Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02097, Date: 2024-04-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02097    Hearing Date: April 26, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO STRIKE

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Llyod Mosely (Plaintiff) brings this action against GWH3, LLC. (Defendant) alleging violation of his rights under California Civil Code § 51. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s restaurant, located at 5342 Vineland Avenue in North Hollywood, California, contains physical conditions which deny him equal access to the facilities as a person who is quadriplegic. Plaintiff alleges that the bathroom at the restaurant does not contain the required amount of grab bars and that the toilet seat covers are placed in an inaccessible location. (FAC ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s FAC states causes of action for (1) Violation of California Civil Code § 51 and (2) Violation of California Civil Code §§ 54 and 54.1.

Defendant now moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. (FAC Prayer for Relief ¶ 1.) Plaintiff specifically states in his FAC that his is not seeking injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendant argues that injunctive relief is not permitted in an action brought solely under California Civil Code § 51. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS:

I.            LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. § 435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. § 431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. § 436 (b).)

II.            MERITS

Meet and Confer

C.C.P. § 435.5(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to a motion to strike. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Sahelian Decl. ¶ 3.)

Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in the Complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be struck because the type of relief it requests is barred by California Civil Code (Cal. Civ Code) § 52. Defendant reasons that because Plaintiff does not state any causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, his claims for injunctive relief must be predicated on the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh). While the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief must derive from Unruh, it disagrees that Cal. Civ. Code § 52 functions to limit the type of injunctive relief requested.

Cal. Civ. Code § 52 provides the remedies that may be imposed for a violation of the Unruh Act. Civil Code § 52(c)(3) provides that a complaint under the act must include:

A request for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for the conduct, as the complainant deems necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights described in this section.

The Court notes that Cal. Civ. Code §52(c) does not define preventive relief. As a result, Defendant cites to Cal. Civ. Code § 3368 which defines preventive relief as “prohibiting a party from doing that which ought not to be done.” Defendant contrasts this definition with the California Supreme Court definition of mandatory relief. “As a general rule, we think we may say that when the injunction merely grants preventive relief it is prohibitive, but when it directly or indirectly grants affirmative relief it is mandatory.” (Ohaver v. Fenech (1928) 206 Cal. 118, 122; see also Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 446-447 [“[T]he general rule is that an injunction is prohibitory if it requires a person to refrain from a particular act and mandatory if it compels performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties.”].)

In short, injunctions which seek to prohibit illegal conduct are deemed prohibitive/preventive while injunctions which seek to require affirmative action from the defendant are deemed affirmative/mandatory. This is a distinction derived from common law that the California Supreme Court has subsequently enshrined in case law. (See Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030 [“…courts have understood the default statutory rule governing stays pending appeal to apply to some injunctive orders but not others, embracing a common law distinction between prohibitory, or preventive, injunctions and those mandating performance of an affirmative act.”].)

The Court finds that the employment of the word preventive in Civil Code § 52(c)(3) was intended by the Legislature to limit the availability of injunctive relief requiring affirmative acts. If a word or phrase has a particular meaning in one part of the law, the court will give it the same meaning in other parts of the law. (Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 890, 899; see also Balasubramanian v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 977, 988 [“We must construe identical words in different parts of the same act or in different statutes relating to the same subject matter as having the same meaning.”].) Cal. Civ. Code § 3368 is a general statute which was enacted in 1872 outlining the tenets of injunctive relief. In instances where a specific statute does not define a term, the Court must look to the general statute for guidance in interpreting the legislative intent behind the use of that term. Here, the use of the term preventive in Cal. Civ. Code § 52 is undefined and thus its meaning is guided by the definition in the general statute dealing with injunctive relief, Cal. Civ. Code § 3368.

Further, in analyzing legislative intent the Court generally presumes the Legislature had knowledge of the legal principles and decisions relevant to the legislation. (See Mattco Forge Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 854 [“It is generally accepted principle that in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.”].) Here, the Court presumes the Legislature was aware of the general principles of common law governing injunctions and the Supreme Court decisions which have implemented those principles. Viewed under this lens, it is logical to conclude that the Legislature purposefully employed the word preventive to mean injunctive relief which does not require affirmative acts on behalf of the enjoined party.

In applying the above reasoning to this case, the Court finds the injunctive relief requested by the Complaint to be improper. Plaintiff cedes that he is not requesting injunctive relief pursuant to any provision of the ADA. (FAC Prayer for Relief ¶ 1.) Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief seeks to enjoin Defendant from “further violations of the ADA”. Given that the violations alleged are physical fixtures in Defendant’s bathroom facilities, Plaintiff’s request would require Defendant to affirmatively alter the property. As claims made solely under Cal. Civ. Code § 52 cannot seek preventive relief, the Court finds Plaintiff’s request should be struck.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Reclassification

Actions in which the amount in controversy is $25,000 or less are classified as limited jurisdiction cases. (C.C.P. § 86(a)(1).) The court may order a case reclassified as a limited civil case upon finding to a legal certainty that a judgment over $25,000 cannot be obtained. (C.C.P. §§ 396, 403.040(a).) A court on its own motion cannot reclassify an unlimited civil case to a limited civil case, without notice and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to contest the reclassification with evidence. (Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 232.) Evidence in making a determination of reclassification can include the complaint, arbitration awards and a settlement recommendation. (Id. at 233.) Without sufficient evidence as to the value of the case, where the allegations of the complaint preclude a finding that the verdict will “necessarily” fall short of the $25,001 jurisdictional requirement, a reclassification order may be an abuse of discretion. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief having been struck, the only remaining claims for relief in the Complaint are those for statutory damages. Plaintiff’s claims total damages of $8,000, which falls below the minimum threshold of $25,000 for an unlimited civil action. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a) authorizes statutory damages no less than $4,000 for each occurrence. Reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff only alleges a single occurrence in which Defendant violated Unruh. Plaintiff alleges no actual damages suffered as a result of this violation. Given the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds any verdict rendered would necessarily fall short of the $25,001 jurisdictional requirement. (See Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 230.)

Accordingly, the Court orders the matter reclassified as a limited civil matter. The case is referred to the Clerk’s Office for reclassification.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

GWH3, LLC.’s Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on April 26, 2024 with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

THE COURT ORDERS THE CASE RECLASSIFIED AS LIMITED CIVIL AND REFERS THE CASE TO THE CLERK’S OFFICE FOR RECLASSIFICATION.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  April 26, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles