Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV01652, Date: 2024-04-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23BBCV01652 Hearing Date: April 5, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
APRIL 5, 2024
DEMURRER
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 23BBCV01652
| 
   MP:    | 
  
   Empire Properties, LLC, Radford
  Residential, LLC, and Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (Defendants)
     | 
 
| 
   RP:    | 
  
   Paulette Stokes (Plaintiff)  | 
 
 
The
Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is
required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no
argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the
court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention
to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the
court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”   
Notice
may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818)
260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS: 
Paulette Stokes (Stokes) brings this action against Empire Properties, LLC, Radford Residential, LLC, and
Apartment Management Consultants, LLC (Moving Defendants). Stokes alleges
that she and her personal property were injured in a fire at her apartment
complex on August 27, 2020. Plaintiff further
alleges that Moving Defendants’ negligence was a contributing factor to the
fire. 
Stokes’ Complaint
contains three causes of action for (1) Negligence, (2) Premises Liability, and
(3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
Moving Defendants now
demur to Stokes’ Complaint. Moving Defendants first demur generally to the
entire Complaint, arguing that it is identical to another pending action.
Moving Defendants also demur to each cause of action arguing that they are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Stokes opposes the demurrer
and Moving Defendants reply. 
ANALYSIS: 
I.           
LEGAL STANDARD 
The grounds for a
demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable
matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311,
318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Id.)
 
A demurrer assumes
the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged
pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how
unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true
for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural
Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.  App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not
include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the
complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a
court may take judicial notice.  (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d
at 318.)
 
Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”) §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a
complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the
pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or
that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse
of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a
reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando
v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)
II.           
MERITS 
Meet and Confer 
C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a)
requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the
pleading that is subject to the demurrer. Upon review the Court finds the meet
and confer requirements were met. (Sakr Decl. ¶ 5.) 
General Demurrer 
Moving Defendants
first argue that a general demurrer to Stokes’ Complaint is appropriate on
grounds that another identical action exists which precludes this one. Moving
Defendants contend this other action, Jose Lemus, et al. v. Empire
Properties, et al. LASC Case No. 21STCV09154, features Stokes as a
plaintiff making identical claims. (Dem. p. 6.) Moving Defendants argue the Lemus
matter consists of the same three causes of action resulting from the same
August 27, 2020 fire. Moving Defendants further argue that claimed damages are
identical in both cases. (Id.) 
Stokes argues that
she is no longer a plaintiff in the Lemus action. Stokes explains that
she was originally a plaintiff in the Lemus action but was removed via
the filing of an amended complaint. (Opp. p. 3.)    Stokes thereafter hired counsel to
represent her claims against Moving Defendants separately. (Id.) 
“The pendency of
another earlier action growing out of the same transaction and between the same
parties is a ground for abatement of the second action. The defendant may
assert the pending action as a bar either by demurrer, or where fact issues
must be resolved, by answer. In either case, where the court determines there
is another action pending raising substantially the same issues between the
same parties, it is to enter the interlocutory judgment specified in Code of
Civil Procedure section 597.” (Leadford v. Leadford (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 571, 574.) 
“A demurrer raising
this objection to a second action between the same parties is strictly limited
so that the defendant must show that the parties, cause of action, and issues
are identical, and that the same evidence would support the judgment in each case.”
(Pitts v. City of Sacramento (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 853, 856.) 
As previously stated,
upon Demurrer the Court is limited to considerations of the pleadings
themselves and facts which are subject to judicial notice. The Court notes that
neither party has requested judicial notice for the purposes of this demurrer.
Instead, Moving Defendants attach exhibits and declaration of their counsel in
support of their position. These submissions are outside the scope of a
demurrer. 
Regardless, the Court
possesses the power to judicially notice the records of any court of the State
of California. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) As such, the pleadings filed in the Lemus
matter are appropriate subjects for judicial notice. The Court takes
judicial notice of the following: 
·        
The Complaint in the Lemus
matter filed March 9, 2021.
·        
The First Amended
Complaint in the Lemus matter filed April 23, 2021. 
A review of these
documents reveals that while Stokes was a plaintiff in the Complaint, she is
afterward listed as a defendant in the First Amended Complaint (FAC). The Court
notes that while the Complaint is attached to Moving Defendants papers, the FAC
is absent. Regardless of this oversight, it is clear from the Court’s review of
the Lemus file that the FAC is the operative pleading in the matter. As
such, from the face of the Complaint in this matter and judicially noticeable
documents, it appears the parties are not identical between the two actions. 
Lastly, the Court
acknowledges but does not consider, Moving Defendants submission of deposition
testimony in the Lemus action. Moving Defendants offer a statement made
by counsel Terrence Butler during Stokes’ February 7, 2024 deposition. Moving
Defendants argue that Butler confirmed Stokes is a plaintiff in the Lemus action.
(Reply. Exh. 1.) The Court reiterates that this exhibit is outside the scope of
a demurrer as it is not judicially noticed. Further, the Court finds Butler’s
opinion of whether Stokes is a plaintiff is unpersuasive to her status as a
plaintiff by virtue of the actual pleadings of the case. 
Accordingly, the general
demurrer to the entirety of the Complaint on these grounds is OVERRULED. 
Statute of
Limitations 
Moving Defendants
also demurer to each cause of action on grounds that they are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Moving Defendants argue that each cause of
action includes time-bared claims of personal injury and that each is therefore
subject to demurrer. Stokes concedes that her claims of personal injury, which
are present in each cause of action, are barred as outside the two-year statute
of limitations. (See C.C.P. § 335.1) Stokes argues that this should not be
grounds for demurrer to the causes of action for Negligence and Premises
Liability because they also allege damage to personal property, which is
governed by a three-year statute of limitation. (See C.C.P. § 338.) 
The Court finds
Moving Defendants’ arguments unpersuasive. While a cause of action can be
subject to demurrer for being outside the statute of limitations, personal
injury claims are only a portion of Stokes’ causes of action for Negligence and
Premises Liability. “A demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a
cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City
of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028,
1047.) Here, Moving Parties request a demurrer be sustained as to both the
Negligence and Premises Liability causes of action merely because they include
claims of time-barred damages. A review of the Complaint shows the presence of
other damages claims, namely those of damage to Stokes’ personal property. As
such Moving Defendants’ demurrer is improperly directed to only part of the
Negligence and Premises Liability causes of action. To the extent that Moving
Parties wish the claims for personal injury to be removed from the Complaint,
it appears the appropriate vehicle would be a motion to strike. (See C.C.P. §
437.) 
Accordingly, the
demurrer to the first and second causes of action is OVERRULED. 
As concerns the third
cause of action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Stokes concedes
this entire cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
(Opp. p. 2 ¶ 4.) 
Accordingly, the
demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. 
--- 
RULING:
 
In the event
the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order
or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following
form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered
into the court’s records. 
ORDER 
Empire
Properties, LLC, Radford Residential, LLC, and Apartment Management
Consultants, LLC’s Demurrer came on regularly for hearing on April 15, 2024 with
appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the
court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as
follows: 
 
THE GENERAL DEMURRER TO THE ENTIRE COMPLAINT IS
OVERRULED. 
THE DEMURRER TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF
ACTION IS OVERRULED. 
THE DEMURER TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION IS
SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 
THE CASE
MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 5, 2024 IS CONTINUED TO AUGUST 15,
2024 AT 9:00 AM. 
UNLESS
ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANTS TO GIVE NOTICE. 
IT IS SO
ORDERED. 
 
DATE: 
April 5, 2024                            _______________________________ 
                                                                   
    F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 
Superior Court of California 
County of
Los Angeles