Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 21STCV23431, Date: 2024-12-13 Tentative Ruling

REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT PER CRC 3.1308

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Notice of the ruling must be served as indicated in the tentative.  Remote appearances are permitted for all law and motion unless otherwise indicated by the Court.  

Case Number: 21STCV23431    Hearing Date: December 13, 2024    Dept: A

MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

NOTICE:

The Court is requesting oral argument on this matter.  Parties are requested to address the issue of whether the July 24, 2024 email from Plaintiff’s counsel is accompanied by an electronic signature.

ALLEGATIONS: 

On June 24, 2021, Andrew Rafat Bolous (Plaintiff) brought this action against Rodrigo Roderex Rodriguez III dba Roderex Trucking (Roderex) and STG Holdings, LLC (STG) (collectively Defendants). Plaintiff alleges that, on August 14, 2019, he was injured by virtue of Defendants’ negligence in delivering and installing a car lift. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to bring a forklift to unload the car lift and efforts to unload the car lift via other means resulted in the car lift falling on Plaintiff.

On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case. This notice indicated that the settlement was conditional upon the satisfactory completion of specified terms. The Court then set an OSC re: Dismissal for November 12, 2024. On November 12, Defendants’ counsel informed the Court that there was difficulty in finalizing the settlement agreement and requested additional time to bring the instant motion.

Defendants now move to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to C.C.P. § 664.6. Defendants state that despite Plaintiff’s counsel having confirmed the settlement in writing, Plaintiff has refused to sign the Settlement Agreement.

Plaintiff has filed a document entitled “Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement”. This document presents no substantive argument as to the Settlement Agreement. Instead, the opposition informs that Plaintiff intends to personally appear at the hearing for this motion to present arguments. It is unclear from this filing whether Plaintiff’s counsel will also be present at the hearing.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

Pursuant to C.C.P. § 664.6: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Chan v. Lund (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165-66 [quoting Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809-10.]) Under C.C.P. § 664.6, a court may determine disputed factual issues regarding the settlement agreement and even permits the court “to entertain challenges to the actual terms of the stipulation, that is, whether there actually was a settlement … and to interpret the terms of the settlement agreement.” (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566.)

The Court notes that C.C.P. § 664.6 was amended in 2021 to clarify the Legislature’s intent that the statutes use of the word “parties” included attorney representatives. (See Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310.)

II.                 MERITS

Relevant Facts

On July 17, 2024, the parties participated in a formal mediation with mediator Richard L. Gilbert (Ret.) (Hawatmeh Decl. ¶ 2.) In the course of this mediation, the parties reached a settlement of the case. (Hawatmeh Decl. ¶ 3.) As evidence of the agreement, Defendants attach a copy of an email correspondence on which all parties and the mediator are attached. (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1.) This email exchange is as follows:

·         July 17, 2024, the mediator emails to confirm his settlement recommendation. The mediator suggests that Plaintiff accept and that defendants pay a specific settlement amount in full and complete settlement of Plaintiff's claim. The mediator further suggested that Roderex bear the cost of mediation. The mediator also stated, “Plaintiff Rodriquez has authorized me to convey, and I did convey, that subject to confirmation of defendants' authority to settle at that amount, he is prepared to accept the recommendation.” (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 9.)

·         July 22, 2024, Roderex’s counsel emailed to confirm that their insurance carrier has agreed to the settlement. Roderex’s counsel asks counsel for STG to prepare the global release. (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 8.)

·         July 22, 2024, the mediator replies requesting that, “everyone confirm by “reply all” email that we have a settlement on the terms described below and the agreement that the email will serve as the written memorialization of that settlement within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6(b)(2).” (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 7.)

·         July 22, 2024, counsel for STG confirms the settlement and states they will circulate a global release. (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 6.)

·         July 22, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff replied simply, “Agreed.” (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 6.)

·         July 22, 2024, counsel for Roderex requests counsel for STG invoice the mediation to Roderex’s insurance carrier. (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 6.)

·         July 23, 2024, counsel for STG forwards the invoice. (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 6.)

On July 23, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendants with a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case which was signed by Plaintiff’s counsel. (Hawatmeh Decl. ¶ 5.) A release was circulated (the Settlement Agreement) but Plaintiff did not sign it. (Hawatmeh Decl. ¶ 6.) On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff, independently from his attorneys, reached out via telephone to Roderex’s counsel to inquire about the policy limits of the case. (Id.) Roderex’s counsel did not speak to Plaintiff, who stated in his voicemail that “the case is settled and everything is fine.” (Id.)

On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel informed that he would provide his signature once the Settlement Agreement was revised to include language on Roderex’s preferred payment method. (Hawatmeh Decl. ¶ 7.) On September 4, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel informed Defendants that their office was experiencing difficulties in contacting their client for signature. (Id.) Plaintiff continues to refuse to sign the Settlement Agreement. (Hawatmeh Decl. ¶ 8.)

Discussion

Traditionally, C.C.P. § 664.6 was interpreted to require a signature by both the party seeking to enforce a written settlement agreement and the party against whom enforcement is sought. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)74 Cal.App.4th 299, 305.) As explained in Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, C.C.P. § 644.6 was amended in January 2021. The January 2021 revision clarified that, “For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following: [¶] (1) The party. [¶] (2) An attorney who represents the party.” (Id. citing Stats. 2020, ch. 290, § 1.) The Greisman court explained that the 2021 revision was done with the explicit purpose of clarifying the legislative intended the word “parties” in the statute to extend to attorney representative. (Id. at 192.)

Although it is now conclusive that a writing by attorney representatives can be used to enforce a settlement agreement under C.C.P. § 664.6, what constitutes a sufficient writing for this purpose remains variable. In an era where most communication in the course of a litigation is conducted via email, courts have been forced to weigh in on when an email confirmation of settlement suffices. The Court finds the cases of J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974 (J.B.B. 2014) and J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1 (J.B.B. 2019) to be instructive.  

In J.B.B. 2014, an investor moved to enforce a settlement agreement between various LLCs and their founding member, Fair. (J.B.B. 2014 supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 977.) In ruling that the settlement was enforceable, the trial court found that an email exchange between Fair and counsel for Plaintiff’s constituted a signed agreement under C.C.P. § 664.6 (Id. at 982.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holing that for an electronic signature to satisfy the § 664.6 requirement that the agreement be signed by the parties, there must be evidence that the parties agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic means and that the signing party intended with his or her printed name to sign the electronic record, in accordance with California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UTEA; Civ Code § 1633.1 et seq.). (Id. at 988-990.) The Court of Appeal determined that the trial court lacked substantial evidence that Fair intended his email sign-off to be a signature under the UETA. (Id.) Simply printing ones name at the end of an email was not sufficient to create a settlement agreement enforceable under C.C.P. § 664.6. (Id. at 989.)

J.B.B. 2019 concerned the same parties as J.B.B. 2014, though this time the attempt to enforce the settlement was not made pursuant to C.C.P. § 664.6. Instead, the LLC’s sought to enforce the settlement agreement through the traditional method of bringing an independent lawsuit for the enforcement of contract. (J.B.B. 2019 supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at 7.) In making its ruling, the Court of Appeal was clear that this procedural difference allowed for the more liberal application of general contract principles. The court rejected Fair’s argument that J.B.B. 2014 already found his intent to form binding agreement was lacking. (Id. at 13.) The court clarified that J.B.B. 2014 did not preclude the court from considering whether Fair’s emails signaled an intent to enter into a binding agreement under general contract law. (Id.) The court noted specifically that J.B.B. 2014 expressed “no opinion as to whether plaintiffs can enforce the July 4 offer by another method, such as a motion for summary judgment for breach of contract.” (J.B.B. 2014 supra at 991.)

Here, it is not clear whether the July 24, 2024 email of Plaintiff’s counsel is accompanied by an electronic signature. (Hawatmeh Decl. Exh. 1, p. 10.) The email of Plaintiff’s counsel contains the usual attorney signoff including her email address, telephone/fax numbers, website, and street address. (Id.) This information is surrounded by a series of three images which apparently could not be displayed when Defendants’ counsel went to copy the communication. Without a copy of the email that shows this signature, the Court is reticent to find the email is a signed writing for purposes of C.C.P. § 664.6.

If a signature is shown, the Court finds there is sufficient evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel intended to enter into a binding agreement on his behalf. The July 24, 2024 email of Plaintiff’s counsel is a direct reply to the request of the mediator to confirm the parties had reached a settlement. In this context, the only feasible explanation for Plaintiff’s counsel replying “Agreed.” would be to confirm the settlement. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel appears to also be agreeing that the email chain serves as a writing for purposes of this motion.

Given the foregoing, the Court requests argument for the purpose of presenting a clear copy of this email exchange. In the event Defendants can sufficiently demonstrate an electronic signature, the Court is inclined to grant the motion. Should Defendants be unable to show an electronic signature at the time of the hearing, the Court is inclined to deny the motion without prejudice.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Rodrigo Roderex Rodriguez III dba Roderex Trucking’s Motion to Enforce Settlement came on regularly for hearing on December 13, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT IS XXXXX (ARGUMENT REQUESTED).  

DEFENDANT RODEREX TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  December 13, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles