Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23BBCV02937, Date: 2024-10-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23BBCV02937 Hearing Date: October 4, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
OCTOBER 4,
2024
DEMURRER
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 23BBCV02937
|
MP: |
The City of Burbank (Defendant) |
|
RP: |
Victoria Goring (Plaintiff) |
The Court is not
requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear
is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling,
no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other
parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the
party’s intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become
the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice may be given
either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS:
Victoria Goring
(Plaintiff) brings this action against The City of Burbank (the City).
Plaintiff alleges that she was granted an Emergency Housing Voucher (EHV) by
the City of Burbank sometime in 2022. Plaintiff alleges that she experienced a
myriad of problems with a certain property she rented with her EHV throughout
2023. Plaintiff further alleges that employees for the City refused to help her
rectify these problems and were occasionally rude to her.
Before the Court is a
demurrer brought by the City. The City demurs to each cause of action on
grounds that (1) Plaintiff fails to allege her compliance with the Torts Claim
Act, and (2) Plaintiff fails to identify statutory authority for her claims
against the City as required by Gov. Code § 815. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer,
and the City replies.
ANALYSIS:
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from
judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Id.)
A
demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled
in the challenged pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p.
318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be
accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb
Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604.)
But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law
alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to
facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra,
39 Cal. 3d at 318.)
Pursuant
to C.C.P. §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been
filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is
uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to
sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability
that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles
(2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)
II.
MERITS
Request for Judicial Notice
The
City requests the Court take judicial notice of the following:
1.
Plaintiff Victoria Goring’s Tort Claim Form presented to
the City of Burbank on February 14, 2023.
2.
Plaintiff Victoria Goring’s Tort Claim Form presented to
the City of Burbank on May 2, 2023.
3.
Plaintiff Victoria Goring’s Tort Claim Form presented to
the City of Burbank on June 15, 2023.
4.
Plaintiff Victoria Goring’s Tort Claim Form presented to
the City of Burbank on October 10, 2023.
The City argues that such documents, when
received and stamped by the City, are official records within the meaning of
Evidence Code § 452. (See Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513,
518 [ holding that records, reports, and orders of administrative agencies are
the subject of proper judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(c).].)
The Court agrees that the records are the proper subject of judicial notice and
the City’s request is GRANTED.
Meet and Confer
C.C.P.
§ 430.41(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who
filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer. Upon review the Court finds
the meet and confer requirements were met. (Clark Decl. ¶ 3.)
Default/Service
As a
preliminary matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument in opposition that
this demurrer is improper because the City is in default and/or this demurrer
was not properly served.
First,
the City’s demurrer was timely filed such that no default can be taken. C.C.P.
§ 430.4 specifically acknowledges the filing of a demurrer as a timely response
to the filing of an initial pleading. Plaintiff served the City with her FAC on
July 18, 2024 and the City filed their demurrer on July 24, 2024. Thus, the
City’s demurer is timely and Plaintiff’s claim of default is without merit.
Plaintiff was notified of this when her August 5, 2024 request to enter default
was rejected by the Clerk of the Court. (See August 6 Notice of Rejection.)
Second,
the City has sufficiently demonstrated that this demurrer was properly served
on Plaintiff. Plaintiff has specifically requested that the City do not send
her any correspondence by U.S. Mail. (Clark Decl. Exh. A.) As such, the City
served the demurrer on Plaintiff via email on July 24, 2024. (Clark Decl. Exh.
B.) A review of this email clearly shows that the Notice of Motion, Memorandum,
and Declaration were all attached to the email. (Id.)
General Discussion
The
City argues that their demurrer should be sustained to the entire FAC as
Plaintiff fails to allege she complied with the Torts Claim Act. The Court is
satisfied from the documents judicially noticed above that Plaintiff has
complied with the Torts Claim Act, at least as concerns her first, second, and
fifth causes of action. As such, the
Court’s discussion of those causes of action will instead focus on the City’s
argument that Plaintiff has failed to identify any statutory authority for her
claims. As concerns the third and fourth causes of action, the Court agrees
that the FAC does not demonstrate compliance with the Torts Claim Act.
First COA – Professional Negligence – Sustained without
Leave to Amend
A demurrer may be sustained where the
plaintiff fails to allege a statutory basis for liability against a public
entity. (Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800 (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 848,
863-864 [affirming trial court's sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend
as to four tort causes of action where plaintiff failed to allege statutory
basis—i.e., mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6—for liability
against public entity].) “The California Tort Claims Act provides that 'a
public entity is not liable for an injury,' 'except as otherwise provided by
statute.' (Gov. Code, § 815 (a).) As that language indicates, the intent of the
Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.”
(Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175,
1179.) Therefore, public entities cannot be liable for common law theories of
general negligence. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [“section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for
public entities”].)
Here, Plaintiff’s first cause of action
alleges no statutory liability upon which the City may be held liable.
Plaintiff’s cause of action for Negligence appears to proceed entirely on a
theory of common law. Statutory and case law make clear that a cause of action
against a government entity must be supported by allegations that the entity
violated a specific statutory duty they owed to the party injured. Plaintiff’s
FAC makes no such allegations.
As such, the demurrer to the first
cause of action is SUSTAINED. The Court denies leave to amend as it does not
appear further factual allegations would allow Plaintiff to bring a common law
Negligence claim against a government entity. To the extent that Plaintiff
believes she can sustain such a claim, she must allege its basis in statute.
Second COA – Business Tort/Unfair
Business Practice – Sustained Without Leave to Amend
Similar
to Plaintiff’s cause of action for Negligence, her cause of action for Business
Tort is without any statutory basis. Plaintiff must allege some statutory
violation which occurred to state a claim against the City, and she has not
done so.
As such, the demurrer to the second
cause of action is SUSTAINED. The Court denies leave to amend as it does not
appear further factual allegations would allow Plaintiff to bring a common law
Business Tort claim against a government entity. To the extent that Plaintiff
believes she can sustain such a claim, she must allege its basis in statute.
3rd & 4th COA – Civil Rights
& Defamation – Sustained with Leave to Amend
The
Tort Claims Act, codified in Gov. Code §§ 900 et seq., establishes certain
conditions precedent to filing a lawsuit against a public entity. (State of
California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237.) In order to
maintain a cause of action against a public entity, a plaintiff must file a
claim with the public entity for money or damages pursuant to Gov. Code §
911.2. (Id.; see Gov. Code, § 911.2(a) [“[a] claim relating to a cause
of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property... shall be
presented as provided in” Government Code section 915 et seq. “not later than
six months after the accrual of the cause of action.”].)
“It
is settled that the filing of a timely claim against the employing public
entity is a condition precedent to a tort action against either the public
entity or the employee.” (Mazzola v. Feinstein (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d
305, 310 (citing Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 & Harman
v. Mono General Hospital (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 607, 613)); see State of
California v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1237 [a failure
to satisfy the claim requirements of the Tort Claims Act bars the plaintiff from
bringing suit against that entity].)
A
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate compliance or excuse from
compliance of the Tort Claims Act. (State of California v. Superior Court,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1243, quoting Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246
Cal.App.2d 443, 447) [“...the language of the amended claim presentation
statutes ‘make[s] it clear that ... a plaintiff must still allege in his
complaint that he has complied with the claim statute in order to state a cause
of action against a public employee.’”].)
The
Court notes that Plaintiff’s FAC contains no aversion to a claim pursuant to
Gov. Code § 911.2. Plaintiff has used a Form Complaint, of which Section 9
specifically prompts the filing party to list whether they are (1) required to
comply with a claims statute and (2) whether they did so. Section 9 of
Plaintiff’s FAC is blank.
Nor
are there any factual allegations speaking to a government claim made by
Plaintiff in connection with this matter. The only allegation which could
potentially be construed as such is located on page three of Plaintiff’s
attachment to her FAC. There, Plaintiff alleges that she “filed a claim for
damages for the carbon monoxide poisoning, and…filed a complaint against the
staff hostility against me.” (FAC Exh. A, p. 3.) It is unclear from this
allegation that Plaintiff is referring to a claim pursuant to Gov. Code §
911.2. Plaintiff does not allege who these claims were made to, when they were
made, or that the claims are the result of the same alleged behavior which
serves as the basis for this litigation.
Regardless,
the Court has taken judicial notice of four Tort Claims Act claims that
Plaintiff submitted to the City throughout 2023. (See DMR Exhs. A-D.) A review
of these claims reveals they are all related to Plaintiff’s loss of her EHV.
None of these claims address the violation of a specific civil right or the
publication of any defamatory statement, only Plaintiff’s general assertion
that the City refuses to honor her rights as a tenant.
Given
the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to
constitute her Civil Rights and Defamation causes of action. The FAC is devoid
of any facts establishing compliance or excuse from compliance of the Tort
Claims Act in connection with these two causes of action.
Accordingly,
the City’s demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED with
20 days’ leave to amend. The Court permits leave to amend on grounds that
Plaintiff may have additional government claims not attached to the FAC or
judicially noticed.
5th COA – Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress – Sustained without Leave to Amend
This
cause of action suffers from the same defect as Plaintiff’s causes of action
for Negligence and Business Tort in that it states no statutory liability upon
which the claim is based.
Accordingly,
the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED. The Court denies leave to amend as it does not appear
further factual allegations would allow Plaintiff to bring a common law claim
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against a government entity.
To the extent that Plaintiff believes she can sustain such a claim, she must
allege its basis in statute.
Conclusion
The Court sustains the demurrer to the
first, second, and fifth causes of action without leave to amend. To the extent
that Plaintiff believes the City was negligent, committed a business tort, or
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her, she must state her claims
against them according to statute.
The Court sustains the demurrer to the
third and fourth causes of action with 20 days’ leave to amend. Although
Plaintiff has not attached any government claims pursuant to Gov.
Code § 911.2 to support these causes of action, it is not impossible that she
could rectify this deficiency on amendment.
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RULING:
In the
event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed
order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the
following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and
entered into the court’s records.
ORDER
The City of Burbank’s
Demurrer came on regularly for hearing on October 4,
2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said
hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there
rule as follows:
THE DEMURRER TO THE FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH
CAUSES OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
THE DEMURRER TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSES OF
ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND
UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, THE CITY TO
GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
DATE:
October 4, 2024 _______________________________
F.M.
TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of
Los Angeles