Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 20BBCV00507, Date: 2022-07-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20BBCV00507 Hearing Date: July 29, 2022 Dept: A
|
MP: |
Defendants Green Solar Technologies, Inc., a California
Corporation; Green Solar Tech California, a California Corporation; Green
Solar Enterprises, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company |
|
RP: |
Plaintiff Milan REI VIII, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company |
ALLEGATIONS:
Milan REI VIII, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company ("Plaintiff") filed suit against Green Solar
Technologies, Inc., a California Corporation ("GST."); Green Solar
Tech California, a California Corporation ("GSTCA"); Green Solar
Enterprises, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company ("GSE", and
together with GST and GSTCA, "GST Defendants"); Nicki Zvik
("Zvik"); and Shay Yavor ("Yavor", and collectively, "Defendants"),
alleging that GST Defendants, controlled by Zvik and Yavor, breached the lease
agreement between the parties and held unlawful possession of Plaintiff's real
property, located at 6400 Laurel Canyon Boulevard, Suites 400, 450, 460, and
490, North Hollywood ("Subject Property").
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on August 8, 2020,
alleging 3 causes of action: (1) Breach of Lease; (2) Trespass; and (3)
Interference with Contractual Relations.
PRESENTATION:
The Court received the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings filed by GST Defendants on July 18, 2022; the
opposition filed by Plaintiff also on July 18, 2022; and the reply filed by GST
Defendants on July 21, 2022.
The Court received the Motion for Leave
to Amend Answer filed by GST Defendants on June 29, 2022; the opposition filed
by Plaintiff on July 18, 2022; and the reply filed by GST Defendants on July
19, 2022.
RELIEF REQUESTED:
GST Defendants move for judgment on the
pleadings as to the Complaint.
GST Defendants move for leave to file a first
amended answer.
ANALYSIS:
Judgment on the Pleadings
I. LEGAL
STANDARD
A defendant may move for judgment on the
pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against that defendant.” (CCP §438(b)(1) & (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “A
motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to
the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]” (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) “A
motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general
demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings
or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic
evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (Citations Omitted).) The standard for ruling on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable
to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with
matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian
v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)
II. REQUEST
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
GST Defendants request the Court take judicial
notice of Exhibits A and B, represented as an Unlawful Detainer Complaint for
Case No. 19BBCV00827 (“Prior Unlawful Detainer”) and a Judgment on Special
Verdict for the same case, respectively.
The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A
and B pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d).
III. MERITS
First, GST Defendants argue that each claim in
the instant action is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and
the one-action rule because Plaintiff has already successfully sued GST
Defendants in the Prior Unlawful Detainer and obtained holdover damages in the
amount of $92,163.12, as well as an award of attorney’s fees and costs. GST
Defendants argue that each claim in this complaint is based on the same
holdover damages, and so the complaint cannot be maintained. Second, GST
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot pursue a trespass claim after
successfully litigating an unlawful detainer action based on holdover as a
matter of law, citing to Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1063 and Vandenberg v. Superior Court (Centennial Insurance
Company) (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815. Third, GST Defendants argue that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for the tortious interference of contract cause of
action. Fourth and finally, GST Defendants argue that the complaint does not
properly plead the alter ego allegation, and so the two individual defendants,
Zvik and Yavor should be dismissed from the action.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that this
action seeks damages that accrued after entry of the Prior Unlawful Detainer
judgment, that were not recoverable in the Prior Unlawful Detainer. Plaintiff
asserts that the Prior Unlawful Detainer did not determine whether GST
Defendants committed misconduct after judgment was entered, and that those
claims are brought in the instant action. Plaintiff argues that this action is
proper because unlawful detainer actions are summary proceedings with limited
preclusive effect.
A.
Procedural Context and Case History
On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against
all Defendants involving the same Subject Property in a prior action with Case
No. BC586898 (“Prior Action”), alleging that they breached the lease by failing
to pay rent. In September of 2016, the parties settled their claims and
requested the Court retain jurisdiction.
On September 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a
commercial unlawful detainer suit involving the same Subject Property against
only GST with Case No. 19BBCV00827 (“Prior Unlawful Detainer”). The court entered
judgment for Plaintiff in this case on November 26, 2019 for possession of the
Subject Property and holdover damages in the sum of $92,163.12 as a result of
Defendant remaining in possession after August 15, 2019.
B.
Res Judicata; Collateral Estoppel; One-Action Rule
Res judicata, or claim preclusion,
prevents the relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between
the same parties or parties in privity with them. (Gabriel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 547,
556.) For collateral estoppel, prior judgment operates in a second suit
based on a different cause of action as an estoppel as to issues in the second
action that were actually litigated and determined in the first action. (People
v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 252.) Res judicata or collateral
estoppel apply if: “(1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is
identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior
proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party
against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior proceeding.” (Boekenn v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
(2010) 48 Cal. 4th 788, 797.)
The Complaint requests holdover damages and
other fees against Defendants for alleged unlawful possession from November 23,
2019 through December 18, 2019, as well as other associated costs and legal
fees incurred. The damages associated with this period of possession differs
from the damages awarded in the Prior Unlawful Detainer for the period of
August 15, 2019 through the November 21, 2019 jury verdict. Plaintiff is
correct in that an unlawful detainer action generally has a very narrow
preclusive effect limited to issues that were fully tried. (Gombiner v. Swartz
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371.) As the Prior Unlawful Detainer tried only
the issues of possession and holdover damages relating to the period of August
15, 2019 through November 21, 2019, the judgment does not bar the instant
action, which, on review of the Complaint, seeks holdover and other associated
damages relating to alleged unlawful possession from November 23, 2019 through
December 18, 2019. (Complaint, ¶¶ 35, 43, 46.) The same rationale applies
to GST Defendants’ trespass estoppel argument.
GST Defendants argue that the one-action rule
precludes Plaintiff from “seeking a second bite of the apple when asserting a
claim based upon the exact legal theory and claim for damages previously sought
and fully adjudicated.” (Mov., 6:19-21.) This definition describes a term more
akin to res judicata. The one-action rule bars creditors from initiating
more than one form of action for the recovery of debt secured by a mortgage or
deed of trust on real property. (Walker v. Community Bank (1974) 10
Cal.3d 729, 733-34.) No such debt is alleged here.
C.
Third Cause of Action (Interference with Contractual
Relations)
Intentional interference with contract requires
proof of (1) a valid and existing contract between the plaintiff and a third
party, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the contract and intent to induce
breach, (3) the plaintiff’s breach of contract (4) caused by defendant’s
unjustified or wrongful conduct, and (5) damages. (Dryden v. Tri-Valley
Growers (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 990, 995.)
GST Defendants argue that the elements of
intent, breach, and damages are not met.
On review of the Complaint, the Court finds
that the pleading sufficiently alleges: (1) a valid lease agreement between
Plaintiff and a new lessee (Complaint, ¶ 49); (2) GST Defendant’s knowledge of
the contract and intent to induce a breach (Complaint, ¶¶ 50, 52); (3)
Plaintiff’s breach of the lease agreement (Complaint, ¶ 51) (4) caused by
GST Defendants’ wrongful conduct (Complaint, ¶ 51); and (5) Plaintiff’s damages
(Complaint, ¶ 53). None of the damages are facially related to the holdover
damages relating to the Prior Unlawful Detainer.
D.
Claims Against Zvik and Yavor
Zvik and Yavor were dismissed without prejudice
from the action on July 12, 2022. This issue is thus moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court denies the instant
motion.
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Leave to File Amended Answer
I. LEGAL
STANDARD
California courts employ a liberal approach to
amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all
disputes between parties in the same action. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972)
6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend will
normally be granted unless (a) the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in
bringing the proposed amendment; and (b) the delay in seeking leave to amend
will cause prejudice to an opposing party. (Hirsa v. Superior Court
(1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Absent a showing of prejudice, delay in
seeking an amendment alone does not justify denial of leave to amend. (Higgins
v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-65.)
III. MERITS
GST Defendants assert that current counsel was substituted
in on June 23, 2021 and has only recently discovered facts that led to the
proposed First Amended Answer (“FAA”). (Decl. Stanley, ¶ 2.) GST Defendants
argue that they did not file the instant motion sooner because Plaintiff never
filed a Notice of Related Case, and because their counsel assumed that the case
would be dismissed or settled prior to trial, due to the lack of activity in
the case during the past year. (Decl. Stanley, ¶ 2.)
GST Defendants have been dilatory in seeking
amendment. It is the responsibility of counsel to adequately prepare for a case
when assuming responsibility as counsel for a party: GST Defendants’ arguments
concerning the lack of a Notice of Related Case and their assumption that the
case would easily be dismissed or settled are thus unavailing. It is further no
fault of Plaintiff’s that GST Defendants’ past counsel somehow missed the prior
case history between Plaintiff and GST Defendants. This case is coming up on
two full years, with trial set to begin within three weeks of the instant
hearing date. However, given that Plaintiff is seeking a 120 day continuance
for discovery related matters, the Court believes denying the leave to amend
would not be appropriate considering California’s policy of liberality in
allowing amended pleadings, as well as the large number of discovery motions
coming up on calendar, and grants the instant motion, along with a continuance
of trial.
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RULING:
In the event the parties submit on this
tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its
discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either
electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s
records.
ORDER
Defendants Green
Solar Technologies, Inc., a California Corporation; Green Solar Tech
California, a California Corporation; Green Solar Enterprises, LLC, a Nevada
Limited Liability Company's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for
Leave to File Amended Answer came on regularly for hearing on July 29, 2022,
with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and
the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as
follows:
THE
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS DENIED.
THE
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED ANSWER IS GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE:
July 29, 2022
_______________________________
F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior
Court of California
County of Los Angeles