Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 22BBCV00619, Date: 2023-04-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22BBCV00619    Hearing Date: April 21, 2023    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

ALLEGATIONS: 

On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff Abimelec Burgos (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) for GM’s alleged violation of the Song Beverly Act. The Complaint alleges five causes of action for (1) violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b), (3) violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3), (4) breach of express written warranty, and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

HISTORY:

On March 20, 2023 Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPD”). On April 12, 2023, GM filed its opposition. On April 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Reply and Evidentiary Objections.

RELIEF REQUESTED:   

Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an order compelling GM’s response to Plaintiff’s RFPD as follows:

RFPD Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27, pertaining to GM’s internal investigation and analysis of the alleged defects of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

RFPD No. 50, pertaining to GM’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS:

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the declaration of Ryan Kay Nos. 3 and 4 are sustained, the remainder are overruled.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. § 2031.310(c).) 

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there is “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  

If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

"The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (C.C.P. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)  

II.              MERITS

Meet and Confer

On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter addressing Defendant's responses and objections to the requests at issue. (Manno Decl. ¶ 17.) GM responded to the meet and confer letter on February 16, 2023. (Id. ¶ 18.) GM indicated it was willing to supplement its document production to include other customer complaints that are substantially similar to Plaintiffs complaint(s) concerning the alleged defects, for vehicles purchased in California of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle pursuant to the entry of the negotiated protective order. (Id. Exh. 12.) GM also indicated it was willing to produce its policy and procedure documents directly responsive to Plaintiffs Requests, subject to the negotiated protective order. (Id.) Plaintiff signed a stipulated protective order as evidence of Plaintiff’s willingness to accommodate GM's claims of confidentiality. (Id. Ex. 13.) On March 7, 2023, this stipulated agreement was filed with the Court. The Court finds the meet and confer effort sufficient.

RFPD Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27

These requests all concern documents related to GM’s internal investigation and analysis of the alleged defects in vehicles which are the same year, make, and model as Plaintiff’s 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe (“Subject Vehicle”). The Court notes GM’s opposition repeatedly misidentifies the Subject Vehicle as a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado. Consequently, the alleged defects discussed track with those in the 2019 Silverado and not the Subject Vehicle.  The Court presumes this is an oversight and will analyze the Opposition as though it addressed the Subject Vehicle correctly. The legal reasoning of GM’s objections remains unchanged by these oversights.

To determine whether responses can be compelled the Court must first determine if Plaintiff has shown good cause. Plaintiff submits the declaration of his counsel, Alessandro Manno, which attaches several Technical Service Bulletins (“TSB”) issued by GM. (Manno Decl. Exhs. 1-6.) Plaintiff states these TSB are issued by GM and acknowledge the existence of defects in GM’s vehicles. (Mot. pg. 3.) Plaintiff has produced some of the TSB affecting the Subject Vehicle, which he argues provides good cause for his requests.

The Court agrees. The TSBs in relation to the subject vehicle create good cause for Plaintiff’s document requests. Plaintiff’s requests relate directly to Defendant's investigation, analysis, and communications regarding the same defects or same parts as the subject vehicle. The good cause showing is not stringent and is adequately made here.

If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to disclosure of the documents. GM objects to each RFPD on the same grounds. The Court will address them in turn.

GM first objects to these requests on grounds the terms are vague and ambiguous. The Court finds Plaintiff’s Requests for Documents are not vague and ambiguous as they are accompanied by a definition section which identifies those documents to be produced with reasonable clarity. (Manno Decl. Exh. 7, pg. 2.) To the extent GM claims the vehicle defects are vaguely defined, they do not elaborate on how Plaintiff’s current definitions are insufficient.

GM also objects on grounds the requests are overbroad and seek documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because they are not limited to the vehicle at issue in this action.

In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.) It must be noted that discovery rules are to be applied liberally “and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653-654.) In fact, evidence regarding other vehicles with similar defects as Plaintiff's could potentially be admissible at trial in a lemon law action. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154; see also Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s requests are reasonably particularized.

GM argues Donlen is irrelevant to the issue of discoverability. (Oppo. pg. 6.) The Court disagrees. While Donlen does not specifically address the scope of discovery requests, it does concern the admissibility of evidence of defects in similar vehicles. It follows that if evidence of a type is admissible then it must also be discoverable. Further, the Court disregards Defendant's citation to hearing transcripts in other cases within the Los Angeles Superior Court as they have no precedential value. (Kay Decl. Ex. A-B.)

GM also objects on grounds the requests are burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.

GM fails to substantiate any objection based on undue burden. Undue burden objections must be accompanied by a specific factual showing setting forth the amount of work necessary to respond to the subject discovery. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court supra, 56 Cal.2d 407, at 417-418.) GM has made no such showing. GM argues “The issues at stake in this litigation are de minimis when compared to the cost and burden of compiling and producing the vast number of irrelevant documents sought by Plaintiff.” (Oppo. pg. 6.) However, GM's declarations do not address the amount of work necessary to respond.

GM also objects on grounds the requests seek confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. GM submits the declaration of Huizen Lu (“Lu”). The Lu declaration demonstrates that warranty related documents contain highly confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information such as engineering, warranty, and root cause analysis; engineering and manufacturing specifications and testing; component or product improvement; and costs and financial forecasts. (Lu Decl. ¶¶ 33 & 38). Pursuant to the stipulated protective order, any documents which contain such information may be designated as confidential by GM. GM requests that any further production ordered of them be subject to protective order. Given that a protective order is already in place, the Court finds any further production by GM is subject to the protective order.

GM further objects on grounds the requests seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. GM’s declaration contains no aversion to documents requested by Plaintiff which may be subject to either of the above privileges. In GM’s March 2, 2023 meet and confer letter they state, “As of this time, no documents have been withheld on the basis of privilege.” (Manno Decl., Exh. 12, pg. 6.) As such, the Court finds this objection has no merit.

Plaintiff has shown good cause for an order that further documents be produced. GM has failed to justify its objections to these requests. As such, the Court GRANTS the motion with respect to RFPD Nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27.

RFPD No. 50

RFPD No. 50 requests “All documents which evidence your organizational charts of people within your customer service call center or prelitigation department.”

Plaintiff contends this information is relevant to the current action, but does not specifically brief the matter. Plaintiff seemingly relies upon the broad scope of discovery to show the relevance of this request. GM objects on grounds the terms “evidence” and “prelitigation department” are vague and ambiguous.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s RFPD No. 50 to be vague and ambiguous, as well as overboard. Plaintiff’s definition section does not include definition of the term “prelitigation department”, creating uncertainty as to which departments GM must produce records for. Further, Plaintiff does not endeavor to narrow its requests for customer service call center records. The Court finds the requests for all documents pertaining to GM’s customer service call center is facially overboard considering the amount of information it would require GM to produce. Whereas Plaintiff has narrowed its other requests to concern only vehicles subject to the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle, here there are no such limitations.

As such, the Court DENIES the motion to compel as to RFPD No. 50.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Abimelec Burgos’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents came on regularly for hearing on April 21, 2023, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS GRANTED AS TO NOS. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27.

THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS DENIED AS TO NO. 50.

PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE, UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: April 21, 2023                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles