Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV00639, Date: 2023-09-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV00639    Hearing Date: January 12, 2024    Dept: A

DEMURRER
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV00639

NOTICE: 

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”   

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. 

ALLEGATIONS: 

Jean Aintablian (“Plaintiff”) brings this action, individually and as successor in interest to Sera Aintablian (“Decedent”) against the People of the State of California (“State”) in connection with a motor vehicle accident that occurred March 24, 2022. Plaintiff alleges a dangerous condition was present on the US-101 which created substantial risk of injury. Plaintiff further alleges the State is liable for injuries to Decedent pursuant to Government Code § 835. 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contains causes of action for (1) Negligence (as against Does 1-50) and (2) Dangerous Condition of Public Property (as against the State). 

The Court previously sustained the State’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for dangerous condition. On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed her FAC containing the same causes of action. 

The State now demurs to Plaintiff’s second cause of action on grounds that it is uncertain and fails to state sufficient facts. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and the State responds. 

ANALYSIS: 

I.          LEGAL STANDARD 

The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action.
(Ibid.) 

A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.  App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”) §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.) 

II.          MEET AND CONFER 

C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Prieto Decl. ¶¶ 5-8.) 

III.          MERITS 

The Court previously sustained the State’s demurrer with respect to the second cause of action for failure to state facts with sufficient particularity. Plaintiff’s Complaint contained only conclusory allegations as to the existence of a defect in the road such that no cause of action for dangerous condition was stated. Plaintiff subsequently filed her First Amended Complaint which seeks to rectify the issues raised on demurrer. Plaintiff’s additional facts speaking to the Dangerous Condition cause of action are as follows: 

Among other things, the roadway, including its curvature and lack of any warnings of the recommended speed for the curve, caused and/or contributed to decedent losing control of the Toyota Camry. Thereafter, decedent’s vehicle began to yaw and impacted the non-collapsible metal beam guardrail which had been installed to keep motorists from hitting the pole, but which Defendants…knew posed a substantial risk of injury to occupants of vehicles traveling on the freeway due to, among other reasons, prior incidents where vehicles had hit the guardrail. Defendants … should have, among other things, fixed the curvature of the roadway, provided the proper warnings about the curve, placed the pole for the signage outside of the freeway, and/or protected the pole with a collapsible guardrail with a different end treatment as Defendants … did after the subject fatal crash. Additionally, there existed a concealed trap caused by the curvature of the roadway and lack of warnings of the recommended speed for the curve. 

(FAC ¶ 17.) 

The Court notes the State demurs on grounds that the FAC is both uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute the Dangerous Condition cause of action. These are two separate grounds for demurrer with separate legal standards. The Court will address each in turn. 

Insufficient Facts 

“[T]o state a cause of action [for government tort liability] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) “The limited and statutory nature of governmental liability mandates that claims against public entities be specifically pleaded. Accordingly, a claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on generalized allegations but must specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition.” (Goddard supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at 363 [internal citation omitted].) 

The State concedes that Plaintiff’s additional allegations regarding the curvature of the road and lack of warnings are sufficiently detailed to allege a defect in the road. The State’s demurrer is instead based on an apprehension that there are factual allegations which Plaintiff intends to utilize later which are not stated in the FAC. The State argues the employment of the phrase “among other things” in paragraph 17 indicates that there are other allegations which are not stated with sufficient specificity to give the State notice to defend against this claim. 

A demurrer is concerned with whether sufficient facts are alleged which constitute the cause of action. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) Here, the State admits that certain facts are pled with the requisite specificity required by statute. The State’s argument is not that the FAC doesn’t state sufficient facts, it is that the FAC indicates there may be additional facts which are omitted. The Court does not find the State’s argument speaks to a demurrer for sufficiency. If the phrase “among other things” were entirely deleted from the FAC, Plaintiff would still have alleged sufficient facts to constitute her cause of action. 

To the extent that the State argues the phrase “among other things” constitutes impermissible uncertainty, the Court will address this argument in the next section. 

Uncertainty 

“A special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made.” (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 883.) “Such a demurrer should not be sustained where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet.” (Id.) 

“Demurrers for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) are disfavored.” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

The State argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that Decedent was “traveling lawfully” is uncertain. (FAC ¶ 20.) The State argues that it cannot ascertain what is meant by this phrasing. The Court finds the phrasing, while peculiar, is easily interpreted as meaning Decedent was traveling on the road and obeying the law while doing so. Presumably this phrasing was used to preempt any sort of argument that Decedent was traveling at excessive speed or in any other way flaunting the rules of the road. In short, the employment of this turn of phrase does not constitute fatal uncertainty. 

The State next argues that the FAC fails to distinguish what is meant by the term “fatal collision”. (Fac ¶ 17.) The FAC describes (1) a collision between Decedent and another vehicle and (2) a collision between Decedent and the guardrail. (FAC ¶¶ 11 & 17.) The State argues that it is impossible to parse which of these collisions the FAC refers to as the “fatal collision”. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. Nowhere in the first cause of action describing the collision with the other vehicle does Plaintiff employ the phrase “fatal collision”. This phrase only appears in the second cause of action for Dangerous Condition. From the Court’s reading of the FAC it is clear that Plaintiff alleges Decedent was impacted by the other vehicle and then a dangerous condition of the road caused her to fatally collide with the metal guardrail. Even if this reading were not so clear, any ambiguities as to the order of events and when Decedent actually perished could be resolved through discovery. 

Lastly, the State argues that the phrase “among other things”, employed in describing the road’s defects, creates ambiguity in the FAC. The Court finds this argument similarly unpersuasive. It does not appear to the Court that “among other things” is indicative of anything other than a turn of phrase. Even if “among other things” is representative of other allegations of defect, it is clear that discovery could illuminate the parties as to any uncertainty. 

Conclusion 

The Court finds Plaintiff has adequately remedied the issues raised in the prior demurrer. The FAC contains facts which are sufficiently particular under statute such that Plaintiff can sustain her dangerous condition cause of action. Further, none of the pleadings in the FAC are so ambiguous as to be fatally uncertain, as any ambiguity which does exist could be resolved in discovery. Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED. Responsive pleadings shall be filed within 30 days. 

RULING: 

In the event the parties request a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records.  

ORDER 

The People of State of California’s Demurrer came on regularly for hearing on January 12, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the Court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:  

THE DEMURRER IS OVERRULED. 

RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS ARE DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS. 

THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE IS CONTINUED TO FEBRUARY 28, 2024. ALL OTHER DATES TO REMAIN.   

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, THE STATE IS TO GIVE NOTICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE:  January 12, 2024                              

_______________________________

                                                                        Yolanda Orozco, Judge

                                                                        Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles