Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 22STCV21262, Date: 2025-04-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV21262    Hearing Date: April 4, 2025    Dept: A

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is required and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

This action is brought by Wayneider Singh Anand, individually and as guardian ad litem to his children, MSA, RSA, and SSA (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs bring the action against the City of La Cañada Flintridge (Flintridge), Emma Amosh Mirzaian (Mirzaian), and Edwin Baltazar (Baltazar) in connection with a December 4, 2021 incident which claimed the life of Dolly Kaur Suri Anand (Decedent). Plaintiffs allege Flintridge failed to maintain safe conditions for a crosswalk located at Foothill Boulevard and Union Street (the Subject Intersection). Plaintiff alleges that because of this failure, Decedent was struck by a vehicle while crossing the Subject Intersection. Mirzaian is alleged to be the driver of the vehicle and Baltazar the owner.

Plaintiff Second Amended Complaint (SAC) states causes of action for (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property, (2) Tortious Conduct of Employee, (3) Wrongful Death, and (4) Survivorship.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by Flintridge on grounds that each of Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state a triable issue as to any material fact alleged in the Second Amended Complaint (SAC)

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) C.C.P.¿§ 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)¿ 

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As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (C.C.P.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ 

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Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿ 

II.                 MERITS

Evidentiary Objections

Flintridge has submitted 52 Evidentiary Objections spanning 146 pages. Flintridge states each of its 52 objections on the following grounds:

Irrelevant (Evidence Code §§ 210, 350-351), lacks foundation (Evidence Code §§ 400-406, 700), prejudicial (Evidence Code § 352), assumes facts not in evidence. lack of personal knowledge (Evidence Code § 702) calls for expert testimony (Evidence Code §§ 801-805), and hearsay (Evidence Code § 1200); lacks authentication (Evidence Code § 1400-1401); writing not authenticated by party against whom it is offered (Evidence Code § 1414) not a qualified expert and/or expert opinion (Evidence Code § 801-805); calls for a legal conclusion

Flintridge’s identical statement of the grounds for their objections are followed by lengthy passages which do not elaborate on these grounds, but instead appear to constitute both argument and the presentation of countervailing evidence. For example, Objection No. 5 to the declaration of Matthew Manjarrez states, “In Paragraph 26 (e) Manjarrez states that he observed ‘little yielding behavior’. The collision history suggests that only one collision involving failure to yield was reported in the past ten years, the subject collision.” This is not an evidentiary objection; it is a disagreement over the weight of evidence. As another example, Objection No. 28 to the Declaration of Gary Huisingh states that the declarant’s assertion is correct, “He does not state however that the decision made by Mr. El-Rabaa did not require an engineering study, because the crosswalk already existed.” This too constitutes argument rather than a valid grounds for the exclusion of evidence.

Where a trial court is confronted on summary judgment with a large number of nebulous evidentiary objections, a fair sample of which appear to be meritless, the court can properly overrule, and a reviewing court ignore, all of the objections on the ground that they constitute oppression of the opposing party and an imposition on the resources of the court. (See Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 764). Accordingly, the objections of Flintridge are OVERRULED.

Facts

The Subject Intersection was designed in 2006 and included the addition of a median and crosswalk. (El-Rabaa Decl. ¶ 5.) Flintridge explains that the median was designed by traffic engineer G. Manouchehr-Pour and then approved by then city engineer Ying Kwan. (El-Rabaa Decl. ¶ 5.) The 2006 design plans are attached as Exhibit 2 to Flintridge’s Compendium of Evidence. (See COE p. 14.) Flintridge contends that the 2006 plans reflect the state of the median as it was on the date of the incident. (El-Rabaa Decl. ¶ 5.)

Flintridge notes that the 2006 plans called for the installation of certain signage as per the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). (Id.) Specifically, the plans called for the installation of a “post mounted W11-2 pedestrian sign with a W16- 7P diagonal downward pointing arrow plaque below.” (Id.) El-Rabaa states these signs were located as per the design on the date of the incident. (Id.)

In 2020, Flintridge created a revised design for the Subject Intersection. The 2020 plans were developed by the City's Traffic Engineer Farhad Iranitalab and approved by the City Engineer, Maged El-Rabaa (El-Rabaa). These plans are attached as Exhibit 3 to Flintridge’s compendium of evidence. These plans were then presented to the City Council for approval and were approved on June 16, 2020. (El-Rabba Decl. ¶ 6; Exhs. 3, 26-28.) The City Council accepted completion of the project on October 20, 2020. (Id.)

A review of the 2020 plans shows a number of additions to be made to the Subject Intersection. Of specific importance for this motion are items 21 and 23, which read as follows:

# 21: INSTALL R1-5 SIGN & POST.

# 23: INSTALL YIELD LINE SHOWN AS PER DETAIL B ON SHEET 8 OF 9

(Exh. 3, at p. 29.)

Flintridge states that, “During construction…El-Rabaa made a discretionary decision…to not install a yield line in front of the crosswalk as denoted in the plans and to retain the pedestrian warning signs already present but not install additional warnings noted on the plans.” (See UMF No. 21, Exh. 25 “El-Rabba Depo.”) Flintridge maintains that El-Rabaa’s decision to delete these elements of the design were within his discretion as City Engineer. El-Rabba himself states that he chose to delete these elements because,

…this was an existing crosswalk (versus installation of a new crosswalk), with an existing MUTCD post mounted W11-2 pedestrian sign with a MUTCD W16-7P diagonal downward pointing arrow plaque below, that the R1-5 sign and yield line were unnecessary and that restriping the existing crosswalk was all that was needed and was reasonable, especially since there were no prior accidents of any type at this intersection for the 10 years prior…

(El-Rabaa Decl. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiffs contend that despite the above statement, El-Rabaa testified at deposition that he did not make efforts to determine the accident history prior to deleting the yield line and signage. (Opp. Exh. 3, p. 65-66.) Plaintiffs further contend that El-Rabaa did not consult with anyone prior to the deletion, including the designer of the plans. (Id. at p. 67.)

Discussion

Flintridge primarily moves for summary judgment on grounds that they are shielded by design immunity under Gov. Code § 830.6. Although they do not address the individual causes of action, it appears that Flintridge believes design immunity applies to defeat each of them. Flintridge refers to Plaintiffs’ use of additional causes of action as a “red herring” and implores that the only issue before the Court is that of design immunity. For reasons set forth below the Court is unconvinced that design immunity applies to each of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Design immunity is an affirmative defense often raised on motion for summary judgment or nonsuit, enabling the trial court to find the defense established as a matter of law. (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 939-940.) Generally, Gov. Code § 830.6 provides that a public entity is not liable for injury caused by the plan or design of a construction or improvement to public property where the plan or design was approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the legislative body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval.

While Plaintiffs allege a variety of causes for the incident in this case, it is undoubtable that one of those causes is the presence of insufficient traffic control measures to protect pedestrians. (See SAC ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs contend both that the traffic control measures in Flintridge’s design were insufficient, but also that El-Rabaa’s removal of the yield line and the signage from the 2020 plans created a dangerous condition. This is important because it means at least one of Plaintiffs’ claims derive from negligence other than the negligent design of the roadway. Design immunity does not guard against liability caused by negligence independent of design, even though independent negligence is only a concurring proximate cause of the accident. (Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 565, 575.)

The question thus becomes whether design immunity applies where a dangerous condition was allegedly created by a public employee diverging from an approved design. On this note, the Court finds the ruling in Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1451 to be particularly instructive.

Much like this case, Castro concerned a claim by a plaintiff against the municipality arising from a collision between a driver and a pedestrian in a crosswalk. The plaintiff in Castro alleged that the collision was caused in part by the erroneous installation of a pedestrian warning beacon in the crosswalk. (Castro, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at 1455) The evidence showed that the warning beacon was included in the initial plans for the intersection, but that it was removed by the City Council when they approved the plans. (Id.) Despite its removal from the plans, the city engineer installed the pedestrian warning beacon in the crosswalk. (Id.) The trial court granted summary judgment for the city, finding that it was shielded from liability via design immunity and that there existed no triable issue of fact as to the existence of dangerous condition. (Id. at 1455, 1457.)

As to the design immunity, the Court of Appeal reversed and found, “’Add-ons’ which are not part of the approved plan or design and which are installed after the public works project is approved, do not come under the umbrella of design immunity.” (Id. at 1455.) The Court reasoned that decisions exterior to the design itself were not intended to be shielded by design immunity. (Id. at 1457.)

In making the above ruling, Castro disavowed the city’s argument that its engineer was vested with authority to make the addition of the beacon. (Id.) The city pointed to its municipal code as vesting its engineer with authority to “‘place and maintain, or cause to be placed and maintained’ traffic control devices the City engineer believes are necessary to protect public safety.” (Id. at 1456.) Castro found this was insufficient evidence to attach design immunity, noting the difference between the discretion vested in officials in making plans and the discretion invested in them to deviate from those plans. (Id.) “Were we to credit City's theory, every governmental entity would draft a similar code section and this would create design immunity by municipal code section. All that would be required would be a declaration by an engineer approving his or her own safety idea.” (Id. at 1457.)

As to the dangerous condition, the Court of Appeal also reversed. The Court found that although the city had shown the crosswalk adhered to all applicable standards, there were triable material facts as to whether the erroneous beacon (in combination with the other signage) created a pedestrian trap. (Id. at 1458.)

This case presents an almost inverse scenario to the one in Castro. Rather than a dangerous condition created by the addition of unapproved measures, Plaintiffs allege the condition was created by the omission of approved measures. In many ways the Court finds this factual difference only strengthens the rhetoric employed in Castro. Whether an addition or an omission, it is clear that the decision of an employee to deviate from approved plans necessarily falls outside of design immunity. Flintridge cites to no authority which grants El-Rabaa discretion to deviate from plans which were approved by the City Council. Despite claiming several times in their separate statement that El-Rabaa had discretion to do so, Flintridge points to no authority in support. Even had Flintridge pointed to such a provision, Castro makes clear that general provisions of authority do not constitute a grant of discretion to deviate from approved plans. The El-Rabaa declaration does exactly what the Castro court predicted by serving to approve El-Rabaa’s own safety decisions.

In short, the issue of design immunity appears inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, this does not necessarily warrant denial of the motion. While Flintridge did not alternatively move for summary judgment, it maintains that summary judgment should issue because Plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a dangerous condition. In the context of the second cause of action, the Court understands that Flintridge believes there is not triable issue of fact as to whether El-Rabaa’s omission of the yield line and planned signage created a dangerous condition.

“Ordinarily, the existence of a dangerous condition is a question of fact, but whether there is a dangerous condition may be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. (Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1070.)  “[I]t is for the court to determine whether, as a matter of law, a given defect is not dangerous. This is to guarantee that cities do not become insurers against the injuries arising from trivial defects.” (Id. citing Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734.)

Here, Flintridge bears the burden to demonstrate there is no triable issue of fact as to whether El-Rabaa’s omissions created a dangerous condition. The Court finds they have not done so.

Flintridge argues that MUTCD sections 2A.04 and 2C.02 advise against the use of unnecessary warning signs. (Exh. 13 at p. 85.) Regardless, Flintridge provides no declaration (except El-Rabaa’s own) that the yield line and the R-15 were unnecessary. The necessity of the signs as included in the design appears to the Court to create a triable issue of fact.

Flintridge also argues that the yield lines were not statutorily required. (Miller Decl. ¶¶ 31-32.) In support, Flintridge submits the declaration of Rock Miller (Miller), a registered traffic engineer. Miller states that yield lines are only required by Section 3B.18 ¶ 09a of the MUTCD where the speed limit exceeds 40 miles per hour. (Id.; see Exh. 12.) Miller states that yield lines were not required here because the speed at the subject intersection is limited to 30 miles per hour. (Id.) The Court finds this declaration is insufficient to erase a triable issue of fact. Whether a yield line is statutorily required is a separate matter from whether it was necessary for this specific intersection. Further, if the yield lines were unnecessary and dangerously so, why then were they included in the designs which Flintridge claims adhere to all applicable standards?

In short, the Court finds Flintridge has not carried its prima facie burden to demonstrate no triable issue of material fact as concerns the dangerous condition. Flintridge has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ entire cause of action is without merit such that it should be dismissed upon a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

The City of La Cañada Flintridge’s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on April 4, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.

PLAINTIFFS TO GIVE NOTICE.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.