Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV00088, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23BBCV00088 Hearing Date: November 8, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
NOVEMBER 8,
2024
DEMURRER
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 23BBCV00088
MP: Steven
Taback M.D., Erik Sitker M.D., Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center, and Vanessa
Nicole Ybarra, R.N. (Defendants)
RP: Mary
Baghikian & the Estate of Sarkis Baghikian (Plaintiff)
The Court
is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear
is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling,
no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other
parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the
party’s intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become
the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice
may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818)
260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS:
Mary Baghikian & the Estate
of Sarkis Baghikian (Plaintiffs) bring this action against Providence Health
& Services, Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center (collectively
Providence), Jarod Michael Keller, M.D., Jilbert Issai, M.D., Dr. Steven Taback
(Taback), Dr. Erik Sitker (Sitker), Dr. Conrad, Dr. Harris, Vanessa Nicole
Ybarra (Ybarra), R.N., Gilead Sciences, Inc., Veklury, and Genentech Inc.
Plaintiffs allege that Sarkis Baghikian (Decedent) was a patient of Providence who
was treated for Covid-19. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent was given medication
for Covid-19 and intubated against his will, resulting in his eventual death.
Plaintiffs initial Complaint
stated 14 causes of action for (1) Wrongful Death- Negligence, (2) Wrongful
Death-Negligent Supervision, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
(4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (5) False Imprisonment, (6)
Discrimination, (7) Strict Products Liability, (8) Products Liability-Failure
to Warn, and (9) Premises Liability.
On June 14, 2024, the Court
sustained a demurrer by Taback and Sitker to each of these causes of action. The
Court found that each cause of action was preempted by the immunity conferred upon
Taback and Sitker under the Federal
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”) (42 U.S.C.
§§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e.) The Court granted leave to amend insofar as it found
it was not impossible that Plaintiff could allege facts showing his claims fell
outside the PREP Act.
Plaintiffs’ FAC now states only two causes of action for (1) Wrongful
Death Sounding in Constructive Fraud and (2) Survival Action Sounding in
Violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. The
causes of action are stated against all Defendants.
Taback, Sitker, Providence, and Ybarra
(hereinafter Moving Defendants) all now demur to each cause of action in the
Complaint. Moving Defendants challenge
each cause of action on the ground the Court does not have jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ claims because they are barred by the Federal Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) (42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e.) Plaintiffs
oppose and Moving Defendants reply.
ANALYSIS:
I.
LEGAL
STANDARDS
Demurrer
The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the
face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. §
430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a
demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Id.)
A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual,
material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. (Blank v.
Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable,
the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling
on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981)
123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions;
deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts
impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take
judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318.)
Pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the
party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the
grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible.
It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if
there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando
v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)
II.
MERITS
Meet and Confer
C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) and 435.5(a) require that the moving
party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to
the demurrer and/or motion to strike. Upon review the Court finds the meet and
confer requirements were met. (Tredway Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Munoz Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.)
Grounds for Demurrer
As a
preliminary matter the Court notes that a demurrer under C.C.P. § 430.10(a) may
be used to secure dismissal of a superior court action based on federal law
preemption. (Ball v. GTE Mobilnet of Cal. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
529, 535.) This may be shown by, among other things, the “explicit language of
a federal statute.” (Id.)
Discussion
The Court previously sustained
the demurrer of Taback and Sitker as to each cause of action in the Complaint.
The Court found that Plaintiffs’ claims were preempted as a matter of Federal
Law, evidenced by the clear language of the PREP Act. While the Court will not
retread its prior reasoning, it will provide a summary below for the sake of
clarity.
The
Federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”) (42 U.S.C.
§§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e.) was signed into law in 2005 and, among other things,
provides immunity from liability for claims of loss caused, arising out of,
relating to, or resulting from administration or use of countermeasures to
disease, threats, and conditions. PREP Act immunity applies to any “covered
person” with respect to all “claims for loss” caused by, arising out of,
relating to, or resulting from the “administration” or the “use” of a “covered
countermeasure” if a declaration has been issued with respect to that
countermeasure. (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).)
42 USC
§ 247d-6d(d)(1) provides that “the sole exception to the immunity from suit and
liability of covered persons ... shall be for an exclusive Federal cause of
action against a covered person for death or serious physical injury
proximately caused by willful misconduct ... by such covered person.” Such an
action “shall be filed and maintained only in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.” (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(1).
In
response to COVID-19, the Secretary of Health and Human Services for the United
States issued a declaration that provided PREP Act immunity for individuals and
entities responding to Covid-19. (85 Fed. Reg. 15198, Mar. 17, 2020.)
The
Court has already held that Plaintiffs allegations indicate (1) that Taback and
Sitker are “covered persons” within the meaning of the PREP ACT, (2) that the
administration of Remdesivir and Dexamethasone as a treatment for Covid-19 were
“covered countermeasures”, and (3) that Plaintiffs’ claims all arise out of or
relate to the use of this covered countermeasure. All of the allegations which
permitted the Court to makes its previous ruling remain present in the FAC.
The
Court notes that Plaintiffs do not contest that Moving Defendants are “covered
persons” within the meaning of the PREP Act. A “covered person” includes “a
qualified person who prescribed, administered, or dispensed such
countermeasure” or its agent or employee. (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(2).) A
“covered countermeasure” includes a “qualified pandemic or epidemic product”
which is further defined as a product manufactured or developed to “limit the
harm such pandemic or epidemic might otherwise cause.” (42 U.S.C. § 247(i)(1)
and (7).) Here, Plaintiffs specifically allege that Moving Defendants either prescribed,
administered, or dispensed Remdesivir and Dexamethasone to Decedent. 42 U.S.C.
§ 247d-6d(i)(2) is clear that a “covered person” includes both persons and
entities which are manufacturers, distributors, program planners, or qualified persons
administering a covered counter measure.
Given
the above, the question presented by these subsequent demurrers is whether the
additional allegations of Plaintiffs’ FAC are sufficient to establish that
their claims do not arise from or relate to Decedent being given Remdesivir and
Dexamethasone. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ amended allegations do not
achieve this.
The
following is a list of relevant factual allegations which carry over from the
Complaint to the FAC:
·
Plaintiffs
maintain that Taback and Sitker were licensed physicians providing medical care
at Providence Saint Joseph Medical Center (PSJMC). (FAC ¶ 7.)
·
Plaintiff
maintains the allegation that the doctors at Providence, referred to in the
aggregate, diagnosed Decedent with pneumonia. (FAC ¶ 38.)
·
Plaintiffs
maintain the allegation that Decedent was admitted to Providence as a Covid-19
patient. (FAC ¶ 39.)
·
Plaintiffs
maintain the allegation that the nurses and doctors ignored Decedent for hours
at a time after learning he was unvaccinated. (FAC ¶¶ 45, 49, and 120.)
·
Plaintiffs
maintain that Decedent received treatment with Remdesivir and Dexamethasone
with no explanation of the side effects. (FAC ¶ 46.)
·
Plaintiffs
maintain that Decedent was intubated without his consent or the consent of his
family. (FAC ¶¶ 55-61.)
The
majority of Plaintiffs’ additional allegation on amendment revolve around
alternative treatments which could have been administered to Decedent.
Plaintiffs allege at length that Remdesivir and Dexamethasone were abnormally dangerous,
and Providence pushed its doctors/staff to administer them despite the risks.
(FAC ¶¶ 22-24.) Plaintiffs allege that Providence did this in order to
obtain Federal subsidies. (Id.) This allegation has no bearing on
whether the administration of Remdesivir and Dexamethasone were a covered
counter measure under the PREP Act. To the extent that Plaintiffs believe any
of the Defendants willfully ignored the risks associated with Remdesivir and
Dexamethasone in treating Decedent, the PREP Act is clear that such claims must
be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
(42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(1).
The
same can be said for Plaintiffs’ additional allegations that Decedent could
have more effectively been treated with Ivermectin and Hydroxychloroquine. (FAC
¶¶ 25-30.) Plaintiffs’ allegation
is still that Moving Defendants employed a less effective method to treat
Decedent, rather than ones that Plaintiffs claim would have produced a better
result. This claim is clearly related to the employment of a covered counter
measure under the PREP Act.
This
pattern continues with Plaintiffs’ additional allegations as to the refusal of
Taback and Sitker to disclose the risks of Remdesivir and Dexamethasone.
Plaintiffs now allege that Taback and Sitker specifically refrained from
informing Decedent about treatment with Remdesivir and Dexamethasone (1) in
order to avoid being ostracized or jeopardize their working relationship with Providence,
(2) because they believed that they had immunity from liability under the PREP
Act if Remdesivir was used, and (3) to avoid Decedent declining treatment if
alternative treatments were disclosed. (FAC ¶ 31.) In short, Plaintiffs allege
that Taback and Sitker deliberately jeopardized Decedent’s health to preserve
their own status and secure financial gain. These allegations are both (1)
related to the administration of covered countermeasures, and (2) indicative of
a claim for willful misconduct which must be brought in the D.C. District
Court.
If
anything, Plaintiffs’ additional allegations have only further drawn their
claims into the purview of the PREP Act. Under California law, “willful
misconduct” is any intentional act of an unreasonable character undertaken in
disregard of a known risk or a risk so obvious that the actor must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make the harm highly probable. (Cleveland
v. U.S. (N.D. Cal. 2008) 546 F.Supp.2d 732, 771.) Whereas Plaintiffs’
previous allegations as to the administration of Remdesivir and Dexamethasone
could have sounded in negligence, their FAC clearly alleges intentional conduct
rising above the level of mere negligence. Plaintiffs cannot hereafter retract
these allegations lest they run afoul of the sham pleading doctrine. Regardless
of whether they sound in negligence or willful misconduct, the PREP Act is
clear that claims related to a covered counter measure cannot proceed in state court.
Plaintiffs FAC has added no allegations of conduct by Moving Defendants which
do not arise from or relate to a covered countermeasure.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that PREP Act immunity cannot apply because Decedent
was not a “covered individual” under 42 USC 247d-6e. The argument
misunderstands the PREP Act. The only citation to the statute that Plaintiffs
provide is to 42 USC 247d-6e(c) which outlines the requirement for the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to properly inform treatment providers
as to the voluntary nature of the program. This section has nothing to do with
the person receiving treatment. No provision of 42 USC 247d-6e supports
Plaintiffs’ argument that Moving Defendants are not immune because Decedent did
not opt in to the PREP Act.
Plaintiffs’
argument that this Court should follow the ruling in Eaton v Big Blue
Healthcare, Inc. 480 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1193-94 is unpersuasive. Eaton found
that the PREP Act was inapplicable to its plaintiff’s case because the
allegations involved inaction rather than action. In Eaton, the
plaintiff brought suit concerning the death of their mother who was a resident
in a nursing home alleging the defendants caused her death by failing to
implement protocols to prevent Covid- 19. The Eaton plaintiff did not
make any allegations that her mother died because of the use of any covered
countermeasures. Thus, the PREP Act was not applicable. Here, Plaintiffs make
explicit allegations that Decedent died as a result of Moving Defendants’ use
of Remdesivir and Dexamethasone.
As
concerns Plaintiffs’ argument that Moving Defendants cannot claim immunity
under Cal. Gov. Code § 8659, the Court fails to see the relevance of this
argument. The PREP Act is clear that its immunity is preemptive of state law.
Nor does Taback and Sitker’s failure to prove the acted in “response to a
government request” under Cal. Gov. Code § 8659 have anything to do with the
applicability of the PREP Act.
In
conclusion, Plaintiffs’ additional allegations upon amendment are insufficient
to avoid the application of immunity under the PREP Act. Plaintiffs repackaging
of their claims as being for Constructive Fraud and Elder Abuse does not change
the nature of the facts that they allege. It is clear from the FAC that any
claims Plaintiffs have against Moving Defendants arise out of or relate to the
allegedly intentional administration of a covered countermeasure under the PREP
Act. The PREP Act is clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction over those
claims.
Accordingly,
the demurrers of Steven Taback M.D., Erik Sitker M.D., Providence Saint
Joseph Medical Center, and Vanessa Nicole Ybarra, R.N. are SUSTAINED as to each
cause of action without leave to amend.
---
RULING:
In the event the parties submit on this
tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the Court in its
discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either
electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the Court’s
records.
ORDER
Steven Taback M.D., Erik Sitker M.D., Providence
Saint Joseph Medical Center, and Vanessa Nicole Ybarra, R.N.’s Demurrers came on regularly for hearing on November
8, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said
hearing, and the Court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there
rule as follows:
THE DEMURRERS TO EACH CAUSE OF ACTION ARE
SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
DEFENDANT PROVIDENCE TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: November
8, 2024 _______________________________
F.M. Tavelman, Judge
Superior
Court of California
County of Los Angeles