Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV01008, Date: 2024-11-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV01008    Hearing Date: November 1, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Jinny McTague (Plaintiff) brings this action against Bryon & Cornelius Hopson (Defendants). Plaintiff alleges she was injured by virtue of Defendants’ negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to yield at Fairmount Road & 5th Street in Burbank, CA, resulting in a collision and Plaintiff being injured.

Before the Court is a Motion to Enforce Settlement brought by Defendants. Defendants argue that Plaintiff initially agreed to a settlement in writing but thereafter refused to comply. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that no settlement exists because she did not personally sign any writing memorializing the settlement.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

C.C.P. §664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809-810.) The trial court must first determine whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement. In making that determination, the trial court acts as the trier of fact, determining whether the parties entered into a binding and valid settlement. Trial judges may consider oral testimony or may determine the motion based upon declarations alone. (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 103 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1428-1429.)

II.                 MERITS

Relevant Facts

Defendants’ argue that Plaintiff refuses to honor a Settlement Offer Letter sent by her counsel on April 11, 2024. (Leaton Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 1.) This letter demanded Defendants settle in the amount of $100,000, reflecting the policy limits in the case. (Id.) This letter is signed by Plaintiff’s counsel, Victor C. Marshall. (Id.)

On April 15, 2024, Defendants’ counsel responded to the Settlement Offer Letter by accepting its terms. (Leaton Exh. B.) The language of the acceptance email is as follows:

I have authority to meet Ms. McTague’s demand of $100,000, inclusive of any and all liens, in exchange for USAA’s standard release of all claims signed by Ms. McTague and a dismissal of the entire action, with prejudice, each side bearing their own costs and fees. Cassandra will send the closing documents under separate cover tomorrow.

Please let us know if there are any applicable statutory liens as separate checks would need to be issued for Medicare, Medi-Cal or a CA ER lien.

Last, please file a notice of settlement with the court so that upcoming hearings can be vacated.

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “Thank you for the update. We will forward those to you immediately. And thank you.” (Leaton Exh. C.)

On April 16, 2024, Defendants’ counsel emailed Plaintiff’s (1) a letter regarding settlement, (2) a release, and (3) a request for dismissal. (Leaton Decl. Exh. D.) Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “Please find attached the RFD with Attorney Marshall’s signature. As soon as we have the release signed by Ms. Tague we will send it too. We will file the notice of settlement today.” (Leaton Decl. Exh. E.)

On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed an unconditional notice of settlement. This notice has since been withdrawn.

Party Signature v. Attorney Signature

Plaintiff’s primary argument in opposition is that the Settlement Offer Letter is not binding because she did not personally sign it. Plaintiff argues that her attorney’s signature is insufficient under C.C.P. § 664.6.

Traditionally, C.C.P. § 664.6 was interpreted to require a signature by both the party seeking to enforce a written settlement agreement and the party against whom enforcement is sought. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)74 Cal.App.4th 299, 305.) “Section 664.6 requires the parties’ signatures because settlement is such a serious step that it requires the client’s knowledge and express consent. [Citations.] A party’s signature fails to convey such knowledge and consent unless it is contained in a document that was clearly intended by that party to be a binding settlement agreement.” (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37 [internal quotations omitted].)

The authority relied upon by Plaintiff in opposing this motion reflects the traditional understanding. Plaintiff cites both Sully-Miller Contracting and Harris in asserting that the settlement agreement must be signed by Plaintiff and that the signature of her counsel cannot suffice. The holding in Sully-Miller Contracting and Harris on the invalidity of an attorney signature reflects a version of C.C.P. § 644.6 which has since been revised.

As explained in Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, C.C.P. § 644.6 was amended in January 2021. Prior to the amendment, C.C.P. § 664.6 read in its entirety as follows:

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.

(Id. citing Stats. 1981, ch. 904, § 2, p. 3437 [italics added].)

The January 2021 revision read as follows:

(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement....

(b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following: [¶] (1) The party. [¶] (2) An attorney who represents the party.

(Id. citing Stats. 2020, ch. 290, § 1.)

In 2024, C.C.P. § 664.6 was further revised to add the following:

(b): [¶] (3) If an insurer is defending and indemnifying a party to the action, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the party’s behalf.

(Id. at fn.4 citing Stats. 2023, ch. 478, § 12.)

The Griesman court explained that the 2021 revision was done with the explicit purpose of clarifying the legislative meaning behind the use of the word “parties” in the statute. (Id. at 192.) Previously, whether the statute’s use of the word “parties” allowed the signature of a representative attorney was a matter of judicial interpretation. (See Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586 [holding that the statutory context of the previous C.C.P. § 664.6 indicated the word “parties” was intended to reference only the litigants themselves].)

The subsequent revisions of C.C.P. § 664.6 removed the ambiguity contemplated in Levy. The current statute makes clear that the signature of a litigant’s attorney is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an enforceable settlement agreement. As discussed in Greisman, the Senate Rules Committee and Judiciary Committee contemplated that this revision would effectively remove the requirement for more direct involvement of the litigants in the settlement approval process. (Greisman supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 1310 citing Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2723 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 20, 2020, p. 5; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2723 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).) Despite this lowered protection, both committees determined this to be a reasonable trade off in streamlining the process of amicable resolution. (Id.)

Although Greisman concerned an oral stipulation before the Court, its discussion of the writing provisions of C.C.P. § 664.6 is instructive in this case. Greisman clarifies that an enforceable settlement agreement can be signed either by the litigant or their representative attorney. Plaintiff’s argument that she did not sign the agreement relies on an ambiguity in C.C.P. § 664.6 which no longer exists. Plaintiff’s Settlement Offer Letter is clearly signed by her counsel in satisfaction of C.C.P. § 664.6.

Release

Plaintiff next argues that the settlement is unenforceable because it was conditioned on her signing a Release sent by Defendants. As will be explained below, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s request for a Release in her Settlement Offer Letter is a condition precedent to the existence of a settlement in this case.

“A condition precedent is either an act of a party that must be performed or an uncertain event that must happen before the contractual right accrues or the contractual duty arises. Conditions precedent may be created either expressly—by words such as “subject to” or “conditioned upon”—or impliedly. They are generally disfavored and are strictly construed against a party arguing the agreement imposes one. Courts will not interpret a provision as a condition precedent absent clear, unambiguous language requiring that construction. (Estate of Jones (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 948, 953 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

Plaintiff argues that the following excerpt from her Settlement Offer Letter is a condition precedent to the creation of a settlement:

This offer is further conditioned on my client reviewing and executing a release to be draft[sic] by counsel for Cornelius and Byron Hopson, which also must be received by May 13, 2024.

(Leaton Decl. Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff argues that her signature on the Release was a condition for the formation of a settlement agreement. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. 

Here, the language of the Settlement Offer Letter does not state explicitly that the settlement itself is conditioned on the signing of the release. It instead states that “this offer” is conditioned on the receipt and signature of the release. In the Court’s view this wording is ambiguous. The Court does not see how a settlement can be conditioned on the occurrence of an event which can only happen after a settlement has been agreed to. If no settlement agreement has been reached, there is no reason for Defendants to draft a Release and no reason for Plaintiff to sign it. 

It appears far more likely to the Court that this language was intended simply to require Defendants to draft and send the Release. On this front, Defendants upheld their end of the bargain when they drafted and sent the Release as requested. Allowing Plaintiff to renege on the basis that she did not thereafter sign the Release makes little sense. It cannot be that Plaintiff can dispute the existence of a settlement simply because she refuses to sign a document specifically requested in her signed Settlement Offer Letter. 

Lastly, Plaintiff’s argument that the signing of the Release was a condition precedent to the formation of a settlement is undermined by her filing of an unconditional Notice of Settlement. If Plaintiff’s signature on the Release was a condition precedent to the settlement, Plaintiff has provided no explanation for why her counsel did not so state in the Notice of Settlement.

In short, Plaintiff’s refusal to sign the Release has no bearing on whether a settlement agreement was reached in this case. Plaintiff’s counsel specifically requested the release, Defendants obliged, and Plaintiff’s counsel then confirmed receipt with no modifications. That Plaintiff thereafter refused to sign the release does not negate the clear intentions of the parties to enter into a settlement. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement is GRANTED.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Bryon & Cornelius Hopson’s Motion to Enforce Settlement came on regularly for hearing on November 1, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT IS GRANTED.  

DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  November 1, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles