Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02514, Date: 2024-03-15 Tentative Ruling
REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT PER CRC 3.1308
The Court will attempt to post all Tentative Rulings at least the day prior to the hearing by 3:00 p.m.; however, the Court does not post Tentative Rulings for all matters.
The
Court will indicate in the Tentative Ruling whether the Court is requesting oral argument. For cases where the Court is not requesting argument, then pursuant to
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required. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no
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to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the
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Notice
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Notice of the ruling must be served as indicated in the tentative. Remote appearances are permitted for all law and motion unless otherwise indicated by the Court.
Case Number: 23BBCV02514 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
MARCH 19,
2024
DEMURRER
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 23BBCV02514
|
MP: |
Yellow
Roses Summit Apartments & Beaumont Management Co. (Defendants) |
|
RP: |
Muhanna W Al-Aljuni (Plaintiff) |
The
Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. Pursuant to
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is
required. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no
argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the
court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention
to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the
court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”
Notice
may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818)
260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS:
Muhanna W Al-Aljuni (Plaintiff) brings this action against
Yellow Roses Summit Apartments & Beaumont Management Co. (collectively Defendants)
in regard to an apartment Plaintiff
rented from Defendants (the Subject Property). Plaintiff alleges Defendants
failed to appropriately modify the Subject Property to accommodate his
disability and threatened him with eviction.
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains 13 causes of
action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Negligence; (3) Breach of the Warranty of
Habitability; (4) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (5) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress; (7) Unfair Business Practices in Violation of California Business
& Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (8) Intentional Influence to Vacate;
(9) Americans With Disabilities Violations; (10) California’s Unruh Civil
Rights Act Violations; (11) California’s Disabled Persons Act Violations; (12) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and (13) Declaratory
Relief.
Defendants now generally demur to each cause of
action in the Complaint on grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s requests for
punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes and Defendants reply.
ANALYSIS:
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
The grounds for a
demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable
matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311,
318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of
action. (Id.)
A demurrer assumes
the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged
pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how
unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true
for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural
Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not
include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the
complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a
court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d
at 318.)
Pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”) §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a
complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the
pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or
that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse
of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a
reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando
v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)
Motions to strike are
used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by
demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435,
436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading
is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made
under C.C.P. § 435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section
435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in
its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (C.C.P. § 436(a).)
Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the
claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim.
(C.C.P. § 431.10.)
The court may also “[s]trike
out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the
laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. § 436
(b).)
II.
MERITS
Meet and Confer
C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a)
and 435.5(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who
filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer and/or motion to strike.
Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Daggenhurst
Decl. ¶ 3.)
Judicial Notice
Defendants request
the Court take notice of a Certificate of Occupancy for the Subject Property.
Defendants state that judicial notice can be taken of this document pursuant to
Evid. Code § 452(d), as it is a record of a court of the State of California. Further,
Defendants offer this document in service of their arguments that the Subject
Property was constructed in 1965 and thus not subject to ADA compliance. This
is an argument which speaks to the merits of Plaintiff’s case and not the
sufficiency of his pleadings. As such, the request is DENIED.
Evidentiary
Objections
Defendants object to
the entirety of Plaintiff’s declaration offered in opposition. Defendants also
object to Exhibit A of the opposition, which appears to be offered as proof of
alterations to the Subject Property. Defendants argue the declaration and
exhibit are an attempt to improperly introduce extrinsic facts into the
consideration of this demurrer. The Court agrees. As such, the objection to the
declaration and Exhibit A attached to Plaintiff’s opposition is SUSTAINED.
First COA – Breach of
Contract – Sustained with Leave to Amend
A contract may be
written or oral. (C.C.P. §§ 337 and 339.) “[T]he complaint must indicate on its
face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct.” (Otworth
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458-459.) A
written contract must be pled verbatim in the body of the complaint, be
attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference, or be pled according
to its legal effect. (Bowden v. Robinson (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 705, 718.)
An allegation of an oral agreement must “set forth the substance of its
relative terms.” (Gautier v. General Tel. Co. (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 302,
305.) “Facts alleging a breach, like all essential elements of a breach of
contract cause of action, must be pleaded with specificity.” (Levy v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal. App. 4th 1, 5)
Plaintiff alleges
that he entered into a written contract with Defendant to lease the Subject
Property on January 4, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The contract is specifically
described as a “written lease agreement”. Despite this allegation, Plaintiff
fails to attach the lease agreement to his complaint. Plaintiff instead
substitutes a deposit receipt signed the same day. (Compl. Exh. A.) This
deposit receipt is clearly separate and apart from the lease agreement and does
not serve as its proxy. The deposit receipt lacks any of the substantive terms
of the lease agreement that would be necessary to Plaintiff’ cause of action
fort breach.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Second COA –
Negligence – Overruled
In order to state a
claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence
of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause
resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v.
Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)
Defendant demurs to
this cause of action on grounds that Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed him a duty of care by virtue of their
status as managers of the leased property. (Compl. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendants breached this duty by virtue of their failure to
accommodate his disabilities. (Compl. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff alleges that this
failure to accommodate his disability forced him to exert himself mentally and
physically to the point of heart attack. (Compl. ¶ 56.)
Defendant’s argument
on demurrer is that the facts stated in the complaint are conclusory and
boilerplate. The Court finds them to be neither. Plaintiff’s facts are
individually stated as to each requirement of negligence. Plaintiff does not
simply write “Defendant was negligent” and move on, rather he states facts
specific to his experience that speak to each element of a negligence claim.
The veracity of these claims is not at issue in demurrer. Defendant’s argument
that the building was constructed in the 1960’s and exempt from liability under
the Unruh Civil Rights Act is a matter entirely extrinsic to the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s pleadings.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.
Third COA - Breach of
the Warranty of Habitability – Overruled
To establish a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, Plaintiffs
must establish (1) “the existence of a material defective condition affecting
the premises’ habitability,” (2) “notice to the landlord of the condition
within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition,” (3) “the
landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and” (4) “resulting
damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset
Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not adequately stated facts
supporting this claim. The Court disagrees. The Complaint alleges that
Defendants failed to maintain common areas and were cited by the Los Angeles
County Department of Public Safety for problems with cockroach infestations,
lack of hot water, and pipe fixtures. (Compl. ¶ 65.) At paragraph 63 Plaintiff
states “Even if the tenant covenants to repair
the landlord will usually be obligated to repair (except for damages caused by
the tenant) under the implied warranty of habitability because the landlord’s
obligations under that warranty are typically non-waivable.” Given the alleged
citations from the County, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support
this cause of action. A breach of the
warranty of habitability may be had for defects in the common area. (Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks
Property Owner, LLC) (2021) 62 Cal. App. 5th 874.
Accordingly, the
demurer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.
Fourth COA – Breach
of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment - Sustained with Leave to Amend
The elements of a
claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are: (1) a lease agreement
between plaintiff and defendant; (2) absence of language contrary to the
implied covenant that tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession; (3) act
or omission of the landlord, or anyone claiming under the landlord, which “substantially
interfere[s] with a tenant[‘]s right to use and enjoy the premises for the
purposes contemplated by the tenancy”; and (4) an applicable remedy. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-591.)
Here, Plaintiff has
not pled the absence of language contrary to the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment. It may be that such language is absent from the lease agreement but
Plaintiff’s failure to attach the lease agreement or plead its terms with
specificity preclude a determination on the matter.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Fifth COA –
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – Sustained with Leave to Amend
“The elements of a
prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;
(2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s
outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed
all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
999, 1009, [citation and ellipses omitted].)
Here, the only
factual allegations as to Defendants conduct is their failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s
disability and Defendants’ attempt to evict tenant via unlawful detainer
actions. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 34-35.) Plaintiff states in a conclusory manner
that Defendants’ conduct was done with malice and oppression. (Compl.
¶ 30.) Plaintiff does not allege that this threat of eviction was wrongful
or without cause. Instead, Plaintiff states that “Defendants threatened
Plaintiff with actual eviction for an issue that was resolved after the first
verbal complaint.” (Compl. ¶ 95.) Plaintiff does not aver to what this
complaint was or what the stated basis for eviction was. Nor does Plaintiff
allege facts in support of his allegation that Defendants were actively
singling him out on the basis of his disability. In short, Plaintiff has
alleged no facts which would indicate that Defendants’ actions were intended to
cause Plaintiff emotional distress rather the result of simple negligence.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Sixth COA – Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress – Sustained with Leave to Amend
A negligent
infliction of emotional distress cause of action is permitted in two types of
actions: “bystander” and “direct victim” cases. (Ess v. Eskaton Properties,
Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 127.) “Direct victim cases involve the
breach of a duty owed [to] the plaintiff that was assumed by the defendant,
imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or arose out of a preexisting
relationship between the two.” (Id. [citations omitted].) Direct victim
cases involve instances where a plaintiff has established a special
relationship between themselves and the tortfeasor, such as a fiduciary or
guardian. (See Christen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 884; Burgess
v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1073.)
Here Plaintiff has
pled no facts which establish a special relationship between himself and
Defendants. Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants owed him a duty as the
managers of the property speaks to a cause of action for negligence and not
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff does not address this
argument in his opposition, instead positing simply that his cause of action
contains sufficient facts. Plaintiff has pled no facts which distinguish his
claim as either a bystander or direct victim claim. Outside of these instances
there is no recognized cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, as it is encompassed in a common law negligence claim. (See McMahon
v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509.)
Accordingly, the
demurer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Seventh COA -
Violation of Buis. & Profess. Code § 17200 – Sustained with Leave to Amend
Plaintiff alleges
that actions comprising a violation of the code section were “undertaken in
combination by all Defendants.” (Compl. ¶ 123.) Plaintiff does not
endeavor to describe what these actions are or how they constituted an unfair
business practice. Plaintiff’s only factual allegation in this cause of action
is a reference to his numerous complaints to management about the “severe
actions and impact of their wrongful actions”. (Compl. ¶ 124.) Plaintiff’s
Complaint contains no facts as to a specific instance of his voicing concerns
to Defendants with the property, nor does it contain facts alleging what these
numerous complaints consisted of. At current this cause of action merely
alleges Defendants violated the code section by virtue of vaguely referenced acts.
The Court finds there are not sufficient factual allegations to support this
cause of action.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Eighth COA –
Intentional Influence to Vacate – Sustained with Leave to Amend
Under Civil Code
§1940.2 (a), “[i]t is unlawful for a landlord to do any of the following for
the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling . . . use, or threaten
to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of
conduct that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises . . .
that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person.”
The Court finds
Plaintiff has pled no facts as to Defendants’ actions which would create the
apprehension of harm is a reasonable person. The only facts in support of this
cause of action are that Defendants served “various [n]otices” upon Plaintiff.
(Compl. ¶ 136.) Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege an instance
where a notice was served on him. Further, it is not clear from the allegations
regarding this cause of action what the notices purportedly served were in
reference to. At current it appears the Complaint bases this cause of action
entirely on the issuance of unspecified eviction notices, with no facts
indicating they were wrongfully issued. It cannot be that every landlord who
serves an eviction notice is subject to statutory liability, something further
must be pled.
Accordingly, the
demurer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Ninth COA – Violation
of the ADA – Sustained with Leave to Amend
To establish a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he or she has a disability covered by the ADA, the defendant
is a private entity that owns, leases or operates a place of public
accommodation, and the plaintiff was denied public accommodations on the basis
of his or her disability. (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061). The ADA does not require a showing of
intentional discrimination -- practices that have discriminatory effects on
disabled persons can violate the ADA. (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009)
46 Cal.4th 661, 669 (2009.)
The Court finds that
Plaintiff has not adequately pled that his disability is one within the scope
of the ADA. The Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations as to the nature
of Plaintiff’s disability and the accommodations it requires. Plaintiff states
in his opposition that he suffered a heart attack in 2023 and discussed
accommodations with Defendants, citing to his opposition declaration. As stated
in the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ objections, Plaintiff’s declaration is
matter entirely extrinsic to his pleadings and cannot be considered for
purposes of demurrer. While Plaintiff appears able to add facts supporting this
cause of action, they are currently lacking.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend
Tenth COA – Violation
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act – Sustained with Leave to Amend
The elements of a
claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act are (1) defendant is a
business establishment, (2) defendant intentionally denied plaintiff
accommodations, advantages, privileges, facilities, or services, (3) defendant
was motivated to do so based on its perception that plaintiff belonged to a
statutorily defined group, (4) plaintiff was harmed, and (5) defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Civ. Code, §
51; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205,
216.)
“The objective of the
Act is to prohibit businesses from engaging in unreasonable, arbitrary or
invidious discrimination. Therefore, the Act applies not merely in situations
where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also where treatment is
unequal.” (Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players
Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174.)
As with the previous
cause of action, the Court finds the factual allegations of the Complaint to be
lacking. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was intentionally discriminated
against are entirely conclusory. While Plaintiff does allege that he was unable
to use his personal mobility scooter around the apartment complex, he does not
allege any facts tending to show this was the result of intentional
discrimination. (Compl. ¶ 146.) The Complaint states that Defendants have “actual
and constructive” knowledge of Plaintiff’s disability, but it states no facts
in support of that conclusion. Plaintiff appears likely to be able to resolve
this issue on amendment with the inclusion of facts from his declaration, but
at current the Complaint is insufficient.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Eleventh COA –
Violation of the CDPA – Sustained with Leave to Amend
Plaintiff states that
his cause of action for violation of the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA)
is brought pursuant to Civil Code § 54.
California Civil Code
§ 54.1(a) states:
Individuals with disabilities shall be entitled to full and
equal access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations,
advantages, facilities, medical facilities, including hospitals, clinics, and
physicians’ offices, and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor
vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses, streetcars, boats, or any other public
conveyances or modes of transportation (whether private, public, franchised,
licensed, contracted, or otherwise provided), telephone facilities, adoption
agencies, private schools, hotels, loading places, places of public
accommodations, amusement, or resort, and other places in which the general
public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established
by law, or state or federal regulation, and applicable alike to all persons.
As previously stated,
the Court finds the Complaint contains insufficient factual allegations
speaking to Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s disability and subsequent
denial of accommodations.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
As an aside, is
unclear whether the same alleged act can support a cause of action under the
CDPA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Courts have held that Civil Code § 54 is a
provision contained in the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (See Sabi v. Sterling (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 916, 924.) The California Supreme Court has stated “The
Disabled Persons Act substantially overlaps with and complements the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. Narrower in focus than the Unruh Civil Rights Act, it
generally guarantees people with disabilities equal rights of access “to public
places, buildings, facilities and services, as well as common carriers, housing
and places of public accommodation.” (Jankey v. Lee (2012) 55
Cal.4th 1038, 1044-1045 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) It
would appear to the Court that any action which is pled as a violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act would necessarily overtake a cause of action based on
the CDPA. Further, Civil Code § 54.3(c) explicitly prohibits the recovery of
damages pursuant to the CDPA and Unruh for the same act or failure to act.
Regardless, Plaintiff is free to plead multiple theories of recovery. Should
Plaintiff adequately plead these causes of action it appears there will come a
point where he must choose one or the other.
Twelfth COA – Breach
of Fiduciary Duty – Sustained with Leave to Amend
“The elements of a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, breach of fiduciary duty, and damages.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)
A cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty requires plaintiff to plead that defendant knowingly
undertook to act on behalf of or for the benefit of another or entered into a
relationship which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law. (Committee
on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,
221.) A landlord and a tenant generally do not stand in a fiduciary
relationship. (Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass’n. (1986) 42
Cal.3d490, 513.)
The Complaint does
not specifically allege how a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and
Defendants was created. It states they “By the virtue of the lease agreement
and landlord-tenant relationship, Defendant[s] had a fiduciary duty to
Plaintiff to act with the utmost good faith and in his best interests.” (Compl.
¶ 182.) As explained above, a landlord-tenant relationship, without more, does
not create a fiduciary duty.
The Court finds that
while it is not likely, it is possible that Plaintiff could add facts to
support the existence of a fiduciary duty. Accordingly, the demurrer to this
cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.
Thirteenth COA –
Declaratory Relief – Sustained without Leave to Amend
“The declaratory
relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and
determining an issue which can be determined in the main action. The object of
the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and not to furnish a
litigant with a second cause of action for the determination of identical
issues.” (General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d
465, 470.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint
presents no allegations which are specific to the cause of action for
Declaratory relief. It appears the relief sought in the cause of action is
comprised entirely of Plaintiff’s other claims for negligence.
Accordingly, the
demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Motion to Strike
Defendants seek to
strike various portions of the FAC which request punitive damages and language
alleging Defendants’ conduct was extreme, outrageous, willful, oppressive, or
malicious. Given the Court has sustained the demurrer to the causes of action
upon which these claims are be made with leave to amend, the motion to strike
punitive damages is MOOT.
---
RULING:
In the
event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed
order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the
following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and
entered into the court’s records.
ORDER
Yellow Roses Summit Apartments & Beaumont Management Co.’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike
came on regularly for hearing on March 19, 2024 with appearances/submissions as
noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised
in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:
THE DEMURRER TO THE FIRST, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH,
SEVENTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, TENTH, ELEVENTH, AND TWELFTH CAUSES OF ACTION IS
SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.
THE DEMURRER TO THE THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
IS SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
THE DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF
ACTION ARE OVERRULED.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS MOOT.
THE CASE
MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE PREVIOUSLY SET FOR MARCH 25, 2024 IS NOW SET FOR JULY 2,
2024 AT 9:00 A.M.
UNLESS
ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANT BEAUMONT MANAGEMENT TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
DATE:
March 19, 2024 _______________________________
F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of
Los Angeles