Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 23PDUD04191, Date: 2024-02-05 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23PDUD04191    Hearing Date: February 5, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALLEGATIONS: 

9001 Chevy Chase, LLC (Plaintiff) brings this unlawful detainer action for unlawful detainer against Magdy Melika (Defendant). The property in question is 1009 Apt. C East Chevy Chase Drive Glendale, CA 91205 Plaintiff states they served a 60-day Notice to Quit on Defendant on September 19, 2023, indicating Plaintiff’s intent to substantially remodel the premises. (Keshishian Decl., Exh. 1.)

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing this matter was brought before the Court unlawfully. Defendant claims that Plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirements laid out under the Glendale Municipal Code. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) C.C.P.¿§ 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)¿ 

¿ 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (C.C.P.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ 

¿ 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿ 

II.                 MERITS

Plaintiff’s action is one for unlawful detainer. In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, Defendant must produce evidence which is dispositive of an essential element of Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer claim.

C.C.P. § 1161(1) provides a tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer for a tenancy at will when he or she (1) continues in possession of the property, or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to the tenant, (2) provided the expiration is of a nondefault nature, and (3) notice of termination is provided as prescribed in the Civil Code.

Here the relevant portion of the Civil Code is § 1946.1, which requires 60-day notice of termination to be provided to a tenant who has resided at a property for a period of longer than 12 months. Civil Code § 1946.2 (b)(2)(D) provides that “intent to demolish or to substantially remodel the residential real property” is a valid no-fault cause for issuance of a notice of termination. However, Civil Code § 1946.2 does not apply where it is preempted by a local just cause ordinance. Here, the relevant local just cause ordinance is Glendale Municipal Code § 9.30.030.

The thrust of Defendant’s argument in his motion for summary judgment is that the 60-day Notice to Quit issued by Defendant is invalid because it did not have permits attached to it as required by Glendale Municipal Code § 9.30.031(A), which reads as follows:

The landlord shall serve on the tenant a written notice setting forth the reasons for the termination with specific facts to permit a determination of the date, place and circumstances concerning the reason. This notice shall be given in the manner prescribed by California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1162 and may be combined with a written notice of termination of tenancy or as a separate written notice. For purposes of Section 9.30.030(G), at the time that the landlord serves the notice to vacate, the landlord shall also serve the permit to demolish the unit or the permit for capital improvements, along with any construction estimates and schedule for performing the work.

Glendale Municipal Code § 9.30.031(G) governs notices to quit issued to demolish or improve rental units and requires that “such works costs not less than the product of eight times the amount of the monthly rent times the number of rental units upon which such work is performed.”

Defendant’s argument that the permits and estimates required by Glendale Municipal Code § 9.30.031(A) is unclear. Defendants argument reads as follows:

Plaintiff never served the proper documents to the Defendant, and the case documents are unlawful, and the 60 Days’ Notice is INVALID, as Plaintiff never attached permits to Notice as they falsely claimed in 2^nd page of their Notice as they should but attached a False Estimate, Per Glendale CA Municipal Code Title9 Public Peace &Welfare: Chapter 9.30 Just Cause &Retaliatory Evictions

(Mot. p. 7, ¶ C.)

It is not clear from this statement whether Defendant contends nothing was attached to the 60-day Notice to Quit, or whether Defendant contends the permits/construction estimates attached were falsified. The Court notes that Defendant’s declaration contains no statement regarding the permits/construction estimates. As such, there is no evidentiary showing before the Court indicating that the permits/construction estimates were not attached. Further, to the extent that Defendant argues these documents are false, such allegations necessarily raise a triable issue of fact.

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint, as well as their exhibits in opposition to this motion, contain copies of the permits and construction work order to be completed on the building. (See Keshishian Decl., Exh. 2.) Plaintiff includes permits to install recessed lighting and install new units, as well as a construction estimate to replace the windows and completely remodel/rewire each unit. The total per unit cost in the construction estimate totals $97,000. (See Id.) Defendant does not evidence what the current rent of the unit is, but Plaintiff states it is $1,336.00 per month. (Keshishian Decl. ¶ 7.) It appears the construction estimates greatly exceed the amount of rent multiplied by eight as required by Glendale Municipal Code § 9.30.031(G).

In short, the Court finds the evidence in this case does not establish that there is no triable issue of fact as to Plaintiff’s action for unlawful detainer. Defendants arguments that Plaintiff have falsified repair estimates do not serve as evidence which defeats an essential element of Plaintiffs claim for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Magdy Melika’s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on February 5, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  February 5, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles