Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02519, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02519    Hearing Date: February 23, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO INTERVENE

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

This is an action between Liana Ordaz (Plaintiff) and Levon Anayan (Defendant) relating to an automobile collision between the parties. Before the Court is a motion to intervene by Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company (Empire). Empire contends that, as the insurer for Defendant, it has an interest in this litigation. The basis for this claim is Empire’s belief that Plaintiff and Defendant staged the collision in order to defraud their insurance companies. Plaintiff and Defendant both oppose the motion and Empire replies.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

For more than a century following the enactment of section 387 in 1872, intervention was permitted on a purely discretionary basis. (Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1136, review granted.) With some minor wording variations as it evolved, the statute stated, “At any time before trial, any person, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding.” (Id. [internal citation omitted].)

In 1977, C.C.P. § 387 was amended to conform with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) more closely. The purpose of this amendment was to create a statutory right to intervention mirroring that of FRCP Rule 24. The current C.C.P. § 387 reads in relevant part as follows:

The court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied:

A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene;

The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.

(C.C.P. § 387(d)(1). [emphasis added].)

The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.

(C.C.P. § 387(d)(2). [emphasis added].)

“This statute has an extensive case law gloss. It is designed to protect the interests of others affected by the judgment, obviating delay and multiplicity. The law abhors multiplicity of actions, consuming the time of the court and entailing additional public expense. While courts have recognized section 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention, the moving party seeking intervention always bears the burden of proving entitlement to party status.” (Accurso supra 94 Cal.App.5th at 1138 [cleaned up].)

Mandatory intervention under section 387(d)(1)(B) must be permitted where parties: (1) file a timely application, (2) have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, (3) are so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede their ability to protect that interest, and (4) show that their interest is not adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.

Permissive intervention carries forward the discretionary regime on which C.C.P. § 387 was founded. A trial court may permit a nonparty to intervene in an action if the nonparty has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. (C.C.P. § 387(d)(2).) Intervention will generally be permitted if: (1) the proper procedures have been followed, (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action, (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation, and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. (City and County of San Francisco v. State of California (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1036.)

II.                 MERITS

The Court notes that Empire improperly states the grounds for its motion as C.C.P. § 387(a). C.C.P. § 387, under the current statute, is a definitional section which does not set forth the grounds for a motion to intervene. It appears from the substance of Empire’s motion that their motion is actually brought pursuant to the permissive intervention principles set forth by C.C.P. § 387(d)(2).

Empire submits the declaration of its counsel Rodrigo J. Bozoghlian. Bozoghlian states that Empire has significant cause to believe that Plaintiff and Defendant conspired to stage the motor vehicle accident in this case. (Bozoghlian Decl. ¶ 3-4.) This belief is founded on the electronic data obtained from Defendant’s vehicle just before the accident and pictures of the scene which Empire claims are inconsistent with Defendant’s recollection of the accident. (Id.) Empire further bases its belief on the refusal of Defendant to cooperate with Empire’s investigation of the incident and to appear for an Examination Under Oath. (Bozoghlian Decl. ¶ 10.) Empire states that both vehicles were taken to a body shop which is subject to investigation for fraudulent activity. (Bozoghlian Decl. ¶ 13.)

The Court finds that Empire has made an adequate showing pursuant to the principles of permissive intervention.

First, Empire has shown that it has a direct interest in the matter of this litigation. Empire, as the insurer for Defendant, would necessarily be financially liable for any monetary judgment obtained against Defendant. Empire’s interest in this litigation is clear.

Next, the Court finds that Empire’s intervention would not enlarge the issues already involved in the litigation. This litigation is, at its core, about a motor vehicle accident between Defendant and Plaintiff. The circumstances surrounding that motor vehicle accident (i.e., when it occurred, how it came to be, and who is responsible) are all considerations relevant to the determination of this litigation. Consequently, it does not appear to the Court that Empire’s claim that the accident was fabricated falls outside the parameters of the current litigation. Empire’s claims directly concern the factors of causation that were already at issue in this case.

Lastly, the Court finds that Empire’s reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by Plaintiff or Defendant. Plaintiff and Defendant oppose this motion solely on the grounds that the Bozoghlian declaration is hearsay. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant substantively brief their opposition outside of their objections to the Bozoghlian declaration. Nor do the parties submit any authority that C.C.P. § 387 requires an evidentiary showing to permit intervention.

C.C.P. § 387(d)(2) vests permissive intervention in the Court’s discretion and makes no reference to an evidentiary showing. By the plain facts of the case, the Court finds Empire has an interest which is separate from the parties that would not otherwise be represented. Further, the Bozoghlian declaration only stands for the belief of Empire that a fraud occurred here. The Bozoghlian declaration is not dispositive of any claims and only serves to establish the basis for Empire’s interest in this case.

Accordingly, Empire’s motion to intervene is GRANTED. Empire is to file its answer in intervention and serve notice upon both Plaintiff and Defendant pursuant to C.C.P. § 387(e). Empires answer shall be filed within 30 days.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company’s Motion to Intervene came on regularly for hearing on February 23, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO INTERVENE IS GRANTED.

EMPIRE IS TO FILE ITS ANSWER IN INTERVENTION AND SERVE NOTICE UPON BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. § 387(e).

EMPIRES ANSWER SHALL BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS.

DATE:  February 23, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles