Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV00502, Date: 2023-12-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV00502    Hearing Date: December 22, 2023    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Damaris Teret and Saul Hurtado (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) for alleged violation of the Song Beverly Act. Plaintiffs alleges GM sold them a defective 2020 Chevrolet Tahoe. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the Subject Vehicle suffers recurring and unpredictable engine defects.  

Plaintiffs now move to compel GM’s further responses to their Request for Production of Documents (“RFPD”) Nos. 16, 19-32, 37-41 and 45-46. GM opposes the motion and Plaintiffs reply.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFPD”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. § 2031.310(c).) 

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  

If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

"The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (C.C.P. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)  

II.                 MERITS

Meet and Confer

Upon review, the Court finds the meet and confer efforts sufficient. (Thomas Decl. ¶¶ 10-19.)

Plaintiffs’ Request

Plaintiff seeks an order compelling GM further respond to the following RFPD:

RFPD No. 16 which requests GM’s warranty claims policy and procedure manuals from 2021 to the present.

RFPD Nos. 19-32 which requests various information regarding GM’s policies and procedures for conducting repurchases of vehicles in complaints with the Song Beverly Act.

RFPD Nos. 37-41 which concerns codes for defects, customer complaints, and repairs for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle.

RFPD Nos. 45-46 which requests all documents related to customer complaints and repairs made to 2020 Chevrolet Tahoe vehicles.

RFPD Nos. 16, 19-32, and 45-46

To determine whether responses can be compelled the Court must first determine if Plaintiffs have shown good cause. Plaintiffs state the existence of corporate policies surrounding vehicle repurchase are highly probative of whether GM’s refusal to repurchase the vehicle was “willful” as required by Song-Beverly. Plaintiffs argue this potential probative value creates good cause for their request. The Court agrees. These requests all concern GM’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies that would be highly relevant to a determination of whether GM’s refusal to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicle was willful under the statute.

GM initially served objections to these requests and stated that no documents would be produced. In reply, Plaintiff states that the parties have since signed a stipulated protective order and GM has rendered subsequent production responsive to these requests. (Reply p. 1.) GM states it has already produced its Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual and the policies and procedures used to evaluate lemon law claims and repurchase requests and its California Customer Engagement Center training materials in response to Request for Production Nos. 16, 19-32, and 45-46.

Plaintiffs agree that subsequent production has occurred for these requests. Plaintiffs state that GM’s confidential production consists of several hundred files, mostly in .pdf format, identified only by a bates number. Plaintiffs argue that GM served no supplemental responses to Plaintiffs’ RFPDs that identify which documents are responsive to which requests. As a result, Plaintiffs do not know whether GM’s responses to any of Plaintiffs’ RFPDs is complete. It appears Plaintiffs believe they have the documents they need; they just have no means to parse the information. 

It appears to the Court the dispute regarding these requests could be resolved by GM serving subsequent responses which identify each document by the request they are responsive to. As it stands, GM’s subsequent production of a litany of documents is not an adequate response to Plaintiffs’ requests.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to these requests is GRANTED. Supplemental responses appropriately identifying the responsive documents are to be produced within 30 days.

RPFD Nos. 37-39

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown good cause for the production of these documents. The documents Plaintiffs seek concern onboard diagnostics codes, vehicle symptoms codes, and component repair codes affecting vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the Subject Vehicle. It is no stretch of the imagination that these documents could tend to prove facts concerning the alleged defect in the Subject Vehicle. As such, the burden shifts to GM to justify its objections.

GM first objects to these requests on grounds that the term “sufficient to identify” is vague and ambiguous. GM does not substantively brief this objection in their opposition. The Court finds this objection to be without merit. It is clear from the language of the requests Plaintiffs seek all documents which identify the codes requested, whichever documents those may be.

GM also objects on grounds the requests are overbroad and seek documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because they are not limited to the vehicle at issue in this action. GM has maintained this objection after subsequent production.

In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.) It must be noted that discovery rules are to be applied liberally “and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653-654.) In fact, evidence regarding other vehicles with similar defects as Plaintiffs’ could potentially be admissible at trial in a lemon law action. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154; see also Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971.) The Court finds Plaintiffs’ requests are reasonably particularized.

GM argues Donlen is irrelevant to the issue of discoverability. (Oppo. pg. 7.) The Court disagrees. While Donlen does not specifically address the scope of discovery requests, it does concern the admissibility of evidence of defects in similar vehicles. It follows that if evidence of a type is admissible then it must also be discoverable.

GM also objects on grounds the requests are burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.

GM fails to substantiate any objection based on undue burden. Undue burden objections must be accompanied by a specific factual showing setting forth the amount of work necessary to respond to the subject discovery. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court supra, 56 Cal.2d at 417-418.) GM has made no such showing here.

GM also objects on grounds the requests seek confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. GM submits the declaration of Huizen Lu (“Lu”). The Lu declaration demonstrates that warranty related documents contain highly confidential, proprietary, and commercially sensitive information such as engineering, warranty, and root cause analysis; engineering and manufacturing specifications and testing; component or product improvement; and costs and financial forecasts. (Lu Decl. ¶¶ 33 & 38). Pursuant to the stipulated protective order, any documents which contain such information may be designated as confidential by GM. GM requests that any further production ordered of them be subject to protective order. Given that a protective order is already in place, the Court finds any further production by GM is subject to the protective order.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED as to RFPD Nos. 37-39.

RFPD Nos. 40-41

The requests ask for documents sufficient to show customer complaint codes, and labor operation codes from 2021 to present. Unlike RFPD Nos. 37-39, these requests contain no limitations to the same model, make, or year as the Subject Vehicle and include a much wider swath of information which exceeds the relevance of this case.

As previously stated Donlen and Doppes concerned evidence which was directly related to vehicles of the same model and year, not generalized requests for defects in any engine utilized by a manufacturer. Given that no such limitations exist here, the Court finds these requests impermissibly broad in scope.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED as to RFPD Nos. 40-41.

Sanctions

The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (C.C.P. § 2033.290(d), C.C.P. §¿2030.300(d).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. As such, the Court finds GM’s opposition was substantially justified. Likewise, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ motion was not without merit.  The Court accordingly declines to award sanctions at this time.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Damaris Teret and Saul Hurtado’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents came on regularly for hearing on December 22, 2023, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS GRANTED AS TO NOS. 16, 19-32, AND 45-46.

THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS DENIED AS TO NOS. 40-41.

FURTHER PRODUCTION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN 30 DAYS.  

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: December 22, 2023                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles