Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 22BBCV01101, Date: 2023-11-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22BBCV01101    Hearing Date: January 26, 2024    Dept: A

MOTION TO STRIKE
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 22BBCV01101

NOTICE: 

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”   

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. 

ALLEGATIONS:  

Yolanda Cooper (“Yolanda”) and Paul Cooper (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Silver Point Trucking, Inc. (“Silver Point”), Martin Gutierrez-Flores (“Guiterrez”), and SSA Containers, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”) in connection with a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs allege that an employee of Silver Point, Guiterrez, negligently operated a motor vehicle such that it collided with Yolanda’s vehicle while stopped in traffic. Plaintiffs further allege Guiterrez failed to stop after the collision. 

The Court previously granted a motion to strike, with leave to amend, on November 17, 2023. The Court found the allegations of the First amended Complaint (“FAC”) were insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on December 15, 2023. 

Defendants now move once more to strike portions of the SAC which request punitive damages. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and Defendants reply.  

ANALYSIS:  

I.                LEGAL STANDARD  

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. § 435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. § 431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. § 436 (b).) 

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code § 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Civil Code § 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294 (a).) As set forth in the Civil Code:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. 

(Civ. Code, § 3294, (c)(1)-(3).) 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice as there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages. (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) 

II.              MERITS 

The Court previously sustained Defendants’ motion to strike, finding that the allegations of the Complaint could not sustain a claim for punitive damages. The Court first found that a general claim for punitive damages was unsupported because the FAC contained no allegations that Guiterrez consciously disregarded the safety of others prior to the collision. The Court found the FAC only spoke to generally negligent operation of a vehicle. 

The Court also found that the FAC contained insufficient allegations to support punitive damages as it pertained to Guiterrez fleeing the scene after the collision. The Court, relying on Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., found that damages for a hit and run can only be sustained when the act of fleeing causes additionally injury above and beyond those caused by the collision itself. (See Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 680.) 

 The Court ultimately granted the motion to strike but allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend. The Court noted that leave to amend was granted because it was possible for Plaintiffs to allege Guiterrez was aware of the dangerous consequences of his conduct in general. The Court stated, “Although it appears Plaintiffs cannot amend to allege further injury from the act of fleeing the scene, the Court finds they could still amend to allege punitive damages stemming from Guiterrez’s awareness of the dangerous consequences of his conduct in general.” (See the Court’s November 17, 2023 Minute Order.) In so stating, the Court reinforced its position that amendment speaking to the hit and run would not be persuasive and that any amendment would need to speak to Guiterrez’s awareness of the dangerous consequences of his actions prior to the collision. 

Plaintiffs’ SAC instead focuses its claim for punitive damages entirely on Guiterrez’s post-collision behavior. The only amended allegations speaking to the pre-collision conduct of Guiterrez are as follows:

Defendant MARTIN GUTIERREZ-FLORES' wide left turn, at an excessive speed, caused the tractor trailer, inclusive of the chassis and trailer, to be elevated off the ground as a result of impacting and dragging Plaintiffs vehicle.

 (SAC Attachment p. 2.) 

The Court finds these allegations remain indicative of negligence and do not rise to the level of a conscious disregard for the safety of others sufficient to show malice. To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff needs to “establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 24 Cal.3d at 896.) Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged in a conclusory fashion that the turn at excessive speed was done with conscious disregard to the safety of others when it could just as well have resulted from negligence. The Court declines to find that making a turn at excessive speed constitutes conduct qualifying for punitive damages. 

Further, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ additional allegations speaking to Guiterrez’s failure to stop remain unsupportive of punitive damages. Plaintiffs’ additional allegations are as follows: 

Plaintiff’s emotional injury was exacerbated by Defendant GUTIERREZ-FLORES' failure to stop, and render immediate assistance, forcing the Plaintiff to attempt interaction with GUTIERREZ-FLORES at the scene, and give chase as he took off fast. A witness to the impact was also yelling at the driver to stop but when he did not, Plaintiff followed. Plaintiff YOLANDA COOPER called 911, reported the hit and run, took photos of the rear of GUTIERREZ-FLORES' tractor trailer and once the 911 operator confmned[sic] she obtained a photo of the license plate, instructed Plaintiff to stop for safety reasons and file a police report. Plaintiff complied.

It would have been nearly impossible for Defendant GUTIERREZ-FLORES not to have observed the impact, or at the very least, feel his tractor trailer elevating off the ground and falling back down 

(SAC Attachment p. 2.) 

In its previous ruling the Court relied on Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. in finding the hit and run did not support punitive damages. The ruling in Brooks makes clear that additional injury from fleeing the scene needs to occur. In Brooks this additional injury took the form of failure to assist a struck pedestrian, which resulted in the pedestrian dying when timely assistance could have saved his life. (Brooks supra 40 Cal.2d at 679.) The Brooks court noted that “One who negligently injures another and renders him helpless is bound to use reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the actor realizes or should realize threatens the injured person/” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ allegations of further injury caused by Guiterrez fleeing are factually distinct from those in Brooks. Plaintiffs allege that Yolanda was further emotionally injured by Guiterrez fleeing the scene. Yolanda was not rendered helpless by the collision and, by her own admission, pursued Guiterrez for a great deal of time after the collision.  Plaintiffs’ allegations that Yolanda’s anxiety was heightened speak more to her voluntary decision to give chase to Guiterrez than the act of Guiterrez leaving the scene. 

In short, Plaintiffs’ additional factual allegations do not cure the deficiencies in her request for punitive damages. Plaintiffs have alleged no additional facts speaking to Guiterrez’s awareness of his conduct prior to the collision, nor have they alleged any additional injury caused by his fleeing the scene. Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.

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RULING: 

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Silver Point Trucking, Inc., Martin Gutierrez-Flores, and SSA Containers, Inc.’s Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on January 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANTS TO PROVIDE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  January 26, 2024                          _______________________________ 

                                                                        Yolanda Orozco, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles