Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02005, Date: 2024-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02005    Hearing Date: November 15, 2024    Dept: A

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS:

Crossroads Equipment Lease and Finance, LLC (Plaintiff) brought this action against Shane Weber dba Weber Enterprise (Defendant), alleging that Defendant breached a Finance Agreement for a 2021 Peterbilt 389 Tractor Truck (the Truck). Plaintiff sought an outstanding balance of $275,825.36, though this amount was offset by Plaintiff’s recovery of the Truck in December 2023 and it subsequent sale for $114,500.00.

On August 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for Summary Adjudication as to their first cause of action for Breach of Written Agreement. Plaintiff subsequently filed a voluntary dismissal of its five other causes of action. On September 11, 2024, judgment was entered against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $189,642.68.

Before the Court is a Motion for Attorney’s Fees brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to recover reasonable attorney’s fees in accordance with a provision in the Finance Agreement. Defendant has not opposed this motion. The Court notes that pursuant to C.R.C. Rule 8.54(c), failure to oppose a motion may be deemed consent to its being granted.

LEGAL STANDARD:

The prevailing party in “any action on a contract” shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees incurred to enforce that contract where the contract specifically provides for attorney's fees. (Civ. Code § 1717(a).)

The Court begins the attorney fee inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Id.) Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations for attorney’s fees are required; the record need only show that the attorney’s fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349.) A trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees in an amount that is less than the lodestar amount and, to discourage claimants from making an unreasonable demand, may deny altogether a fee request that appears unreasonably inflated. (Id. at 1321-1322; see Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)

“The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) “The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

MERITS:

Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees to be awarded in the amount of $11,497.50. This amount reflects a total of 33.5 hours of attorney work at a rate of $350 per hour, except for one hour which is billed at the associate’s rate of $325 per hour. (Khatchadourian Decl. ¶ 6.)

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the matter. C.C.P. § 1032(a)(4) defines a prevailing party as one with a net monetary recovery. The Court also finds that the written Finance Agreement between the parties allows Plaintiff to seek attorney’s fees in this matter. The attorney fees provision of the Finance Agreement is as follows:

Without limiting the foregoing, Lender may at its election declare any or all Agreements to be in default and exercise any and all rights and remedies available to Lender, including the following rights and remedies: ... (vii) declare all of Borrower's Obligations immediately due and payable including the following ("Default Amount"): ... (vii) all costs and expenses incurred by Lender in any repossession, transportation, recovery, storage, refurbishing, advertising, repair, sale, lease, or other disposition of the Equipment or Lender's enforcement of its rights hereunder, including Attorneys' fees. ... (d) If after any Default, any Agreement is placed in the hands of an attorney, collection agent or other professional for collection or enforcement of any other right or remedy of Lender, Borrower will pay all Attorneys' fees and associated costs and expenses and all costs of collections... (f) the term "Attorneys' Fees" shall include any and all attorneys' fees incurred by Lender (whether by its use of in-house counsel or otherwise) incident to, arising out of or in any way connected with Lender's interests in or defense of any Action or Lender's enforcement of its rights and interests under each Agreement, including attorneys' fees incurred by Lender to collect sums due, during any work-out, with respect to settlement negotiations, or in any bankruptcy proceeding (including attorneys' fees incurred in connection with any motion for relief from the automatic stay and any motion to assume or reject any Agreement)...

(Elli Decl., Exh. 1 at p. 3 ¶ 10.)

Given this suit was for the recovery of possession and past due account, the attorney’s fee provision is applicable.

As concerns the amount of fees requested, the Court finds them to be reasonable. “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford, supra at 396; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785.)

Here, Plaintiff presents uncontested records as to the number of hours spent on the case. The billable hours timesheets, submitted as attachments to the declaration Raffi Khatchadourian, reflect a total of 33.5 hours spent litigating this matter. In the Court’s experience, this number of hours is commensurate with the complexity of a case for breach of contract necessitating the repossession of commercial equipment. Further, the Court does not find anything about the billable hours entries to be clearly erroneous. In short, the number of hours billed is reasonably supported by Plaintiff’s uncontested declarations and documentary evidence.

As concerns the rate of Plaintiff’s attorneys, the Court finds this too is reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel states that they have over 26 years of business litigation experience and believe their rate to be at or below the rates charged by similar attorneys. Although Plaintiff does not submit any metrics by which this can be judged (i.e. the Wolters Kluwer Real Rate Report), the Court agrees that these rates are reasonable. In the Court’s training, experience, and expertise, this rate is below the average rate for attorneys practicing in the area of business litigation.

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has shown they are entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of $41,075 and costs in the amount of $11,497.50. Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated the reasonableness of these fees and costs, while Defendant has submitted no opposition. Accordingly, the Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Crossroads Equipment Lease and Finance, LLC’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees came on regularly for hearing on November 25, 2024 with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION IS GRANTED.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE AWARDED IN THE AMOUNT OF $11,497.50.

PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: November 15, 2024                           _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles