Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02171, Date: 2024-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02171    Hearing Date: July 26, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

DEMURRER

MP:     The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of      Transportation (Defendant)

RP:     Jennifer Martinez (Plaintiff)

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS:

Jennifer Martinez, individually and as the Successor-in-Interest to the Estate of Miguel Martinez, (Plaintiff) brings this action against the Estate of Richard James Lopez and the People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Plaintiff alleges that on May 24, 2022, her husband Miguel Martinez (Decedent) was killed as the result of traffic incident on the I-210 Freeway. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Decedent was stopped on the side of the freeway when he was struck by a vehicle operated by James Lopez. Plaintiff further alleges that the section of the freeway had inadequate lighting.

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains causes of action for (1) General Negligence, (2) Survivor Action, and (3) Wrongful Death as stated against all Defendants.

Caltrans now demurs to each cause of action in the Complaint, arguing that they contain insufficient facts to allege liability of a public entity. Plaintiff opposes and Caltrans replies.  

ANALYSIS:

I.                    LEGAL STANDARDS

Demurrer

The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Id.)

A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.  App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318.)

Pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)

II.                 MERITS

Meet and Confer

C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Sahakian Decl. ¶ 5.)

General Facts

Plaintiff alleges that, on May 24, 2022 at 11:47 p.m., Decedent was operating a Freight Box Truck on the I-210 freeway. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20.) Plaintiff alleges that Decedent stopped on the shoulder of the freeway and was standing outside of his vehicle when a Black Honda Civic driven by James Lopez (Lopez) approached. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.) Plaintiff alleges that Lopez’s vehicle collided with Decedent’s vehicle which then fatally struck Decedent. (Compl. ¶ 20.)

The facts alleged as to Caltrans liability are as follows:

Defendant[’s] failure to install lights on I-210 West near Lowell Avenue, a state highway in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, creates dangerous conditions that could not be reasonably apparent to motorists.

(Compl. ¶ 15.)

1^st COA – Negligence – Sustained With Leave to Amend

The Court agrees with Caltrans that Plaintiff has insufficiently pled this cause of action.

Government Code § 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815(a); see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) To state a claim against a public entity, “every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)

The authority is clear that a tort claim against a public entity in California must be based in statute and cannot be grounded in common law negligence. Here, Plaintiff alleges Caltrans’ liability based on Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 820(a), 830.8, 835 and 840.2. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Despite this, Plaintiff’s Complaint only contains factual allegations speaking to liability for Dangerous Condition of Public Property pursuant to Government Code § 835. Factual allegations as to the other code sections are entirely absent.

Claims stemming from a Dangerous Condition of Public Property are generally pled under a separate causes of action from those based in common law negligence. Such claims must specifically allege (1) a dangerous condition of public property, (2) a foreseeable risk, arising from the dangerous condition, of the kind of injury the plaintiff suffered, (3) actionable conduct in connection with the condition, i.e., either negligence on the part of a public employee in creating it, or failure by the entity to correct it after notice of its existence and dangerousness, (4) a causal relationship between the dangerous condition and the plaintiff’s injuries, and (5) compensable damage sustained by the plaintiff. (Toeppev. City of San Diego (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 921, 925) A claim alleging a dangerous condition on public property must be specifically pleaded and cannot be based on generalized allegations. (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.)

Here, Plaintiff has not explicitly pled any statutory duty owed to her under Government Code § 835. While the Court can glean Plaintiff’s theory of liability by inference, the fact remains that she makes no allegations of a duty owed. Nor has Plaintiff set forth allegations speaking to the individual elements of a claim for Dangerous Condition of Public Property. Plaintiff simply alleges that there were no lights on this section of the freeway and that lights are necessary to warn of dangerous conditions of the roads. (Compl. ¶ 15, 31.) There are no factual allegations as to how this condition caused the underlying motor vehicle collision, how Decedent’s injury was foreseeably created by this condition, or any action of Caltrans which created this condition. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the lack of lights on this section of the freeway constitutes a dangerous condition are insufficient.

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition are unpersuasive. Plaintiff argues that dangerous condition claims have been found proper when a third party is involved. These arguments place the cart before the horse, as Plaintiff has yet to sufficiently allege her claim for Dangerous Condition of Public Property.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend. The Court clarifies that this leave to amend is granted in so far as Plaintiff may specifically plead the elements of a Dangerous Condition of Public Property under Government Code § 835 or other statutory basis already pled in the complaint. Further attempts to allege liability of Caltrans under common law negligence will not suffice.

Second & Third COA – Survivor Action & Wrongful Death – Sustained with Leave to Amend

Caltrans demurs to these causes of action on grounds that they are not based on statute. The Court agrees that these causes of action plead no statutory liability. Plaintiff argues that her causes of action for Survivor Action and Wrongful Death are based in C.C.P. § 377.30 and C.C.P. § 377.60 respectively. This argument overlooks the requirement that liability be based in statute.

C.C.P. § 377.30 and C.C.P. § 377.60 are indeed statutes which outline claims for Survivor Action and Wrongful Death, but they establish no right of action against public entities. Government Code § 815 makes clear that public entities are immune from tort liability except in instances where such liability is explicitly created by statute. If Plaintiff could rely on statutes which enshrine general common law tort concepts to circumvent this immunity, Government Code § 815 would be without purpose. To the extent that Plaintiff can maintain Survivor Action of Wrongful Death claims, those claims appear to necessarily stem from a dangerous condition as established in Government Code § 835.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the second and third causes of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Leave to amend is granted in so far as Plaintiff can incorporate the specific facts speaking to a Dangerous Condition of Public Property under Government Code § 835. 

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the Court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the Court’s records.

ORDER

The California Department of Transportation’s Demurrer came on regularly for hearing on July 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the Court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:

THE DEMURRER TO THE FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, CALTRANS TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE:  July 26, 2024                                     _______________________________

                                                                        F.M. Tavelman, Judge

                                                                        Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles