Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV01418, Date: 2024-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV01418    Hearing Date: March 29, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Lisa Stroway (Plaintiff) brings this action against West Palms Event Management (West Palms), Archie Cox (Cox), Cha Cha Jago (Jago), and Chad Mahaffey (Mahaffey) (collectively Defendants). Plaintiff claims that her horse contracted an infectious disease and ultimately died as the result of Defendants’ negligence. The Complaint states causes of action for (1) Negligence (as against all Defendants), (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (as against Cox, Jago, and Mahaffey), and (3) Defamation (as against Mahaffey).

Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings brought by West Palms. West Palms argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cause of action for Negligence against them. Plaintiff opposes the motion. West Palms has not replied.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

A defendant may bring a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings where the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (C.C.P. § 438(c)(1)(B).) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) “Such motion may be made on the same ground as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e., that the pleading at issue fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense.” (Id.)

“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (C.C.P. § 452; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) “When a court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable inferences from the facts pled.” (Duval v. Board of Tr. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.) “In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” (Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.)

“In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.)

II.                 MERITS

Facts

Plaintiff’s action stems from the contraction of an airborne equestrian disease (EVH-1) by her horse Amazing T, ultimately resulting in death. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13, 19.) Plaintiff alleges she entered Amazing T into a show hosted by West Palms in February of 2022. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also alleges that prior to this show, the California Department of Food & Agriculture had identified several positive cases of EVH-1 in horses located at Desert International Horse Park (Desert International). (Compl. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that West Palms implemented a ban on any horses from Desert International in response to the EVH-1 outbreak. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff further alleges that despite this ban, West Palms failed to prevent horses from Desert International from entering the February Show. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she inquired with West Palms as to the safety of the February show and was told West Palms had implemented a ban on Desert International horses. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff restates this allegation in paragraph 23, where she alleges that West Palms informed her that its February show would be safe and that it had implemented a ban on horses from Desert International.

Plaintiff alleges that Cox, Jago, and Mahaffey brought horses from Desert International to West Palms’ February show. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that two days after the February show, Amazing T began to exhibit symptoms of EVH-1. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Amazing T’s condition did not improve despite treatment, and he ultimately needed to be euthanized. (Compl. ¶ 19.)

Discussion

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

The crux of West Palms’ argument is that the Complaint does not allege a duty owed to Plaintiff. West Palms posits that they were not required to follow the United States Equestrian Federation recommendations concerning EVH-1, and that their failure to implement those measures cannot give rise to a duty. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive, as it omits West Palm’s creation of a ban on horses from Desert International. The Court finds that West Palms’ ban, and its subsequent advertisement, can support the existence of a duty.

Generally, a person has no duty to control the conduct of a third person, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct, in the absence of a “special relationship” either to the third person or to the victim. (Pamela L. v. Farmer (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 206, 209 citing Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435.) “However, this rule is based on the concept that a person should not be liable for nonfeasance in failing to act as a good Samaritan. It has no application where the defendant, through his or her own action (misfeasance) has made the plaintiff’s position worse and has created a foreseeable risk of harm from the third person. In such cases the question of duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care.” (Id. at 210 citing Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

“In determining whether one has a duty to prevent injury that is the result of third party conduct, the touchstone of the analysis is the foreseeability of that intervening conduct.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1148.)  Where there is a logical causal connection between the defendant’s negligent conduct and the intervening negligence of a third party, making the intervening negligence foreseeable, courts have found both a duty and liability. (Id. at 149.)

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an act by West Palms which made Plaintiff’s position worse, and which was foreseeable. The Court agrees that ordinarily West Palms would have no duty to protect Plaintiff’s horse simply by holding an open invitation to its February show. However, West Palms is alleged to have affirmatively implemented a ban on horses from Desert International and to have made that ban public knowledge. Further, Plaintiff alleges that she inquired with West Palms about the safety of the show and was informed of the ban in response. Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must do on this motion, the Court finds the implementation and advertisement of the ban created a duty. It is entirely foreseeable that a person who had been informed of the ban would conclude that the February show was safe and decide to attend the show. It is also entirely foreseeable that a subsequent failure to enforce that ban would result in the infection of healthy horses.

West Palms argues that “Plaintiff has indicated that Amazing T did not contract EVH-1 until ‘two days after leaving the LA February Show.’” (MJOP p. 5.) This is a misstatement of the Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Amazing T became sick two days after the show, not that Amazing T contracted the virus two days after the show. (Compl. ¶ 19.)

West Palms also argues that it could not possibly be expected to prevent the contraction of an airborne disease. Although West Palms does not state as much, the Court construes this argument as speaking to the element of breach. It appears West Palms is arguing that, even if they had a duty, the failure to prevent the disease is not a breach of that duty. The Court finds this argument misstates the nature of the alleged breach. The Complaint does not allege breach by way of failing to prevent EVH-1, it alleges breach by virtue of failure to enforce the ban which West Palms self-imposed.

Lastly, the Court finds West Palms’ argument that the failure to enforce the ban cannot be a “substantial factor” in Plaintiff’s injury to be outside the scope of this motion. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is concerned with the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s proof regarding causation. Whether Plaintiff has alleged causation and whether Plaintiff has proved causation are two entirely separate matters. It may be that a trier of fact would not find West Palms’ conduct to be a substantial factor, but such a possibility is irrelevant to the determination of this motion.

In short, the Court finds the Plaintiff has adequately alleged West Palms owed her a duty by virtue of the ban on horses from Desert International. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged breach by virtue of West Palms’ failure to enforce that ban. Lastly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged this breach caused Amazing T to contract EVH-1.

Accordingly, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

West Palms Event Management’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings came on regularly for hearing on March 29, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS DENIED.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, WEST PALMS TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  March 29, 2024                                 _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles