Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV01867, Date: 2023-12-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV01867    Hearing Date: December 22, 2023    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Blooming Life Hospice (“BLH”) and Narine Rafikovna Shakhmuradyan (“Shakhmuradyan”) (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Karina Akhtar (“Akhtar”) and Levine Management Group (“Levine”) (collectively “Defendants”). This action stems from a series of incidents which occurred in June of 2023.

BLH is a licensed hospice service provider in the State of California and Shakhmuradyan is its CEO. Levine is a property management company which maintains the Casa Del Sol Apartments, an apartment complex which caters to “seniors who have experienced homelessness and have a mental health diagnosis.” Akhtar is the property manager for the Case Del Sol Apartments.

On June 9, 2023, Shakhmuradyan visited the Casa Del Sol Apartments with the intent to offer hospice services to residents Kimberly Wilmont (“Wilmont”) and Alex Sotelo (“Sotelo”), to whom Shakhmuradyan had been referred. (Shakhmuradyan Decl. ¶ 3.) Shakhmuradyan alleges that she attempted to speak to Wilmont and Sotelo but was rebuffed by Akhtar. (Shakhmuradyan Decl. ¶ 5.) Akhtar informed Shakhmuradyan that there was no solicitation at Casa Del Sol, whereinafter Shakhmuradyan left and continued to converse with Wilmont at the back of the building. (Id.) Shakhmuradyan was then confronted by a male employee who asked for her identification and business card, which Shakhmuradyan state she went to retrieve from her car. (Id.) Shakhmuradyan attempted to present her business card and identification to Akhtar, who then informed them angrily that there was no solicitation. (Shakhmuradyan Decl. ¶ 6.) Shakhmuradyan decided it was best to leave the premises at this time. (Id.)

The following week Shakhmuradyan attempted to make peace with Akhtar though Wilmont. (Shakhmuradyan Decl. ¶¶ 8-12.) On June 20, 2023 Shakhmuradyan became aware that notices had been posted at Casa Del Sol accusing BLH of being “scammers and solicitors”. (Shakhmuradyan Decl. ¶ 13, Exh. 1.) The notice allegedly accused BLH of “foraging[sic] contracts with [residents] and taking large sums of finances out of your insurance…” (Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs allege the notices were Akhtar’s doing.

Defendants admit that Akhtar posted these notices but state the notices were promptly removed shortly after receiving a letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Akhtar Decl. ¶ 2, Cervantes Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) Defendants argue that Akhtar only posted these notices in the interest of protected Casa Del Sol’s vulnerable residents.

Plaintiffs now ask that Defendants be enjoined from “from further making false and damaging claims about Plaintiffs to others.” (Mot. p. 13.) Defendants oppose the motion and Plaintiffs reply.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. (Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Ass’n. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.) In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, the court looks to two factors, including “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 553-54.) The factors are interrelated, with a greater showing on one permitting a lesser showing on the other. (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.)

However, the party seeking an injunction must demonstrate at least a reasonable probability of success on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73-74.) The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits and the occurrence of irreparable harm. (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.) Irreparable harm may exist if the plaintiff can show an inadequate remedy at law. (C.C.P. § 526(a).)

II.                 MERITS

Plaintiffs ask that Defendants be enjoined from “from further making false and damaging claims about Plaintiffs to others.” Plaintiffs’ request constitutes a prior restraint on Defendants’ free speech which is constitutionally impermissible.

Free speech is protected under both the First Amendment and California Constitution. (See also San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. U.S. Citizens Patrol (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 964, 970 [“California’s provisions are ‘more protective, definitive and inclusive of rights to expression of speech than their federal counterparts.’”].) Prior restraint of free speech is generally unconstitutional. (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167 [“Prior restraints are highly disfavored and presumptively violate the First Amendment”].) “An order prohibiting a party from making or publishing false statements is a classic type of an unconstitutional prior restraint.” (Id.)

In Evans the California Court of Appeals found that a preliminary injunction enjoining the former wife of a police officer from making allegedly defamatory statements online was invalid. The Evans court concluded that “a court may not unconstitutionally prevent a person from uttering a defamatory statement before it has been determined at trial that the statement was defamatory.” (Id. at 1169.) Here, Plaintiffs also seek to restrain speech which has not yet occurred under the presumption of its defamatory natures. Evans makes clear this sort of restriction is impermissible.

Further, none of the exceptions to the rejection of prior restraint are present here. This is not a situation where Defendant is publishing Plaintiffs’ confidential information whereby any countervailing right of privacy may under extraordinary circumstances merit a preliminary injunction. (Id. at 1170.) Nor is this a situation where harmful publications equal criminal or illegal threats of violence whereby a preliminary injunction may be appropriate. (See City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 537.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Blooming Life Hospice and Narine Rafikovna Shakhmuradyan’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on regularly for hearing on December 22, 2023, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS DENIED.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.  

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  December 22, 2023                           _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles