Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24BBCV00090, Date: 2024-06-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24BBCV00090 Hearing Date: June 28, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
JUNE 28, 2024
MOTION
TO COMPEL DEPOSITION
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 24BBCV00090
|
MP: |
American Honda Motor Company, Inc.
(Defendant) |
|
RP: |
Nidal Kobaissa (Plaintiff) |
The Court is not
requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear
is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling,
no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other
parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the
party’s intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become
the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice may be given
either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS:
Nidal Kobaissa
(Plaintiff) brings this action against American Honda Motor Company, Inc.
(Honda). Plaintiff alleges that Honda sold him a defective Certified Pre-Owned
2018 Honda Odyssey in violation of the Song Beverly Act.
On March 21, 2024,
Honda served on Plaintiff its notice of deposition for the date of May 6, 2024.
(Mot. Exh. A.) Honda also served its Request for the Production of Documents
(RFPD) in conjunction with its deposition notice. (Id.) Honda now moves
to compel Plaintiff’s attendance at a deposition and to compel Plaintiff’s
further responses to RFPD. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Honda replies.
ANALYSIS:
I.
LEGAL
STANDARD
“If, after service of a deposition
notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or
employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party
under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section
2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce
for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible
thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move
for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the
production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information,
or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (C.C.P. § 2025.450(a).)
II.
MERITS
Meet and Confer
The Court begins by addressing Plaintiff’s
argument that Honda did not meet and confer in good faith before filing this
motion. Plaintiff argues, “Defendant’s unwillingness to engage Plaintiff’s
counsel in a meaningful discussion on how to facilitate the deposition of both
the Plaintiff and Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable witness(es) renders
Honda’s attempt to ‘meet and confer’ with Plaintiff meaningless.” (Opp. p. 3.)
The Court finds Honda’s failure to
provide dates for the deposition of its Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) is
entirely irrelevant to whether they met and conferred prior to this motion. “A
meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a
reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented
by the motion.” (C.C.P. § 2016.040.) Whether Honda cooperated with
Plaintiff’s discovery requests is not an issue presented by this motion. Each
side’s discovery obligations are independent of one another. If Honda refused
to provide dates for the deposition of its PMK, Plaintiff’s remedy is to file a
motion, not refuse to provide his own responses.
Plaintiff’s Deposition
Honda’s motion asks the Court for an
order compelling two things. First, Honda asks that the Court compel Plaintiff’s
attendance for deposition pursuant to C.C.P. § 2025.240(a). Second, Honda asks
the Court to compel Plaintiff’s responses to their RFPD. Honda’s RFPD were
served in conjunction with the Notice of Deposition. (See Mot. Exh. A.)
The Court first addresses the request to
compel Plaintiff’s response to RFPD. It appears that Plaintiff served
objections to these responses on May 2, 2024. (See Opp. Exh. 2.) As such, the
Court construes Honda’s motion as one to compel further responses under C.C.P. § 2031.310(c), as opposed to initial
responses under C.C.P. § 2031.300(b).
The above
being established, the Court finds the motion
is procedurally defective as to the RFPD. “Any motion involving the content of
a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a
separate statement.” (C.R.C. Rule 3.1345(a).) That includes a motion “[t]o
compel or to quash the production of documents or tangible things at a
deposition.” (C.R.C. Rule 3.1345(a)(5).) The separate statement must include
the text of each demand and response or objection. (Id.)
The notice of plaintiff’s deposition
includes 31 requests for production. (Mot. Exh. A.) It appears Plaintiff served
timely objections to all 31 requests. (Opp. Exh. 2.) Honda’s motion includes no
separate statement and no briefing as to the impropriety of Plaintiff’s
objections. As such, Honda’s motion is procedurally defective. Accordingly, the
motion is DENIED without prejudice as to the RFPD.
As concerns Plaintiff’s deposition, the
Court finds Honda’s motion is proper. Plaintiff did not serve a valid objection
as to his testimony at deposition. Plaintiff objected only on the basis that “[t]his
deposition was unilaterally noticed by Defendant for a date and time on which
Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s counsel is unavailable.” (Opp. Exh. 2, p. 1.)
Unavailability may be a reason not to attend
a deposition as a practical matter, but it is not a valid objection under C.C.P.
§ 2025.410. That section refers to objections to “a deposition notice that does
not comply with Article 2 (commencing with section 2025.210),” not for other
reasons a party cannot attend a deposition. Though it may be a professional
courtesy to mutually schedule a deposition, the Civil Discovery Act does not
require that. “An oral deposition shall be scheduled for a date at least 10 days
after service of the deposition notice.” (C.C.P. § 2025.270(a).) “The service
of a deposition notice under Section 2025.240 is effective to require any
deponent who is a party to the action… to attend and to testify, as well as to
produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for
inspection and copying.” (C.C.P. § 2025.280(a).) The party serving the notice
of deposition can choose the date so long as it complies with these
requirements and Honda did so here. The
deponent still has an affirmative obligation to file a a motion for protective
order (to adjust the timing and/or location). CCP §2025.420(b).
Further, Honda states that they responded
to Plaintiff’s May 2 objections by emailing to request alternative dates for
the deposition. (Mot. Exh. C.) Honda states this email elicited no response.
(Sadanaga Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s only statement in regard to providing
alternative dates is that his counsel proposed dates in a June 14, 2024 email.
(See Opp. Exh. 3.) The Court notes that this email was sent on the same day as
Plaintiff filed his opposition to the instant motion and over a month after the
noticed deposition date.
In short, the Court finds that Honda appropriately
noticed Plaintiff’s deposition and no valid objections under C.C.P. § 2025.410 were
served. The Court finds that Honda appropriately attempted to meet and confer
with Plaintiff as to alternative deposition dates, but that attempt fell upon deaf
ears. Accordingly, Honda’s motion is GRANTED as to compelling Plaintiff’s
deposition.
The Court orders the parties to further
meet and confer to determine a mutually acceptable date for the deposition. Given
that Plaintiff has suggested the dates of September 16, September 25, and
October 4, the Court strongly suggest that Honda agree to one of these dates if
possible. Should the parties be unable to reach a mutual date they are to contact
the Court and a date will be chosen for them.
Sanctions
“If a motion under subdivision (a) is
granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing
with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and
against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless
the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction
unjust.” (C.C.P. § 2025.450.)
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff was
without substantial justification in opposing the motion. Plaintiff’s objection
was clearly not within the bounds of C.C.P. § 2025.410 such that he could have
reasonably expected to avoid the granting of this motion. As such, the Court
grants $560 in sanctions as against Plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and
severally. This amount reflects two and a half hours of attorney work at a rate
of $200 per hour and the $60 filing fee. (Sadanaga Decl. ¶ 6.) The Court finds
this amount reasonable to compensate Honda in bringing the motion.
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RULING:
In the
event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed
order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the
following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and
entered into the court’s records.
ORDER
American Honda
Motor Company, Inc.’s Motion to Compel
Deposition came on regularly for hearing on June 28,
2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said
hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there
rule as follows:
HONDA’S MOTION TO COMPEL IS GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART.
THE MOTION TO COMPEL AS TO PLAINTIFF’S FURTHER
RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IS DENIED.
THE MOTION TO COMPEL AS TO PLAINTIFF’S
ATTENDANCE AT DEPOSITION IS GRANTED.
SANCTIONS
ARE AWARDED IN THE AMOUNT OF $560 AS AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY. PAYMENT SHALL BE DUE IN 30 DAYS.
UNLESS
ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, HONDA TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
DATE:
June 28, 2024 _______________________________
F.M.
TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of
Los Angeles