Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCP00117, Date: 2024-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCP00117    Hearing Date: March 29, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

After being struck by an uninsured motorist on April 17, 2018, David Minkin (Claimant) brings this uninsured motorist action against his insurer United Financial Casualty Company (Respondent).

Claimant now moves to quash 11 of Respondent’s subpoenas requesting his medical records. Claimant argues that the subpoenas are facially overbroad and outside the scope previously agreed to by counsel. Respondent opposes the motion, arguing they are entitled to medical records from a broader time period.  

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) § 1987.1 grants the trial court authority to quash a subpoena when necessary.  C.C.P. 1987.1 states, “If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.  In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”   

The party asserting the right of privacy, bears the initial burden of demonstrating (1) a “legally protected privacy interest”; (2) an “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances”; and (3) a “threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If the asserting party meets this standard, responding party must then show that the requested documents are “directly relevant” to the litigation. (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387, citing Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859.)

In considering whether good cause has been shown to quash or enforce a subpoena, the California Supreme Court in the recent case of Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 345-346, provided a list of seven factors to be considered: (1) Whether the party seeking production has met its burden of showing a “plausible justification” for obtaining the documents from a third party witness; (2) whether the material sought is adequately described and not overly broad; (3) whether the material is “reasonably available” to the person from which the records are sought and not readily available to the person seeking production; (4) whether production would violate the “confidentiality or privacy rights” of a third party; (5) the timeliness of the request; (6) whether the time required to produce the requested information would unreasonably delay trial; (7) whether production of the requested information places an unreasonable burden on the third party.

II.                 MERITS

The Subpoenas

Respondent issued the 11 subpoenas in question on February 5, 2024 and February 9, 2024. (Selame Decl. ¶ 3-4.) These subpoenas follow a series of prior subpoenas issued and retracted after the parties met and conferred. (Kim Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

Subpoenas No. 1-11 are directed to various healthcare providers and pharmacies utilized by Claimant after the collision. Each subpoena requests “all documents” relevant to Claimant which are in the provider’s control. The time frame in which these documents are sought is listed as “from the first date to, and including, the present”. Essentially the subpoenas request the provider turn over all documents in their possession regarding Claimant from the time he began utilizing them.

Claimant argues that each of these subpoenas is overly broad in both scope and time. Claimant states that the parties previously stipulated to limit the subpoenas to the body areas injured in the underlying incident. (Kim Decl. ¶ 5.) The areas in question are Claimant’s upper right back, cervical spine/neck, lumbar spine/low back, head, and ventral (abdominal) hernia. (Kim Decl. ¶ 4.)

Claimant also argues that the parties previously agreed to a five-year time frame for the records requested, which would be from the time of the incident forward. (Kim Decl. ¶ 5.) Claimant states that this agreement was reached after extensive meet and confer following the initial subpoenas. (Id.) Claimant states that Respondent’s counsel agreed to retract the previous subpoenas and issue new ones more limited in scope. (Kim Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6.)

Respondent agrees that the parties stipulated to limit the requests to the relevant body parts but disagrees that they reached an agreement on the time frame. (Salame Decl. ¶ 5.) In declining to limit the temporal scope of the February subpoenas, Respondent’s counsel informed Claimant’s counsel “We have reason to believe that your client treated with the named facilities prior to the accident and failed to disclose [sic] same in his deposition or discovery responses. Further, 5 years is too narrow a period of time considering the information we have received regarding these facilities” (Kim Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. E.)

Claimant counters that Respondent’s counsel never enumerated a reason for their belief that Claimant had treated with the providers prior to the incident. Claimant states that they agreed to broaden the scope of the subpoenas if such information was provided, but Respondent’s counsel never stated their reasoning. (Kim Decl. ¶ 12, Exh. E.)

Discussion

The Court first notes that the parties appear to agree that any order of this Court regarding the subpoenas should limit the requests to documents which concern Plaintiff’s upper right back, cervical spine/neck, lumbar spine/low back, head, and ventral (abdominal) hernia. Respondent’s counsel does not dispute that they agreed to such a limitation in meet and confer efforts and their opposition presents no argument as to why the scope of “all documents” is appropriate.

Secondarily, the Court finds that Claimant has adequately demonstrated a privacy interest in his medical records. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Williams supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552 [internal citations omitted].) The general rule is that medical records are protected by the right of privacy. (John B. v. Superior Court (Bridget B.) (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 119.) Here, Plaintiff has appropriately asserted that his medical records are subject to privacy protection.

The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures which would diminish the invasion of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552 [internal citations omitted].) Here, Respondent and Claimant appear to agree that some countervailing interest exists by virtue of Claimant putting his medical condition into issue.

The parties essential disagreement is one over the temporal scope of requests. Claimant is adamant that the documents should be limited to the past five years, while Respondent is adamant that the period should be ten years.

“[P]laintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury’; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing [a] lawsuit, …they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Britt supra, 20 Cal.3d at 864 [citation and footnote omitted].) However, “... privacy interests may have to give way to [an] opponent’s right to a fair trial. Thus, courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)

Here, the Court finds that Respondent has not shown that a time period of ten years is necessary for the discovery of relevant facts in this case. While Claimant’s medical history for the past five years appears to be indisputably relevant to the instant case, Respondent’s reasoning for the necessity of a ten-year time frame is unsupported. Respondent informed Claimant that they were unwilling to accept the five-year time frame because they had reason to believe Plaintiff treated with the providers prior to the accident. When asked what their belief was based on, Respondent replied that they were not willing to divulge the source of their information. (Moreton Decl. ¶ 3.) Respondent does not include any exhibits or declarations in their opposition further supporting their belief.

While the Court understands the need for strategy in litigation, the fact remains that Respondent bears the burden of showing a countervailing interest to Claimant’s privacy right. If Respondent desires disclosure over a longer period than appears facially relevant, it is incumbent upon Respondent to justify that interest. The Court does not find the mere belief that Claimant treated with the providers prior to the accident establishes such an interest. Without supporting facts, it does not appear that Claimant’s treatment with any of these providers prior to the accident is relevant to this litigation.

In short, the Court finds the subpoenas to be overbroad in both time and scope. Accordingly, the motion to quash the 11 subpoenas is GRANTED.

Sanctions

The court may, in its discretion, order the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred on the motion to quash, if it finds that the motion was “made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (C.C.P. § 1987.2(a).) Here, the Court finds that the motions were not made or opposed in bad faith. Nor does the Court find Respondent’s opposition was without substantial justification. Although Respondent ultimately failed to demonstrate that a wider time frame was appropriate, it does not follow that their arguments were entirely without merit.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

David Minkin’s Motion to Quash Subpoena came on regularly for hearing on March 29, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO QUASH IS GRANTED.  

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  March 29, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles