Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 21PDUD01330, Date: 2024-03-08 Tentative Ruling

REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT PER CRC 3.1308

The Court will attempt to post all Tentative Rulings at least the day prior to the hearing by 3:00 p.m.; however, the Court does not post Tentative Rulings for all matters.  

The
Court will indicate in the Tentative Ruling whether the Court is requesting oral argument.  For cases where the Court is not requesting argument, then pursuant to
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is
required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no
argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the
court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention
to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the
court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”   

Notice
may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818)
260-8412.

Notice of the ruling must be served as indicated in the tentative.  Remote appearances are permitted for all law and motion unless otherwise indicated by the Court.  

Case Number: 21PDUD01330    Hearing Date: March 8, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO REQUIRE THE FILING OF A SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

This motion follows an unlawful detainer judgment rendered for Moussa Faor (Faor) as against Sheldon Pinchuk (Pinchuk). Pinchuk, the plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action, argued that Faor had breached a covenant to maintain or repair the property in dispute. On September 9, 2022, the trial court conducted a non-jury trial and entered judgment in favor of Faor. The case was deemed related to another matter being heard in Department A; the related Department A matter has been dismissed. Faor then filed a motion seeking attorney’s fees, as per the judgment.  On January 11, 2023 the Court entered an order awarding Faor attorney’s fees in the amount of $63,365.86.

Pinchuk now brings this motion for an order requiring the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. Pinchuk argues that the judgment in this matter has been satisfied. Faor opposes the motion, arguing that no such satisfaction has occurred.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

Where a judgment has been satisfied, but the judgment creditor refuses to file an acknowledgment of this satisfaction, C.C.P. § 724.050 provides the relevant procedure for obtaining such an acknowledgement by court order. The judgment debtor must first make a demand on the judgment creditor. (C.C.P. § 724.050(a)-(b).) If the judgment creditor continues to refuse to file the acknowledgement, the judgment debtor may thereafter “apply to the court on noticed motion for an order requiring the judgment creditor to comply with the demand . . .. If the court determines that the judgment has been satisfied and that the judgment creditor has not complied with the demand, the court shall either (1) order the judgment creditor to comply with the demand or (2) order the court clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment.” (C.C.P. § 724.050(d).)

II.                 MERITS

The crux of Pinchuk’s argument is that he satisfied the judgment by tendering a check for $26,915.86 on December 28, 2023. (Shafron Decl. ¶ 9.) Pinchuk previously sent a check for the same amount on May 19, 2023 to Faor’s prior counsel. (Shafron Decl. ¶ 3.) Prior Counsel for Faor never cashed the check and never responded to several demand letters because he was medically incapacitated. (Shafron Decl. ¶ 6.) Pinchuk was informed of this situation by Faor’s new counsel in July of 2023. (Shafron Decl. ¶ 6.) Pinchuk states that despite meet and confer efforts, the parties could not agree on an amount due, and Faor would not stipulate to the filing of a partial satisfaction of judgment. (Shafron Decl. ¶ 7.)

Pinchuk contends that tender of $26,915.86 check satisfies the judgment because it is accompanied by an offset which accounts for rent that was not paid by Faor during the pending unlawful detainer action. During the unlawful detainer action, Faor tendered rent checks to Pinchuk, but these checks were not accepted for fear of waiving the right to proceed. The rent owed during the pendency of the unlawful detainer action was $36,450. (Shafron Decl. ¶ 9.) Pinchuk argues that the combination of the check for $26,915.86 and the rent offset for $36,450 is equivalent to a satisfaction of the judgment in full.

Faor argues that the judgment has not been satisfied. Faor states that they never received the check sent December 28, 2023 and it was likely lost. The check remains uncashed.  (Rasheed Decl. ¶¶ 18-19.) Faor argues further that Pinchuk fails to account for an additional $1,046.70 in costs that accrued as the result of an unopposed memorandum of costs filed on February 24, 2023. (Rasheed Decl. ¶ 9.) Lastly, Faor states that Pinchuk fails to account for interest which accrued at the rate of $17.36 a day from February 23, 2023. (Rasheed Decl. ¶ 10.)

The parties both engage in a lengthy discussion as to the correct date from which interest runs, whether the issuance of the first check stops interest from running, and whether the offset is appropriately claimed. These arguments are all outside of the scope of a motion brought under C.C.P. § 724.050. The statute allows the court to find a judgment satisfied when the judgment debtor shows it paid either (1) the full judgment amount or (2) a lesser amount that the judgment creditor has contractually agreed to accept as payment in full. (See C.C.P. §§ 724.010(a), 724.050; see also Horath v. Hess (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 456, 466, 468.) It does not allow the Court to sua sponte determine the validity of Pinchuk’s proposed offset or the appropriate amount of interest.

A Court adjudicating a motion under C.C.P. § 724.050 must make a finding as to whether the judgment has been paid. Here, Pinchuk has submitted only that he issued a check for an amount less than that of the judgment. Pinchuk makes no representation that this check was cashed, therefore the judgment is not paid. Further, Pinchuk presents no evidence of an agreement by Faor to accept an amount lower than the judgment amount. The original judgment does not discuss the rent owed during the pendency and the Court declines to adjudicate the matter in the context of this motion. A determination of the appropriate amount of an equitable setoff is the subject of its own motion, not a motion to enforce the satisfaction of judgment.

Accordingly, Pinchuk’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Sheldon Pinchuk’s Motion came on regularly for hearing on March 8, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO REQUIRE THE FILING OF SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PINCHUK TO GIVE NOTICE.