Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 22BBCV00202, Date: 2025-02-28 Tentative Ruling

REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT PER CRC 3.1308

The Court will attempt to post all Tentative Rulings at least the day prior to the hearing by 3:00 p.m.; however, the Court does not post Tentative Rulings for all matters.  

The Court will indicate in the Tentative Ruling whether the Court is requesting oral argument.  For cases where the Court is not requesting argument, then the Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) where the Court requests notice of intent to appear.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, a party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.   

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

Notice of the ruling must be served as indicated in the tentative.  Remote appearances are permitted for all law and motion unless otherwise indicated by the Court.  

Case Number: 22BBCV00202    Hearing Date: February 28, 2025    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

EX PARTE APPLICATION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

MP:     Synyahn Johnson (Plaintiff)

RP:      Diana Dolmayan, et al. (Defendants)

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is required and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement on an ex parte basis to be heard on February 19, 2025.  Defendants filed an opposition.  At the ex parte hearing, the Court continued the matter until February 28, 2025 with any simultaneous briefing to be filed no later than February 26, 2025.

SUMMARY

Synan Johnson (Plaintiff), brings this action against Diana Dolmayan (Dolamayan) et al seeking economic, non-economic, special past and future damages, general past and future damages, exemplary or punitive damages, and cost of suit. Plaintiff and Dolamayan were partners in a business venture known as DS Medi Spa in 2021, however their relationship soured, and the business ceased to exist soon after. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Defendant conspired to offer medical services without proper licensing, interfered with Plaintiff’s business, and generally tarnished Plaintiff’s reputation. Settlement was reached in a separate unlawful detainer matter which dismissed the Detox Stop LLC (the Detox Stop), a business owned by Plaintiff, from this action.

As to this action, Plaintiff asserts that the parties reached a “full and final Settlement of this matter.”  “The settlement was a ‘walk-away’ or ‘zero-dollar’ agreement.  (Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion p5 lines 3-8).  Plaintiff asserts that Defendants proposed, through their counsel of record David R. Euredjian, Esq. the following:

“My clients are willing to resolve all matters with Ms. Johnson and The Detox Stop LLC pursuant to a written and notarized settlement with the following principle terms:

- Dismissal of the litigation with prejudice

- Mutual releases of all claims, whether known or unknown, and whether related or unrelated to the litigation

- Releasors to include Ms. Johnson, The Detox Stop, LLC and any other person or entity who may claim by or through Ms. Johnson or The Detox Stop, LLC

- Released parties to include Ascentia Beauty Spa, LLC, Diana Dolmayan and her spouse, and their current, former and future agents, successors in interest, predecessors in interest, heirs, and any and all their parents, affiliates, companies, subsidiaries, divisions, subdivisions, departments, nominees, vendors, officers, directors, shareholders, members, owners, partners, joint venturers, principals, trustees, creditors, agents, servants, employees, insurers, representatives, predecessor, successors, assign and attorneys

- Mutual waivers of Civil Code section 1542

- Mutual non-disparagement provision

- No admission of liability by any party

- Enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Let me know by the close of business on Friday whether your clients are amenable to the foregoing…”

(Plaintiff’s Motion Exh. A; Motion p20).

Defense counsel’s email was dated Wednesday, October 16, 2024 with the deadline to respond being Friday, October 18, 2024.  On October 18, 2024, at 5:00 PM, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote an email to Defendants’ counsel stating, “My clients are willing to resolve in accordance with your proposed terms.  Can you please forward the written agreement for signatures.   Thank you.” (Plaintiff’s Motion p19; Exhibit A).  On October 20, 2024, Defense counsel wrote an email stating, “Before we proceed, please file a substitution of attorney indicating you are Ms. Johnson’s attorney of record.” (Plaintiff’s Motion p19; Exhibit A).  The Court notes that Ms. Johnson was previously self-represented.  On October 22, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Clarke, filed the requested substitution of attorney. 

On October 29, 2024, Mr. Clarke emailed Defendants’ counsel, what appears to be, a standard Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release which memorialized the terms of the email offer.  The following day, Defense counsel advised that based on new information, Defendants “are not interested in resolving this matter on the terms previously discussed.  If you wish to discuss a more appropriate resolution that accurately reflects these circumstances, please feel free to contact me.”  (Plaintiff’s Motion pp 37-38).  Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defense counsel advising that, “while your clients indicate they have obtained ‘significant new information’ relevant to this matter, it would be helpful if you could clarify the specifics of this information.”  Later Plaintiff’s counsel writes, “we understand that your position may have shifted.  However, if your clients are genuinely interested in reaching a resolution that accurately reflects all known circumstances, we remain open to a discussion.”  (Plaintiff’s Motion pp 36-37). 

Plaintiff contends that they had a mutually agreed upon settlement subject to enforcement pursuant to CCP §664.6; Defendants assert that the settlement required a written and notarized settlement agreement which contained the principle terms as noted above.

The Court notes that the Defendants previously believed that they had a global settlement agreement with Plaintiff which was entered in case 22STUD01271.   Plaintiff contested that settlement as applied to this case.  Defendants believed that settlement agreement also incorporated the dismissal of this matter; however, after briefing and a hearing, this Court denied the enforcement of that settlement agreement for the reasons set forth in the Court’s September 16, 2022 minute order.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“California C.C.P. §664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809-810.  The trial court must first determine whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement. In making that determination, the trial court acts as the trier of fact, determining whether the parties entered into a binding and valid settlement. Trial judges may consider oral testimony or may determine the motion based upon declarations alone. Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 103 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1428-1429.

An email may constitute an electronic signature to a writing.  Civil Code §1633.7 provides that a "a record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form" and that "electronic and handwritten signatures have the same legal effect and are equally enforceable." Civ. Code, § 1633.7, subds. (a), (b).  The issue of electronic signatures as referenced in Section 1633.7 was addressed in the decision of J.B.B. Inv. Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 974, where, after the court specifically noted that a printed name or symbol can constitute a signature under UETA and "might even satisfy the more rigorous requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6," the court confirmed that under section 1633.2, an " [electronic signature' means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the electronic record." (J.B.B., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 989, citing CACI No. 380 [party suing to enforce an agreement formalized by electronic means must prove "based on the context and surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, that the parties agreed to use [e.g., e-mail] to formalize their agreement" (italics omitted.)

In this instance, the Court must review the entire relationship between the parties and the history of the case.   Defendants previously believed they had a global settlement agreement with Plaintiff; however, Plaintiff disagreed and declined to honor that settlement agreement from 22STUD01271 as to this case.   Ultimately this Court agreed with Plaintiff that she was not bound by the earlier agreement as to this case.  It is for this reason the Court believes that Defendants required a written agreement signed and notarized by Plaintiff.  While it is true that CCP §664.6 may permit acceptance of a settlement via counsel, Defendants do not need to agree to this and nothing in CCP §664.6 prevents a party to require a specific procedure for acceptance.  It is this Court’s belief that CCP §664.6 creates minimum criteria for enforcement, but it does not hinder a party from requiring more.

In light of Defendants prior unsuccessful efforts to enforce an earlier settlement agreement and resolve this current nearly three years ago, the Court finds that an agreement signed and notarized by the Plaintiff was a material term of the agreement.  Likewise, in reviewing the subsequent email exchange between the parties, when Defendants advised that they were not moving forward with the settlement based on new information, Plaintiff did not assert that an agreement had in fact been reached and that Defendants were in breach.   Rather, Plaintiff’s counsel advised that they remain open to discussion in hopes of resolving the matter.   Such language is more consistent with a negotiation process that has broken down rather than a breach of an agreed upon settlement.

The Court finds Defendants’ argument that the settlement would only occur after Plaintiff personally signed and notarized a copy of a settlement agreement to be a material term.   Since that did not occur prior to Defendants locating new information and revoking the offer, the Court finds that enforcement pursuant to CCP §664.6 is not proper.

Conclusion

The Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement pursuant to CCP §664.6 is denied.

ORDER 

The Ex Parte Application to Enforce Settlement Agreement came on for hearing on February 28, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION  TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT DOLMAYAN TO GIVE NOTICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.