Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: SC127317, Date: 2023-05-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: SC127317    Hearing Date: May 16, 2023    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Ferri v. Devgan Enterprises et al., Case No. SC127317

Hearing Date May 16, 2023

Scope of Phase II of Trial

 

Trial was bifurcated, with liability preceding damages. At phase one, the court found in favor of Devgan on the cross-complaint against Ferri for conversion of personal property from the restaurant location, including ceiling fixtures, lights and kitchen equipment. The court found Ferri’s cause of action for breach of contract failed because the underlying contract was illegal.

 

On March 17, 2023 the court ordered the parties to briefs the scope of phase II of trial. Ferri seeks to submit evidence of his capital investment and claim restitution because the underlying lease contract was found to be illegal.

 

While restitution can be awarded as an alternative to breach of contract damages when the underlying contract is illegal, Ferri did not allege a restitution theory until now. Ferri’s operative pleadings, the first amended complaint, filed 8/26/2019, included causes of action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and fraud. It did not include an alternatively pleaded claim for restitution, quasi-contract or any common count that would allow him to recover his investment in the event the contract was deemed illegal.

 

Had the pleading included claims for quasi-contract, restitution, or quantum meruit, these theories could have been argued at trial in the alternative to Ferri’s breach of contract claim. They were not included in the FAC, nor were they argued during trial. It would be unjust and prejudicial, at this late stage, to allow Ferri to introduce a new, unpleaded theory of equitable liability after discovery has closed and most of the issues have been litigated. At phase I one of the trial, Ferri argued all legal theories alleged his pleading. Restitution or unjust enrichment is a new legal theory, not included in Ferri’s pleading, so cannot be introduced for the first time at phase II of trial.

 

It would be unjust and prejudicial, at this late stage, to allow Ferri to introduce a new, unpleaded theory of liability after discovery closed and phase I of the trial was held. At phase I, Ferri was permitted to argue all legal claims at issue by his pleading. He cannot now introduce a new cause of action after his pleaded claims have failed.

 

Phase II will be limited to evidence regarding Devgan’s damages as a result of Ferri’s conversion of personal property.