. Section 1033 does not
permit the court to “split” its judgment, looking only at the amount of money
awarded to determine whether the case could have been heard in limited civil
court. The final judgment included relief a limited civil court cannot award. Section1033
does not apply, so the court lacks discretion to deny costs outright. Under
§1032 and binding caselaw interpreting it, Houck is the prevailing party. The
court has no discretion to apportion costs or conclude that neither party
prevailed, regardless of the gap between Houck’s litigation objectives and the
relief he ultimately obtained. Houck prevailed and is entitled to an award of
reasonably necessary costs.
Barber’s motion to
tax argues three categories ($12,155.26 in deposition costs, $10,975 in mediation
costs and approximately $777 in filing fees) are unreasonable. In reply, Barber
presents no further argument as to the filing fees, which the court will treat
as an admission that they are recoverable. Even if Barber had argued, the court
finds filing fees reasonable.
The cost of
“taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions” is
recoverable by a §1032 prevailing party if the costs are reasonably necessary
to the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its
preparation. Code of Civ. Proc. §1033.5(a)(3)(A); Davis v. KGO-TV, Inc. (1998)
17 Cal.4th 436, 441. The recovery of deposition costs does not depend on
whether the deponent ultimately testifies at trial. Garcia v. Tempur-Pedic
North America, LLC (2024) 316 Cal.Rptr.3d 898, 902 (“[C]ourts routinely
refuse to tax costs on the ground that a deponent did not end up testifying or
providing useful testimony at trial[.]”)
Houck seeks to
recover $12,155.26 for twelve depositions. Barber argues since Houck lost on
all but one of his causes of action, the depositions were not reasonably
necessary. Houck argues no authority supports Barber’s argument that deposition
costs can be disallowed merely because the prevailing party lost on one or more
claims. Nonetheless, the court has discretion to determine whether it was
“reasonable” for Houck to depose certain witnesses, and the reasonableness of
the prevailing party’s causes of action is relevant to this analysis.
Barber seeks to
disallow fees associated with depositions of Jack Garvey, David Tokushige, Michael
Schaaf, Steve Frankel and Michael Sanders. The memorandum of costs worksheet attached
to the Lorman declaration indicates Houck does not seek costs associated with
the Garvey deposition.
Lorman admits
witnesses Schaaf and Tokushige offered opinions related to Houck’s adverse possession
claim. Lorman decl. ¶13. That cause of action lacked merit, evinced by Houck’s
stipulation to a nonsuit. It was unreasonable to bring that claim, so the court
finds costs associated with it are also unreasonable and are taxed.
Costs associated
with the Frankel deposition are similarly unrecoverable; Barber named Frankel
to refute Houck’s claim for damages due to inability to sell the property. Houck
ultimately abandoned that claim, and the vast gulf between the damages Houck
sought and those awarded indicates the amount initially requested was
unreasonable. Since Frankel was called to refute an unreasonable request for
damages, the court finds in its discretion that Houck’s costs associated with
deposing him are taxed.
Sanders provided
expert testimony as to the value of the disputed area. This was relevant to
Houck’s requests for an easement, an issue that lay at the core of this case
and was litigated at both stages of trial. It was reasonable and necessary for
this witness to be called and for Houck to depose him. Houck is entitled to
costs associated with his deposition.
The court grants
the motion to tax costs by $941.50 for Tokushige, $897.10 for Schaaf and
$313.95 for Frankel, a total reduction of $2,152.55.
Mediator’s fees
are not an allowable cost under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §1033.5, but a court
has discretion to award. Gibson v. Bobroff (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1202,
1209-1210; Berkeley Cement, Inc. v. Regents of University of California (2019)
30 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1140-1143.
Houck requests
$11,091 in mediator fees. This includes $1,945 for mediation with Judge Collins
before litigation began. Lorman decl., exh. 2. Under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc.
§1032(b), a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs “in any action or
proceeding.” The statute does not allow costs incurred before the action began.
This amount is therefore unrecoverable.
The other
mediation costs are recoverable subject to court discretion. Granting these
costs would violate the public policy behind mediation. Courts encourage
mediation as a timely and cost-effective method for resolving disputes and
saving judicial resources. Code of Civ. Proc. §1775. Barber notes if losing
parties are penalized through post-judgment cost awards for participating in voluntary
mediation, litigants would be reluctant to agree to mediate. The policy in
favor of mediation is best served by requiring parties to bear their own
mediation costs.
$11,091 in costs
associated with mediation will be taxed. Houck’s costs are taxed by $13,243.55,
for a final cost award of $20,196.84.
GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.