Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV01098, Date: 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV01098    Hearing Date: April 12, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Erika Gomez Sandoval (Sandoval) and Francisco Salazar (Salazar) (collectively Plaintiffs) bring this action against American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (Honda). Sandoval and Salazar allege that Honda sold them a defective 2019 Honda Odyssey (Subject Vehicle) and thereafter refused to repurchase the vehicle in violation of the Song-Beverly Act.

Before the Court are six motions brought by Honda to compel further responses to various discovery requests. Honda seeks further responses to its Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Requests for Admissions (RFA) from both Sandoval and Salazar. Plaintiffs oppose each of these motions, arguing that code compliant responses were served subsequent to Honda’s motions being served/filed. Salazar and Sandoval ask that the Court deny each motion as moot and deny Honda’s request for sanctions.  

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that the responses contain: (1) answers that are evasive or incomplete, (2)¿an unwarranted or insufficiently specific exercise of an option to produce documents in lieu of a substantive response, or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. §¿2030.300(a).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections thereto. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21.)

Motion to Compel Further Responses on RFA

On receipt of a response to requests for admission, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply: (1) an answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete or (2) an objection to a particular request is without merit or too general. (C.C.P. § 2033.290(a).)

II.                 MERITS

Discovery and Supplemental Responses

The facts concerning service of discovery are the same for each motion and for each Plaintiff. Honda asserts that it served all discovery on counsel for Plaintiffs on August 18, 2023. (Sloas Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Plaintiffs both returned “objection only” responses to Honda’s Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and RFA. (Sloas Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. C.) Honda thereafter attempted to meet and confer with counsel for Plaintiffs but received no further responses prior to the filing of these motions on January 12, 2024. (Sloas Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.)

Plaintiffs now state they have rendered supplemental responses to each request. (Grigoryan Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs’ counsel explains that the failure to provide supplemental responses was the result of the case changing managing attorneys. (Id.) Plaintiffs counsel states he was unaware of any outstanding discovery until he was notified that an opposition was due on the Court Docket. (Id.) It appears Plaintiffs served supplemental responses on February 16, 2024. (See Exh. 1, p. 6 of each Grigoryan Decl.)

Discussion

The disagreement of the parties is essentially over how the Court should rule on these motions in light of supplemental responses having been received. Honda does not claim that the supplemental responses are legally invalid or deficient in their reply papers. The argument is essentially one over the imposition of sanctions.

In cases where supplemental responses have been made after a motion to compel further responses has been filed, the Court has several options in how to resolve the motions. The Court finds the following excerpt from Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants to be instructive:

In many cases involving untimely responses, the propounding party will take the motion off calendar or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions. If the propounding party proceeds with the motion, however, the trial court has the discretion to rule on the motion. The trial court might compel responses without objection if it finds no legally valid responses have been provided to one or more interrogatories; it might deny the motion to compel responses as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part, and just impose sanctions; it might treat the motion as one under section 2030.300 and either determine that further answers are required, or order the propounding party to “meet and confer” (§ 2030.300, subd. (b)) and file a separate statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1020(a)(2), (c)); or it might take the motion off calendar, thereby requiring the propounding party to file a motion under section 2030.300.”

(Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390.)

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ oppositions all contain a quotation which they purport is from Sinaiko but is not actually in the case text. Plaintiffs quote “[w]here a supplemental discovery response is served before a motion to compel is heard, the court has substantial discretion in deciding how to rule in light of the circumstances presented, such as denying the motion as moot.” This quote does not appear anywhere in Sinaiko.  In fact, that quotation is from an unpublished Superior Court trial court order from the Orange County Superior Court.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Invensys Climate Controls Am., 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 131405.  These actions can be tantamount to professional misconduct for two reasons: (1) it falsely represents a quotation from a published Court of Appeal Opinion and (2) quotes an unpublished Superior Court trial court order that is generally not citable under CRC 8.1115, especially when it is not identified as originating from a trial court order, and not even from an Appellate Division of that trial court.  Furthermore, the trial court order originated outside of Los Angeles County and was represented as originating from a court that would have appellate jurisdiction over cases heard in Los Angeles – the California Courts of Appeal, Second District.  Ultimately, the Court agrees that Sinaiko expresses the Court’s discretion in these matters; nevertheless, the Court cautions that this erroneous quotation should be removed from any future filings.  Further violations will likely run afoul of the Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.  The Court will presume that this was simply an oversight by an inexperienced attorney and finds that no professional misconduct has occurred.

The above being established, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the motions, as filed, are moot. The Court reiterates that Honda’s reply papers do not contend the supplemental replies are insufficient. The Court sees no reason in issuing a ruling compelling the production of answers which have already been given at this point.

The Court does not agree with Plaintiff that sanctions should not issue. Despite Plaintiffs subsequently serving supplemental responses, the fact remains that Honda was forced to file these motions to receive those responses. However, in reviewing the amount of sanctions Honda requests, the Court finds them to be excessive. Each of Honda’s motions request $1,787.50 in sanctions. (Sloas Decl. ¶ 13.) Incorporated into this amount is four hours of travel time to appear at the hearing for these motions. (Id.) While the Court appreciates the in-person attendance of attorneys at hearings, it does not mandate such an appearance.  In fact, the vast majority of all court appearances in this court are generally remote appearances, unless for trial, evidentiary hearing, final status conference for trial, or some other hearing in which the Court mandates an in-person appearance.  The Court does not find four hours of travel to be a necessity in the modern setting of virtual hearings.  Furthermore, the Court has not requested argument on this matter.

The Court does not find the legal and factual issues of each motion were distinctive enough to warrant the granting of the same amount sanctions for all six motions but looks to all the motions together.

As such, the Court grants sanctions in the amount of $1,445 against Plaintiffs and their counsel, jointly and severally calculated as four hours of attorney time, one hour of court time and filing fees for two motions. (5 hours at $265 per hour plus $60 x 2). This amount appears reasonable to the Court considering the nature of the work performed and the relatively similar nature of each motion.

The Trial Preparation Order having previously been issued, the in-person  Final Status Conference and the Jury Trial date remain.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

American Honda Motor Company, Inc.’s Motions to Compel Further Responses came on regularly for hearing on April 12, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO HONDA’S DISCOVERY DEMANDS ARE DENIED AS MOOT.

SANCTIONS ARE ISSUED IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,445 AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY.

SANCTIONS TO BE PAID WITHIN 30 DAYS.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  April 12, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles