Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02525, Date: 2024-07-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23BBCV02525    Hearing Date: July 5, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

 

TENTATIVE RULING

JULY 5, 2024

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV02525

 

MP:  

 

Martha & Rigoberto Ayala (Defendants)

RP:  

Jose Hernandez (Plaintiff)

 

NOTICE:

 

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

 

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

 

ALLEGATIONS: 

 

Jose Hernandez (Plaintiff) brings this action against Martha & Rigoberto Ayala (Defendants) related to an April 29, 2022 motor vehicle incident. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligently operating their vehicle and caused a collision which subsequently injured Plaintiff.

 

Before the Court is a motion to compel further responses to discovery demands brought by Defendants. Defendants seek an order compelling Plaintiff’s further responses to their Request for the Production of Documents (RFPD) Nos. 17 and 18. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants reply.

 

ANALYSIS: 

 

I.                LEGAL STANDARD 

 

A motion to compel further responses to RFPD may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. § 2031.310(c).) 

 

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(1).) If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

 

II.              MERITS

 

RFPD

 

The requests to which Defendants seek further responses are as follows:

 

·       “All documents that reflect text messages to and from the cell phone that was in Plaintiff’s possession at the time of the incident from fifteen minutes prior to the incident through one hour after the incident.” (RFPD No. 17.)

 

 

·       “A copy of Plaintiff’s cellular phone bill reflecting fifteen minutes prior to the incident though one hour after the incident.” (RFPD No. 18.)

 

 

Meet and Confer

 

The Court first addresses the parties’ arguments as concerns their meet and confer efforts. C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(2) requires that a motion to compel further responses to RFPD include a meet and confer declaration pursuant C.C.P. § 2016.040. C.C.P. § 2016.040 in turn requires the parties to make a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution prior to bringing their motion. Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith because they repeatedly failed to provide “good cause” for further production. The Court does not construe the disagreement over whether good cause existed as a lack of good faith. If this was the case nearly every discovery motion could be denied for a lack of good faith. Defendants demonstrated that they reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel and stated the reasons they believed the replies to be insufficient. This is evidence of a good faith meet and confer effort. That Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ reasoning is not evidence of bad faith.

 

Discussion

 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not demonstrated good cause for further production. Plaintiff maintains that because neither party has claimed he was on his cell phone, there is no good cause to compel him to produce his cell phone records.

 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. It appears that Plaintiff contends Defendants must have included Plaintiff’s distracted driving as a defense in Defendants’ responsive pleading to seek discovery of his phone records. Plaintiff cites to no authority, nor is the Court aware of any, that a claim must be present in a responsive pleading to establish good cause in a discovery motion.

 

Discovery is intended to obtain information that may lead to admissible evidence at trial.  CCP §2017.010.  As concerns Defendants’ actual showing of good cause, the Court finds its to be sufficient. In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  Defendants maintain that Plaintiff may have been distracted by his phone at the time of the incident causing him to cross over traffic lanes. Defendants’ counsel expressed this position to Plaintiff in the process of meet and confer. It is not a great stretch of the imagination to postulate that a party in a motor vehicle negligence action was potentially distracted by their cell phone. Plaintiff appears to agree, given that they propounded identical requests for Defendants’ cell phone records. (Hillier Decl. ¶ 6.) The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegations that Defendants were on their phone at the time of the incident.

 

Regardless of the factual pleadings in this case, it is abundantly clear to the Court that whether Plaintiff or Defendants were on their cell phone at the time of the incident is now a fact directly relevant to potential claims/defenses in this case. As such, the Court finds that Defendants have shown good cause to compel further discovery.

 

The Court thus turns to Plaintiff’s objection on the grounds of privacy concerns. The party asserting the right of privacy, bears the initial burden of demonstrating (1) a “legally protected privacy interest”; (2) an “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances”; and (3) a “threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If the asserting party meets this standard, responding party must then show that the requested documents are “directly relevant” to the litigation. (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387, citing Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859.)

 

The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552 [internal citations omitted].)

 

Under Williams, a party objecting to discovery must establish a legally protected privacy interest and a reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, Plaintiff has done so. Plaintiff's cell phone records are protected by the right to privacy, and he has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in these records. Compelled disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a serious intrusion into Plaintiff's right to privacy.

 

As Plaintiff has made the showing of protected privacy interest, the burden shifts to Defendant to show that the discovery is "directly relevant" to the claims or defenses in dispute and is "essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit." (Lantz v. Super. Ct. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854.) Here, Defendants have done so. Evidence as to whether Plaintiff was on his phone at the time of the incident is directly relevant to the potential defense of comparative negligence. Further, there exists no viable alternative for Defendants to obtain this information outside of the phone records and thus the information is essential to a fair resolution.

 

While the Court finds Defendants have demonstrated an important countervailing interest to Plaintiff’s privacy rights, it disagrees that the scope of the request is appropriate. If the purpose of this discovery is to obtain information on whether Plaintiff was on his phone at the time of incident, there appears to be little need for the records to extend to an hour after the incident.  

 

Accordingly, the motion to compel further responses is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff is ordered to produce text message records and his cell phone bill documenting 15 minutes prior and 30 minutes after the incident.

 

Protective Order

 

To the extent Plaintiff deems it necessary, they may request a protective order regarding any perceived privacy rights of Plaintiff or any third party either by stipulation or through court order.

 

Sanctions

 

The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (C.C.P. § 2031.310(h).)

 

Here the Court finds that Plaintiff opposed the instant motion without substantial justification. The fact that Plaintiff tendered an identical document request to Defendant and thereafter argued against Defendants’ claim of privilege indicates to the Court that Plaintiff knew this opposition to be without merit. As such, the Court awards Defendant sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount of $585. This amount reflects three hours of attorney work is bringing and arguing this motion at a rate of $175 per hour, plus the $60 filing fee. (Hillier Decl. ¶ 11.) The Court finds this rate reasonable and the amount of work commensurate with a motion of this type. The Court notes that Defendants’ request appears to include another listing for “filing fees” at $1,000. (Hillier Decl. ¶ 11(d).) Defendant provides no explanation as to what this additional filing fee is and the Court declines to include it.

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RULING:

 

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

 

ORDER 

 

Martha & Rigoberto Ayala’s Motion to Compel Further Responses came on regularly for hearing on July 5, 2024 with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:  

 

THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES IS GRANTED IN PART.

 

PLAINTIFF IS ORDERED TO PRODUCE TEXT MESSAGE RECORDS AND HIS CELL PHONE BILL DOCUMENTING 15 MINUTES PRIOR AND 30 MINUTES AFTER THE INCIDENT.

 

SUBSEQUENT PRODUCTION TO OCCUR WITHIN 30 DAYS.

 

SANCTIONS ARE AWARDED AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, IN THE AMOUNT OF $585.  SANCTIONS SHALL BE PAID WITHIN 30 DAYS.

 

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANTS TO GIVE NOTICE.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATE: July 5, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles