Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 19STCV15400, Date: 2022-08-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV15400    Hearing Date: August 26, 2022    Dept: A

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALLEGATIONS:

Naphtali Del Villar ("Naphtali"), Quetzali Del Villar ("Quetzali"), Itzel Del Villar ("Itzel"), and Kaleb Del Villa, a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Scarlett Del Villar ("Kaleb", and collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed suit against the California Department of Transportation ("Caltrans"), alleging that Jose Luis Del Villar ("Decedent") was involved in a multi-vehicle collision on May 29, 2018 on the transition between the SR-134 WB freeway and the SR-2 WB freeway (“Subject Roadway”), which resulted in his death.

Plaintiffs also filed suit against David Lee Walker ("Walker"), Patricia Ann Crider ("Crider"), Gus Paul Nanos ("Nanos"), and H.L. Moe Co. ("HLMC"), alleging that these defendants were driving at the time and location of the collision and ran over Decedent.

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Caltrans ("Caltrans Complaint") on May 2, 2019, alleging two causes of action: (1) Wrongful Death and (2) Dangerous Condition of Public Property.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Walker, Crider, Nanos, and HLMC ("Driver Complaint") on January 13, 2020, alleging a single cause of action for Wrongful Death.

HLMC filed a Cross-Complaint ("HXC") against Walker and Crider on September 9, 2020, alleging three causes of action: (1) Declaratory Relief; (2) Implied Indemnity; and (3) Apportionment of Fault.

Walker filed a Cross-Complaint ("WXC") against Crider, Nanos, and HLMC on October 1, 2020, alleging four causes of action: (1) Indemnity; (2) Apportionment of Fault; (3) Comparative Fault; and (4) Declaratory Relief.

Crider filed a Cross-Complaint ("CXC") against Walker on December 1, 2020, alleging three causes of action: (1) Equitable Indemnity; (2) Declaratory Relief; and (3) Comparative Contribution.

Nanos and HLMC filed a Cross-Complaint (“NXC”) against Walker and Crider on June 29, 2022, alleging three causes of action: (1) Declaratory Relief; (2) Apportionment of Fault; and (3) Implied Indemnity.

HISTORY:

This case was related with Case No. 20STCV01350 on October 8, 2020, with the instant action as the leading case.

The Court received the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Walker on May 20, 2022. The Court has not received any opposition or reply.

The Court received the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Caltrans on June 10, 2022; the opposition filed by Plaintiffs on August 18, 2022; and the reply filed by Caltrans on August 19, 2022.

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Walker moves for summary judgment as to the Driver Complaint; and, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to unspecified issues.

Caltrans moves for summary judgment as to the Caltrans Complaint.

ANALYSIS:

MSJ (by Walker)

I.          LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP § 437c(a).) To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c).) In other words, the opposing party cannot present contrary admissible evidence to raise a triable factual dispute.

“A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court must consider all inferences from the evidence, even those contradicted by the moving party’s evidence. The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, "the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 171, 179.)

With a summary judgment motion, a three-step analysis is required of the trial court. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Nat’l Bank (1986) 179 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 1064–65.) First, the trial court must identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading. (Ibid.) Secondly, the court must determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor. (Ibid.) When a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Ibid.)

II.        MERITS

A.    First Cause of Action (Wrongful Death)

The elements of a cause of action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263.)  

A complaint for damages for negligent injury to person or property must allege: (1) defendant's legal duty of care toward plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach of duty, i.e., the negligent act or omission; (3) injury to plaintiff as a result of the breach, i.e., proximate or legal cause; and (4) damage to plaintiff. (Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 1117.)

Walker argues that Plaintiffs cannot show that Walker drove negligently in relation to the accident that caused Decedent’s death. Walker cites to his own declaration for evidence that he was driving at or lower than 65 miles per hour when approaching the transition road tunnel, that he was not charged with any traffic violations or citations relating to his driving on the day of the accident, and that the officer on scene, Officer Andrew Lloyd (“Officer Lloyd”), did not consider Walker as a cause of the accident. (Decl. Walker, ¶¶ 3, 12, 16, 17; Compendium of Evidence (“COE”), Exh. D Lloyd Depo. 92:24-93:2.) Walker also cites to the Lloyd Deposition and asserts that the speed limit on the relevant road was 65 miles per hour. (COE, Exh. D Lloyd Depo. 53:14-18.)

The Court finds that Walker satisfies his prima facie burden to show that the wrongful death claim based on negligent driving cannot be established. Plaintiffs have not submitted opposition and so do not satisfy their corresponding burden to show a triable issue of material fact on the claim.

III.       CONCLUSION

The Court thus grants the instant motion.

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MSJ (by Caltrans)

I.          LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP § 437c(a).) To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c).) In other words, the opposing party cannot present contrary admissible evidence to raise a triable factual dispute.

“A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court must consider all inferences from the evidence, even those contradicted by the moving party’s evidence. The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, "the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 171, 179.)

With a summary judgment motion, a three-step analysis is required of the trial court. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Nat’l Bank (1986) 179 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 1064–65.) First, the trial court must identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading. (Ibid.) Secondly, the court must determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor. (Ibid.) When a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Ibid.)

II.        PROCEDURAL DEFECTS AND UNTIMELINESS

First, Plaintiffs submitted their objections combined with their separate statement in violation of CRC Rule 3.1354(b), which requires that objections be served and filed separately from other papers. Second, Plaintiffs filed their opposition briefing and associated filings on August 18, 2022, three days after the opposition filing deadline on August 15, 2022. Caltrans objects to the opposition in light of the delay and argue that this delay has prejudiced its ability to respond properly to the opposition.

The Court finds that these issues are de minimis in light of the circumstances of the case and the instant motion, and further considers that Caltrans was able to file a complete reply. The Court will rule on the merits of the motion and consider all materials filed by both parties.

III.       OBJECTIONS

A.    Plaintiffs’ Objections

Plaintiffs’ combined objections and separate statement filing does not appear to contain any actual objections.

B.     Caltrans’ Objections

The Court overrules each of Caltrans’ objections despite Plaintiff’s procedural and timeliness violations based on the reasoning stated above.  The objection to the Declaration of Edward Ruzak is overruled.

IV.       MERITS

The TAC alleges a wrongful death cause of action and a dangerous condition of public property cause of action against Caltrans, both based on the allegation that the transition road tunnel where the accident occurred was in a dangerous condition due to improper lighting and the design of the roadway at the location of the accident, a transition point between the SR-134 WB freeway and the SR-2 WB freeway.

Gov. Code § 835 establishes that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property” where a plaintiff establishes several conditions. To prevail, the plaintiff must show that (1) the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; (2) the dangerous condition caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury incurred; and (4a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the condition or (4b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in time to have taken measures to protect against it. (Gov. Code § 835; see also Song X. Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1183.) A dangerous condition is “a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code §830(a).) “The existence of a dangerous condition is usually a question of fact, but may be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion.” (Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1194, as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 28, 1995).)

First, Caltrans argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish that there was a dangerous condition at the Subject Roadway that caused Decedent’s accident. Caltrans cites to the lack of substantially similar accidents in the area through the Declaration of Christian Engelmann (“Engelmann”), a registered Civil Engineer, as evidence. (Decl. Englemann, ¶¶ 17, 21-25, 27, 38, 40, Exh. E.) Second, Caltrans argues that Decedent did not exercise due care or use the roadway in a foreseeable manner, citing to the Englemann Declaration, the deposition of Andrew Lloyd (“Lloyd”), another investigator on scene, the GoPro footage found at the accident scene, and the deposition testimony of Officer Adam Eggleston (“Eggleston”), the California Highway Patrol Officer who specializes in vehicle collision investigations and worked the accident scene. (Defendant’s Appendix of Evidence (“Appendix”), Exh. L Eggleston Depo., 15:17-22:4, 45:23-46:3, 46:11-66:6; Exh. N Lloyd Depo., 75:18-23, 75:24-76:5, 75:24-77:13, 77:23-78:8, 78:13-79:1, 78:13-79:1.)

Caltrans argues that Eggleston’s testimony and GoPro footage captured from the perspective of Decedent show that Decedent was splitting lines while traveling at between 80 and 101 miles per hour prior to the accident, although it does not show the accident itself. Third, Caltrans argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish that State employees had actual or constructive notice of any alleged dangerous condition. Fourth and finally, Caltrans argues that it is protected by design immunity, citing to paragraph 24 of the Caltrans Complaint itself to show a causal relationship between the roadway design and the accident; to the Engelmann Declaration to show that the design was approved by public employees with discretionary authority (Decl. Engelmann, ¶¶ 30-36, 40, Exh. E); and to the Engelmann Declaration again to show the reasonableness of the roadway design (Decl. Engelmann, ¶ 37, Exhs. E, J, K).

The Court finds that Caltrans sufficiently satisfies its prima facie burden to show that each element of the dangerous condition of public property cause of action cannot be established. The Court also finds that Caltrans has sufficiently established its entitlement to design immunity. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiffs to show a triable issue of material fact for this cause of action, and to show that design immunity is inapplicable.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that a triable issue exists as to whether there is a confusing contradiction between the posted speed limit at the Subject Roadway and the stated safe speed, given the reduced stopping sight distance of the transition point. Plaintiffs do not cite to any evidence to support their argument, but do cite to the Englemann Declaration as a basis for their stated contradiction. The Court will nonetheless review the Declaration of Edward Ruzak (“Ruzak”), a registered civil engineer, which was filed as evidence by Plaintiffs but not cited in the opposition briefing.

Ruzak reasons that if the posted speed limit at the Subject Roadway was 65 miles per hour and the “safe speed” for the roadway was 61 miles per hour, it is foreseeable that drivers may travel faster than the “safe speed” on the roadway, because the posted speed limit is higher than the designed safe speed. (Decl. Ruzak, ¶¶ 13-17.) Ruzak concludes that it was thus necessary for the State to have placed advance curve warning signage, as well as an advisory speed plate for the Subject Roadway. (Decl. Ruzak, ¶ 18.)

First, neither Plaintiffs nor Ruzak have addressed Caltrans’ showing that Plaintiffs cannot establish that a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or that Caltrans had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in time to have taken measures to protect against it, pursuant to Gov. Code § 835. Second, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that design immunity is inapplicable. The sole fact that Ruzak, Plaintiffs’ civil engineer, disagrees with the opinion of Englemann, Caltrans’ civil engineer, on reasonableness, does not serve to raise a triable issue on whether there is substantial evidence of the reasonableness of the design of the roadway for the purposes of design immunity. (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 941.)

The Court need not analyze further. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their corresponding burden to show that there exists a triable issue of material fact as to the dangerous condition of public property cause of action. As the wrongful death cause of action relies on the claims alleged in the dangerous condition cause of action, Plaintiffs have also not satisfied their burden on the wrongful death cause of action.

V.        CONCLUSION

The Court thus grants the instant motion in its entirety.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records.

ORDER

Defendant California Department of Transportation’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant David Lee Walker’s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on August 26, 2022, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY CALTRANS IS GRANTED.

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY WALKER IS GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE:  August 26, 2022                               _______________________________

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge

                                                                        Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles