Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02436, Date: 2024-05-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23BBCV02436 Hearing Date: May 17, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
MAY 17, 2024
MOTION
TO STRIKE
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 23BBCV02436
| 
   MP:    | 
  
   DGK Plumbing and Gary
  Kleinman (Defendants)    | 
 
| 
   RP:    | 
  
   Karla Mendoza, Jaime
  Montoya Mendoza, and Jeremias Misael Montoya (Plaintiffs)  | 
 
 
The Court is not
requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear
is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling,
no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other
parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the
party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become
the ruling of the court if no argument is received.   
Notice may be given
either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS: 
This
action is brought by Karla Mendoza, Jaime Montoya Mendoza, and Jeremias Misael
Montoya (Plaintiffs). Jaime and Jeremias are minors represented by and through their
Guardian Ad Litem, Milen Montoya Cabrera. Plaintiffs bring this action
individually and on behalf of Misael Montoya (Decedent). Plaintiffs allege that
DGK Plumbing, Yaya Glenoaks LLC, Gary Kleinman, and Michael Engelman were
negligent in the digging of a trench for a construction project on which
Decedent worked. DGK Plumbing is an entity owned and operated by Gary Kleinman.
Yaya Glenoaks LLC is the company which owns the property on which construction
occurred and Michael Engelman is its principal shareholder. 
Plaintiffs
allege that, as a result of Defendants’ negligence, the trench collapsed on
Decedent while he was working inside of it. Plaintiffs allege Decedent was
buried in the trench for the greater part of an hour before being removed and
pronounced dead.  Plaintiffs’ Complaint
states causes of action for (1) Wrongful Death and (2) Survivor Action. 
DGK
Plumbing and Gary Kleinman (Defendants) now move to strike Plaintiffs’ claim
for punitive damages and related language in the Complaint. Plaintiffs oppose
the motion and Defendants reply. 
ANALYSIS: 
I.           
LEGAL STANDARD 
Motions to strike are used to reach
defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such
as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.)
The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to
strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. §
435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of
motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion,
and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant
matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or
those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. §
431.10.) The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not
drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an
order of the court.” (C.C.P. § 436 (b).)
II.           
MERITS 
Meet and Confer 
C.C.P. § 435.5(a)
requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the
pleading that is subject to a motion to strike. Upon review the Court finds the
meet and confer requirements were met. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 3.) 
Corporate Liability 
As a preliminary
matter, the Court addresses whether punitive damages can be properly addressed
to DGK plumbing. “[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is
based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault
of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88
Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds
capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award
of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of
the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s
malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof
of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing
agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned
up].)
Defendants do appear to
contest the applicability of punitive damages to GDK. Further, Plaintiffs
address punitive damages to DGK as a result of the business decisions of Gary
Kleinman. As such, the Court finds the punitive damages properly addressed. 
General Punitive
Damages Concepts 
In ruling on a motion
to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a
motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their
truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To
state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the
elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. (College
Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Cal. Civ.
Code § 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) Under Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3294(b), “[a]n employer shall not be eligible for damages pursuant to
subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer unless the
employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”
Discussion 
Defendants argue (1) that
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not allege conduct warranting punitive damages and
(2) that Plaintiffs’ allegations are stated without sufficient particularity.
For reasons stated below, the Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. 
Both parties discuss
the holding in Taylor v. Superior Court. There, the California Supreme
Court reviewed a successful demurrer to a cause of action asserting punitive
damages. The plaintiff in Taylor sought punitive damages in connection
with injuries incurred from the defendant’s driving while intoxicated. (Taylor
v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 893.) The lower court sustained the
demur on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to allege any actual intent of
defendant to harm others. (Id. 895.) While punitive damages claims are
commonly thought of as applying only to strictly intentional torts, the Taylor
court observed that such claims could also be based on a party’s awareness
of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct. (Id. at 896.) The
Taylor court held that such claims must be accompanied by allegations
that a defendant willfully and deliberately failed to avoid the dangerous
consequences of their actions. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs cite to Taylor
in arguing that they have pled “malice or despicable conduct” within the
meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. Plaintiff outlines a number of factual
allegations in the Complaint which speak to Defendants’ conscious disregard of
the safety of those working on the trench. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
knew or should have known that the trench built to install the sewer line
needed to have an adequate protective system in accordance with the law.
(Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff also allege that Defendants recklessly and maliciously
failed to design and install any protective system and failed to ensure that
the spoils of the excavation were far enough away from the trench’s edge to
avoid a hazardous condition. (Id.) Plaintiffs further assert that
Defendants failed to secure project permits and proper supervision. (Id.)
Crucially, Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ actions/failures were
conducted despicably with the intent and purpose of saving money and/or
increasing profits from the project. (Compl. ¶ 26.) 
Defendants rightfully
point out that since the Taylor decision, Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 has been
amended to require a plaintiff to plead and prove Defendants conduct was
“despicable”. “The adjective despicable connotes conduct that is so vile, base,
contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down
upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Lackner v. North (2006)
135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pled facts from which Defendants’
despicable conduct can be implied. 
The Court finds
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged despicable conduct by Defendants. The
defendant in Lackner was alleged to have recklessly caused a collision
on a ski slope, which the court found did not support a finding of despicable
conduct. (Id.) In contrast, Plaintiffs’ allegations appear significantly
more dire. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants forewent virtually every safety
measure associated with digging the trench in order to save costs on the
construction project. Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must do on
a motion to strike, they are indicative of conduct which is despicable. The
Court construes the intentional failure to ensure the safety of ones employees
in the hopes of maximizing profit as behavior which is so contemptible that it
would be looked down on and despised by ordinary people. 
Defendants further
argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting punitive damages
with sufficient specificity. Defendants cite to Anschutz Entertainment
Group, Inc. v. Snepp, where the California Court of Appeal held that
general allegations were insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.
The Court finds Anschutz to be both procedurally and factually
inapposite to this case. First, Anschutz concerned a special motion to
strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Anschutz Entertainment Group,
Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598.) Second, the pleadings in Anschutz
were conclusory in a way that Plaintiffs’ allegations here are not. Whereas
the plaintiffs in Anschutz only generally alleged willful and
malicious behavior, Plaintiffs’ allegations here are specifically supported. 
“When a defendant
must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands
that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G.
D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned
up].) Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants deliberately ignored safety
protocols in order to save costs are sufficiently specific to provide adequate
notice of the conduct charged. Whether Plaintiffs will be able to prove this
conduct remains to be seen, but their allegations are sufficient to survive the
motion to strike.   
Accordingly, the
motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages is DENIED. 
--- 
RULING:
 
In the
event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed
order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the
following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and
entered into the court’s records. 
ORDER 
 
DGK
Plumbing and Gary Kleinman’s Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on May 17, 2024 with
appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the
court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as
follows: 
 
THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED.  
UNLESS
ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PLAINTIFF KARLA MENDOZA TO GIVE NOTICE. 
IT IS SO
ORDERED. 
 
DATE: 
May 17, 2024                            _______________________________ 
                                                                   
    F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 
Superior Court of California 
County of
Los Angeles