Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24BBCV00051, Date: 2024-11-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24BBCV00051    Hearing Date: November 8, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS

MP:     Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Petitioner)

RP:      Matliouba Katsnelson & Irina Zerev (Respondents)

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS/HISTORY:

On January 5, 2024, Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Petitioner) successfully petitioned this Court to obtain a Superior Court Case Number. This petition was submitted in connection with an uninsured motorist arbitration with Petitioner’s insured Matliouba Katsnelson and Irina Zerev (Respondents). Petitioner obtained a case number so they could request the Court’s assistance is adjudicating a number of discovery disputes.

Before the Court is a motion for terminating sanctions brought by Petitioner. Petitioner argues that terminating sanctions should issue as the result of Respondents’ repeated noncompliance with the Court’s order compelling discovery. Respondents have not opposed the motion. The Court notes that, pursuant to C.R.C. Rule 8.54(c), a failure to oppose a motion may be deemed consent to its being granted. 

ANALYSIS:

Where a party fails to obey an order compelling answers to discovery, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction.” (C.C.P. §§ 2030.290(c), 2023.010(c); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 486, 495.) Terminating sanctions are appropriate when a party persists in disobeying the court’s orders. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 795-796.)

A terminating sanction is a “drastic measure which should be employed with caution.” (Deyo supra, 84 Cal. App. 3d at 793.) “A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 262, 279-280.)

While the court has discretion to impose terminating sanctions, these sanctions “should be appropriate to the dereliction and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.” (Deyo supra, at 793.) “[A] court is empowered to apply the ultimate sanction against a litigant who persists in the outright refusal to comply with his discovery obligations.” (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD:

The Court begins by noting that this motion occurs in the context of an arbitration matter and not a filed lawsuit. In making this motion, Petitioner asks that the Court award terminating sanctions dismissing the arbitration matter with prejudice pursuant to C.C.P. §2023.030(d)(3).

The Insurance Code adopts the Civil Discovery Act in its entirety and “grants the superior court the exclusive jurisdiction to hear discovery matters arising under uninsured motorist arbitrations,” including motions for terminating sanctions. (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2008) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 926 [citing Insurance Code section 11580.2, subd. (f).) Where a party fails to obey an order compelling answers to discovery, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction." (C.C.P. §§ 2030.290 (c), 2023.010 (c); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495.)

On March 15, 2024, the Court granted Petitioner’s motions to compel Respondents’ discovery responses. This included Petitioner’s Form Interrogatories and Request for the Production of Documents (RFP). These motions were unopposed by Respondents. Respondents were to serve their discovery responses within 30 days of the entry of the order.

Petitioner represents to the Court that Respondents have not complied with this order. (Trafton Decl. ¶ 4.) Petitioner states that despite sending notice of the Court’s order to Respondent, they have still yet to receive the discovery responses. (Trafton Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 1.)

When deciding whether to impose terminating sanctions, courts generally weigh three factors: (1) whether the party subject to the sanction acted willfully, (2) the detriment to the party seeking discovery, and (3) the number of formal and informal unsuccessful attempts to obtain discovery. (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702; Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.) Further, willful disobedience of a court order is a prerequisite to the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403.)

Here, the Court finds Petitioner has demonstrated the required willful behavior to warrant terminating sanctions. “Lack of diligence may be deemed willful in the sense that the party understood his obligation, had the ability to comply, and failed to comply.” (Deyo supra, at 787.) Despite the fact that Respondents have been in receipt of these discovery demands since July 2023, Petitioner remains without responses. Not only have these responses been outstanding for more than a year, but they have also been the subject of an order from this Court. The Court ordered these responses served several months ago and Respondents have demonstrated no effort to comply.

Further, the evidence before the Court indicates that a lesser sanction would be ineffective in producing Respondents’ responses. Respondent failed to oppose Petitioner’s motions to compel and the instant motion for terminating sanctions. Despite the fact that Respondents demanded arbitration in July 2023, no arbitrator has been selected. (Trafton Decl. ¶ 3.) Respondents did not respond to any of Petitioner’s informal meet and confer efforts regarding the discovery and have never filed any response under this case number. (Trafton Decl. ¶ 4.) In short, Respondents have “show[n] no interest in taking part in the case or in following orders of the court.” (Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789, 799-800.)

Accordingly, the motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED and Respondents’ uninsured motorist arbitration proceeding is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to C.C.P. §2023.030(d)(3).

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions came on regularly for hearing on November 8, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

 THE MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS IS GRANTED PURSUANT TO C.C.P. §2023.030(d)(3).  

RESPONDENTS’ UNINSURED MOTORIST ARBITRATION PROCEEDING IS DISMISSED. WITH PREJUDICE.

AAA TO GIVE NOTICE.

DATE: November 8, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles