Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 21BBCV00512, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT PER CRC 3.1308

The Court will attempt to post all Tentative Rulings at least the day prior to the hearing by 3:00 p.m.; however, the Court does not post Tentative Rulings for all matters.  

The
Court will indicate in the Tentative Ruling whether the Court is requesting oral argument.  For cases where the Court is not requesting argument, then pursuant to
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is
required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no
argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the
court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention
to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the
court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”   



Notice
may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818)
260-8412.

Notice of the ruling must be served as indicated in the tentative.  Remote appearances are permitted for all law and motion unless otherwise indicated by the Court.  

 

Case Number: 21BBCV00512    Hearing Date: March 15, 2024    Dept: A

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

 

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

 

ALLEGATIONS: 

 

Before the Court is a motion for attorney’s fees brought by Tim Ditty (Ditty) as against Rosemead Holdings, LLC (Plaintiff). Ditty seeks to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to C.C.P. § 2033.420. C.C.P. § 2033.420 allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees where a moving party has demonstrated the opposing party denied a Request for Admission (RFA) without a good faith belief that they would succeed at trial. Ditty argues that Plaintiff failed to admit Ditty had no personal liability for a lease agreement between Plaintiff and Ditty Container Company, Inc. (DCCI).

 

The Court notes that this motion is brought post judgment. Judgment was entered on September 26, 2023 after bench trial. Judgment was entered in favor of Ditty.

 

Also in a related footnote, the Defendant requests the Court rule on the sanctions request initiated pre-trial concerning discovery.   The Court deferred this request until after all the facts necessary to determine whether there was an appropriate good faith basis to contest compliance.  Ditty Container, Inc. previously brought Motions to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted, Motion to Compel Reponses to Interrogatories, Motion to Compel Responses to Inspection Demands for which the Court tentatively determined sanctions of $1,530 may be warranted.  Having heard all the evidence in the case, the Court finds the sanctions previously requested are warranted.

  

ANALYSIS: 

 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

 

C.C.P. § 2033.420 states:

 

a)      If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.

 

b)      The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following:

 

1.      An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290.

 

2.      The admission sought was of no substantial importance.

 

3.      The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter.

 

4.      There was other good reason for the failure to admit.

 

“When a party denies an RFA, the question is not whether a reasonable litigant would have denied the RFAs. Nor is the question simply whether the litigant had some minimum quantum of evidence to support its denial (i.e., ‘probable cause’). The relevant question is whether the litigant had a reasonable, good faith belief he or she would prevail on the issue at trial. Consideration of this question requires not only an assessment of the substantiality of the evidence for and against the issue known or available to the party, but also the credibility of that evidence, the likelihood that it would be admissible at trial and persuasive to the trier of fact, the relationship of the issue to other issues anticipated to be part of trial (including the issue’s importance), the party’s efforts to investigate the issue and obtain further evidence, and the overall state of discovery at the time of the denials and thereafter.” (Samsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal. App. 5th 517, 526 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

 

“Unlike other discovery sanctions, an award of expenses... is not a penalty. Instead, it is designed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a party in proving the truth of a requested admission... such that trial would have been expedited or shortened if the request had been admitted.” (American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 247, 267 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

 

“If a party who denies a request for admission lacks personal knowledge but had available sources of information and failed to make a reasonable investigation, the failure will justify an award of sanctions. In order to be of substantial importance, a request for admission should have some direct relationship to an issue which, if not proven, would have altered the results of the case. There is no requirement, however, that the fact in question is one that would have altered the determination of the ultimate issue.” (Rosales v. Thermex-Thermatron, Inc. (1988) 67 Cal. App. 4th 187, 198 [citation omitted].)

 

II.                 MERITS

 

Facts

 

The RFA in question are Ditty’s RFA Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 7. These requests are as follows:

 

Request No. 1: Admit that TIM DITTY, as an individual, was never a tenant of 2200 and 2226 Rosemead Blvd., South El Monte, Ca. (hereinafter “the PROPERTY”). As used herein, TIM DITTY refers to TIM DITTY as an individual.

 

Request No. 2: Admit the previous owner of the PROPERTY never indicated to Plaintiff Rosemead Holdings, LLC (Hereinafter “YOU” or “YOUR”) that TIM DITTY was a tenant of the PROPERTY.

 

Request No. 3: Admit TIM DITTY is not liable to YOU for any rent.

 

Request No. 7: Admit there was never any proper service on any defendant of notice of an increase in rent served by YOU.

 

Ditty argues that Plaintiff had no reasonable good faith belief that they would prevail on the issue of his personal liability at trial. Plaintiff points to the Statement of Decision, issued by this Court on September 26, 2023, which stated “Plaintiff presented no evidence that Mr. Ditty personally entered into a lease agreement with the prior landlord, was a personal guarantor of the lease, or is otherwise liable under the alter-ego theory for the oral agreement with DCCI.” (Statement of Decision pgs. 4-5.)

 

Proof of Fact

 

Costs of proof are recoverable only where the moving party actually proves the matters that are the subject of the requests. (Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 529.) This means evidence must be introduced. (Id.)

 

Plaintiff argues CCP § 2033.420 requires Ditty, and Ditty alone, to have affirmatively introduced evidence specifically proving that he had no personal liability. In support of this interpretation Plaintiff cites to Evid. Code § 190’s definition of “proof” and Evid. Code § 140’s definition of “evidence.” While the Court does not dispute that these are the statutory definitions for these terms, they cannot be defined in a vacuum.

 

The Court agrees with Ditty that an analysis of cases involving CCP § 2033.420 is required to ascertain what is meant by proving the truth of the matter. Ditty cites to Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services, which held that proof of fact could still be established even in cases where nonsuit was granted. (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 692.) The Doe court distinguished its case from Stull v. Sparrow, a case relied upon by Plaintiff. Stull concerned an instance where a party refused to admit an RFA matter, then later testified to its truth before trial commenced. (Stull v. Sparrow (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 860, 865.) The Stull court held that because no evidence had ever been submitted to a trier of fact, a determination of proof could not be made to support an award. (Id.) The Doe court contrasted Stull, stating that proof of fact could be found where trial had started, and defendants were required to present evidence. (Doe supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at 692.)

 

Here, unlike both Stull and Doe, the Court has rendered a final verdict on the merits after the presentation of evidence at trial. The statute is silent as to whether evidence must solely come from the party seeking the award. Plaintiff argues that Ditty has not produced evidence because the evidence relied on, namely the two estoppel certificates, were provided as joint exhibits. Plaintiff provides no legal authority from its argument. The Court finds the argument unpersuasive. Where the lease of real property and the relevant contract are in dispute, it stands to reason that the contract between the parties would be offered as evidence by either party or both. The fact that Plaintiff also submitted the certificates as evidence does not negate the fact that the Court relied upon them in finding no personal liability existed.

 

Further, the Court does not find Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson to be analogous to this case. The court in Universal held that proof of fact had not been shown where a moving party’s papers made virtually no reference to evidence presented at trial. (Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 132.) Universal is factually distinguishable from this case in that it concerned a much more diminutive brief, and the showing of proof was combatted by a bevy of evidence from the opposing party as to reasonable belief. It was also procedurally distinguishable in that the trial court was not the court that ruled on the motion for attorney’s fees. (Id.) The Court concedes that Ditty could have made more accurate reference to the trial record in his moving papers. Regardless, unlike Universal, the Court hearing this motion and the Court to whom evidence was presented are one in the same. Having served as the trier of fact in this case, the Court finds Ditty provided ample proof of the fact that he had no personal lability.

 

Reasonable Belief

 

Plaintiff also argues that it had a reasonable belief in denying the requests that they would prevail on the issue at trial. As proof of this reasonable belief, Plaintiff submits that Ditty admitted his tenancy with Plaintiff in his Answer. Plaintiff states that Ditty’s answer identifies himself as the defendant in the action and states a variety of facts regarding Plaintiff’s acceptance of rent from him. Plaintiff argues that because Ditty stated his tenancy in his answer, Plaintiff believed it had a reasonable chance of success in holding him liable under a theory of “tenancy at will”.

 

The Court finds that the content of Ditty’s answer does not speak to Plaintiff’s reasonable belief of their ability to prevail on the issue of his personal liability. Ditty’s answer does not present any factual basis upon which Plaintiff could base its belief. While Ditty’s answer may have given Plaintiff the ability to pursue a “tenancy at will” theory, it does not follow that it also gave them reason to believe they would succeed. Something more than reference to a defendant’s pleading is required to show Plaintiff’s reasonable belief in prevailing. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff was also privy to evidence which pointed in precisely the opposite direction. The Court maintains, as it did at trial, that the estoppel certificates indicate Ditty was not personally liable. By Plaintiff’s own admission they had access to these estoppel certificates, which were obtained from them via discovery. Plaintiff’s belief in the success of its tenancy at will theory could not have been reasonable in light of the estoppel certificates. Further, the Court declines to entertain Plaintiff’s argument that the estoppel certificates hold a different meaning as to do so would be to relitigate a matter already reduced to judgment.

 

Ditty argues that Plaintiff’s reasonable belief is undermined by its responses to Form Interrogatory 17.1, which asked Plaintiff to state the reasoning for their denials. The Court notes that Ditty does not attach these responses to his moving papers, nor is the Court aware of any filing in this case which contains them. Accordingly, this argument will not be considered.

 

Lastly, the Court declines to entertain Plaintiff’s argument that Ditty testified at trial as to tenancy at will. Regardless of the content of Plaintiff’s claims and Ditty’s rebuttal, the fact remains that these statements were made well after the RFAs were denied.

 

In short, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown a reasonable belief that they would prevail at trial.

 

Reasonable Fees

 

Plaintiff argues that Ditty has not sufficiently segregated the fees necessary to proving Ditty’ lack of personal liability. Plaintiff argues that “The requested amounts must be segregated from costs and fees expended to prove other issues” (citing to Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 529.) In reply, Ditty asserts that the issue of his personal liability permeates the entire matter such that all fees incurred should be recoverable. Ditty cites to Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias which held “The statute does not require that fees and costs must be separately allocated to each specific request for admission, particularly not where, as here, virtually all the requests relate to a single issue.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Macias (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1030.) The Macias court contrasted this to a situation where a party sought fees for issues that were completely outside the scope of the request for admissions. (Id. distinguishing Garcia v. Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 724, 736.)

 

The Court disagrees with Ditty’s argument that his personal liability permeated every issue in this case such that all attorney’s fees incurred would theoretically be recoverable. A large portion of the evidence in this case and the argument at trial focused on the validity of the rent increase as concerned DCCI. While Ditty’s personal liability was a fundamental issue in this case, it was not the only issue. Having said this, the Court also disagrees with Plaintiff’s proposed approach. Plaintiff seems to suggest that Ditty is required to excise any time entry not solely related to his individual liability. The Court finds this approach to be too granular to comport with the realities of legal billing. Especially in instances where a singular attorney represents multiple defendants, this approach makes little sense. For example, the Court does not see how Ditty’s counsel would be expected to retroactively analyze the time spent in preparing discovery as regarded Ditty and the time spent preparing that same discovery as regarded DCCI.

 

The Court’s reading of the case law suggests that fees are reasonably recoverable under C.C.P. § 2033.420 where they are not substantially unrelated to the fact at issue. The Court finds that Ditty has shown through declaration of his counsel that the requested fees were incurred in the course of proving he had no personal liability. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to rebut the reasonableness of the fees. Plaintiff argues most of the billing has to do with discovery which had nothing to do with Ditty’s personal liability. As evidence Plaintiff proffers a meet and confer letter sent by Ditty’s counsel seeking discovery. (Oppo. Exh. E.) The Court finds this letter does not adequately support Plaintiff’s position. The letter specifically requests production of (1) the purchase and sale agreement, (2) the primer contract to which the design build amendment was attached, and (3) communications between Ditty and Plaintiff regarding the payment of rent among others. (Id.) The fact that some of the requests may not have concerned Ditty’s personal liability does not negate the fact that a considerable portion of them did.

 

Conclusion

 

The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees under C.C.P. § 2033.420. Ditty has produced adequate proof of the truth of the fact denied by Plaintiff in RFAs. Subsequently, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a reasonable belief in success at trial on the issue. Plaintiff has also not demonstrated that the fees sought by Ditty are unrelated to the proving of this issue.

 

Accordingly, the motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED. Attorney’s fees are awarded as against Plaintiff in the amount of $42,340.

 

The previously requested sanctions for motions to compel discovery, which the Court deferred to determine after the facts were fully developed the appropriateness of sanctions, are also imposed in the amount of $1,530 against Plaintiff.

 

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RULING:

 

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

 

ORDER 

 

Tim Ditty’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees came on regularly for hearing on March 15, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

 

THE MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IS GRANTED.

 

ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE AWARDED AS AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $42,340.

 

THE REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY MONETARY SANCTIONS, DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE, IS GRANTED AGAINST PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,530.

 

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DITTY TO GIVE NOTICE.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.