Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24BBCV00170, Date: 2024-06-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24BBCV00170 Hearing Date: June 21, 2024 Dept: A
LOS
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH
CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT
A
TENTATIVE
RULING
JUNE 21,2024
MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 24BBCV00170
|
MP: |
PMC Global, Inc. (Plaintiff) |
|
RP: |
None |
The Court is not
requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear
is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling,
no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other
parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the
party’s intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become
the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice may be given
either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS:
PMC
Global Inc. (Plaintiff) brings this action against CSC Auto Salvage and
Dismantling Inc. dba Express Metals Recycling (Express Metals), XBand Solar
Flare LLC (XBand), Metro Metals Recycling, Inc. (Metro Metals), Moonbeam
Properties II, LLC (Moonbeam), First Stop Recycling, Inc. (First Stop), and
Capital Ready Mix, Inc. (Capital Ready mix) (collectively Defendants).
Plaintiff
owns and operates its corporate headquarters at 12243 Branford Street, Los
Angeles, California 91352. This properly directly abuts a recycling facility located
which is owned, operated, or leased by the various Defendants. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants own/operate the recycling facility in such a manner
that endangers Plaintiff’s employees and disrupts Plaintiff’s business. Plaintiff’s
Complaint states causes of action for (1) Private Nuisance, (2) Public
Nuisance, and (3) Declaratory Relief.
Plaintiff
now moves for a preliminary injunction restraining Defendants from, among other
things, operation of the recycling facility in a way which poses a threat to
the abutting property. The Court notes that no Defendant has appeared in this
matter and that Default has been entered against all Defendants except Metro
Metals.
ANALYSIS:
I.
LEGAL
STANDARD
The
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final
resolution upon a trial. (See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc.
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536.) Relief requires the use of competent evidence to
create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. (See, e.g., ReadyLink
Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; Ancora-Citronelle
Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150.) The burden of proof is on
the plaintiff as moving party. (O'Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the
absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. (C.C.P. § 526(4); Thayer
Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d
The
trial court considers two factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction: (1) the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its
case at trial, and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if
the injunction is denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to
suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (C.C.P. § 526(a); Husain
v. McDonald's Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-67.) The moving party
bears the burden of demonstrating both a likelihood of success on the merits
and the occurrence of irreparable harm before a final judgment can be entered.
(Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1571.)
II.
MERITS
The Properties & The Proposed Enjoined
Parties
As
previously stated, Plaintiff’s headquarters are located at 12243 Branford
Street, Los Angeles, California 91352. Plaintiff has operated its headquarters
at this location since 1976. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 2.) The alleged offending property (Offending Property) is located at
12207 Branford Street, Los Angeles, California 91352. Plaintiff’s property is
identifiable as Los Angeles County Assessor’s Parcel Number 2537-015-063.
(Compl. ¶ 12.) Defendants’ property is identifiable by Parcel Number 2537-015-059.
(Compl. ¶ 13.) An aerial photograph attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s motion
confirms the properties are directly adjacent.
As per a
grant deed dated June 28, 2018, XBand is the sole owner of the Offending
Property. (Bakalay Decl. ¶ 3(c), Exh. O.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Express Metals, Metro Metals, Moonbeam, and First Stop are the owners and
operators of the recycling facility. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff states that XBand is the lessor of
the Offending Property to First Stop and Capital Ready Mix. (Manasan Decl.
¶ 8.)
Plaintiff
submits the Secretary of State (SOS) filings for each Defendant in support of
this motion. (See Exhibits I, J, K, L, M, & N.) Plaintiff also submits the
recorded grant deed for the property. (See Exhibit O.) A review of these exhibits
reveals that Defendants all maintain 12207 Branford Street, Los Angeles,
California 91352 as their business address with the SOS, with the exception of
First Stop and Capital Ready Mix. First Stop maintains a business address of
12231 Branford Street, Sun Valley, Ca 91352. (Exhibit M, p. 2.) Plaintiff
states that Capital Ready Mix operates a concrete production facility on a
different property, but that they serve as the guarantor for First Stop’s lease
with XBand. (Compl. ¶ 15, Manasan Decl. ¶ 8, Exhibit G.)
Evidentiary
Showings
Nuisance
Conditions
Plaintiff
submits the declaration of their Associate General Counsel and Head of Human Resources,
Rowe Manasan (Manasan). As concerns the nuisance conditions, Manasan states the
following:
·
That Defendants created, maintained, caused, permitted,
aided, and/or abetted multiple piles of trash, rock, metal, dust, dirt, sand,
and other debris on the Offending Property. These piles regularly reach heights
of 40 feet and are positioned directly adjacent to the property line. (Manasan
Decl. ¶ 9.)
·
That trash, rock, metal, dust, dirt, sand, and other debris regularly
enter Plaintiff’s property from these piles. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 10(b).)
·
That dust clouds arising from some “noisy and earthshaking
activity” have regularly caused the intrusion of dust, dirt, sand, and other
debris onto Plaintiff’s property. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 10(a).)
·
That the above activity causes considerable noise and
shaking to affect Plaintiff’s property. ((Manasan Decl. ¶ 10(e).)
·
That water overspray from the tops of these piles often intrudes
into Plaintiff’s property. (Manasan Decl.
¶ 10(d).)
·
That Defendants and their employees regularly park large
trucks and other vehicles in such as way that prevents access to Plaintiff’s
property. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 10(f).)
·
That all such behaviors described constitute a violation of
the Los Angeles Municipal Code. (Manasan Decl.
¶ 10(g).)
·
That the alleged nuisance conditions have been occurring
since at least September 2020. (Manasan Decl.
¶ 9.)
Manasan
explains that Plaintiff’s employee parking lot is directly adjacent to the
piles of debris on Defendants’ property. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 10(a).) As a result, Plaintiff’s
employees and their vehicles are often adversely affected by debris intruding
from the piles. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff has experienced numerous complaints from employees and customers
expressing concern about safety. (Manasan Decl.
¶ 12, Exh. D.) Plaintiff has also incurred increased costs in
maintaining its property as the result of the intrusions. (Manasan Decl. ¶ 10(b).) The intrusions have also
caused Plaintiff to incur additional expense in maintaining its food grade
packaging production. (Manasan Decl.
¶ 10(c).) Manasan states that Plaintiff currently hires third-party
cleaning services to mitigate the situation roughly five times a year. (Manasan
Decl. ¶ 22.) Manasan states the
cost for such services has totaled roughly $20,000 to date. (Id.)
In
addition to the Manasan declaration, Plaintiff submits several photographs
detailing the Offending Property’s conditions. Exhibit B consists of 35
photographs documenting the debris piles. In these photos large piles of debris
are clearly visible despite the presence of what appears to be an approximately
20-foot wall constructed out of corrugated metal separating the properties. These
piles apparently consist of loosely stacked scrap material, and many piles
greatly exceed the height of the separation wall. The photos also depict the
piles placed a few feet away from the vehicles of Plaintiff’s employees.
Several of the photos depict an excavator atop these loose scrap piles. (See
Exh. B, pgs. 22-26, 34-35.)
DTSC
Enforcement Order
Plaintiff
also submits case filings and an enforcement order in a case brought by the State
of California Environmental Protection Agency Department of Toxic Substances
Control (DTSC). (See Exhs. Q, T.) These documents detail at length several
violations of the California Hazardous Waste Control Law (HWCL) by Express
Metals. These violations include improper storage of hazardous materials, failure
to minimize the release of hazardous material into the air/soil, handling
hazardous material without the proper permits, and maintaining debris exceeding
regulatory thresholds for various hazardous chemicals. (Exh. P, ¶ 33.) Express Metals appears to have stipulated to
the entry of a judgment requiring both injunctive measures and the payment of
$100,000. (Exh. T, p.11.)
Scope
of the Injunction
Plaintiff’s
proposed injunction requests Defendants be enjoined from the following:
1.
Creating, maintaining, causing, permitting, aiding, and/or
abetting the existence of piles of trash, rock, metal, dust, dirt, sand, and
other debris on the Offending Property (the “Piles”) in excess of twenty (20)
feet;
2.
Creating, maintaining, causing, permitting, aiding, and/or
abetting conditions that cause trash, rock, metal, dust, dirt, sand, and other
debris from the Piles and elsewhere on the Offending Property to enter the PMC
Property;
3.
Creating, maintaining, causing, permitting, aiding, and/or
abetting water overspray from the tops of the Piles to enter the PMC Property;
4.
Creating, maintaining, causing, permitting, aiding, and/or
abetting the use of heavy equipment operated on the Offending Property in a
manner which generates noises or sounds that impede PMC’s use and enjoyment of
the PMC Property;
5.
Creating, maintaining, causing, permitting, aiding, and/or
abetting the parking of vehicles in on Branford Street which impede access to
PMC’s Property; and
6.
Creating, maintaining, causing, permitting, aiding, and/or
abetting any other conditions, in addition to those referenced above, that
violate provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, including, but not
limited to: unapproved construction; failure to control the emission of dust,
dirt, sand, and other debris; uses not conducted within an enclosed building or
within a completely enclosed area; unpermitted over-height storage; and
unapproved open storage; and the existence of rubbish, garbage, and trash on
the premises.
In
order for these requests to be granted, Plaintiff must demonstrate that they
are likely to prevail on the related cause of action and are likely to suffer
irreparable harm should the injunction not be granted. Given these parameters
the Court will address each of these requests in turn.
Requests
Nos. 1, 2, & 3
Each
of these requests relate to the nuisance conditions created by the large debris
piles that Defendants maintain on the Offending Property. With respect to the
piles, their production of debris which intrudes on Plaintiff’s property, and the
water overspray that is used to maintain them, the Court finds Plaintiff has
produced sufficient evidence to enjoin such behavior.
To
prevail on a cause of action for Private Nuisance, Plaintiff must prove (1) an
interference with his use and enjoyment of its property; (2) that the invasion
of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land is
substantial, i.e., it caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage;
and (3) the interference with the protected interest is unreasonable, i.e., it
must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.
As
concerns the likelihood of prevailing, the Court finds Plaintiff has upheld
their burden. Civil Code § 3479 defines nuisance to include “[a]nything which
is injurious to health … or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property….”
Here,
Plaintiff has provided copious exhibits documenting that the conditions of the
piles at the Offending Property are a nuisance. Plaintiff has clearly
demonstrated the existence of piles in excess of 20 feet. (See Exh. B, Manasan
Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff’s Exhibit D contains numerous pictures of the vehicles
of Plaintiff’s employees covered in dust and debris from the piles. Plaintiff also
offers the complaints of their employees wherein they state, “the dust has scratched
the paint and clogged the air filter of my car”, “the dust seems to be eating
the clear coating off of my car's paint job.”, and “over the last two years the
paint on my car has started to peel off” (Exh. D. pgs. 14, 22, and 35.) These
are but a few of the examples of how the piles, and the debris they cause,
constitute a nuisance which inhibits Plaintiff’s enjoyment of the land.
As
concerns the water overspray of request number three, Plaintiff explains that
the water overspray mixes with the debris and causes several damaging
conditions. One employee of Plaintiff states that they experienced difficulty
opening their car door because of the mixture of water and debris. (Exh. D. p.
11.) Another employee opines that their car is often covered in a sticky, maple
syrup like substance. (Exh. D. p. 42.)
From
the above evidentiary showings, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has
demonstrated the behavior sought to be enjoined by these three requests constitutes
a nuisance. The Court is also satisfied that Plaintiff’s exhibits demonstrate
this nuisance is such that their enjoyment of the property is seriously
impeded. As such, Plaintiff has demonstrated they are likely to prevail on
their nuisance claim as regards the piles, the debris entering their property,
and the water overspray.
The
Court also finds Plaintiff has shown the likelihood of harm if the injunction
is not granted. Plaintiff has demonstrated that its products, vehicles, and
employees have been repeatedly damaged by the behavior complained of. Plaintiff’s
building and the vehicles of its employers are regularly covered in dirt to
such a point that they have become damaged. To this end, Plaintiff has already
incurred substantial costs in mitigating the conditions in its parking lot. It also
is reasonable to conclude from the evidence provided that the threat of being
struck by debris from the Offending Property is highly likely. Further, without
evidence from Defendants, the Court cannot see a situation in which the
injunction would cause them harm outweighing that likely to be suffered by
Plaintiff, especially in light of the prior violations issued from the State of
California.
Accordingly,
the motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED as to requests number one,
two, and three.
Request
No. 4
As
concerns request number four, the Court finds the request is too vague to be
enforceable. “An injunction must be narrowly drawn to give the party enjoined
reasonable notice of what conduct is prohibited.” (Midway Venture LLC v.
County of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 58, 92.) “An injunction must be
sufficiently definite to provide a standard of conduct for those whose
activities are to be proscribed, as well as a standard for the court to use in
ascertaining an alleged violation of the injunction.” (People ex rel. Gascon
v. HomeAdvisor, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1082.) “ An injunction
which forbids an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application exceeds the
power of the court.” (Id. at pp. 1082-1083.)
Here,
Plaintiff requests the Court enjoin Defendants from “operating heavy machinery”
in such a wat that “generates noises or sounds that impeded PMC’s use or
enjoyment of the property”. The Court finds these terms are impermissibly
vague. It is not clear from the phrasing of the injunction what behavior is
actually enjoined. There is no attempt to define “heavy machinery” and no
attempt to define what noises constitute a restriction of Plaintiff’s
enjoyment. As written, request number four could encompass the operation of any
machinery in a way that produces any amount of noise. If Plaintiff were
to come before the Court to argue a violation of this request, the Court would
be without an applicable standard to use in ascertaining whether a violation
has occurred.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction is DENIED as to request number four.
Request
No. 5
Request
number five concerns the parking of various large vehicles by Defendants in a
way that allegedly blocks Plaintiff’s access to their property. Plaintiff
represents that Defendants frequently park trucks and other vehicles along
Branford Street in such a way that Plaintiff’s front entrance is blocked. (Manasan
Decl. ¶ 10f.)
Unlike
the first three requests, Plaintiff provides no photographic evidence that this
parking practice is occurring. Instead, Plaintiff submits the complaints of its
employees as to the parking practices. One employee explains that trucks line
up on Branford Street in anticipation of dumping their cargo on Defendants’
property. (Exh. D, p. 37.) This employee goes on to explain that this creates a
situation where emergency vehicles cannot pass, but they do not mention that
the trucks block access to Plaintiff’s property. (Id.) Another employee
attests that these trucks often block vision and make pulling out of the
parking lot difficult, but they do not state the trucks block the lot. (Exh D,
p. 42.) Other employee complaints all state that the trucks park “too close” to
the Plaintiff’s lot, but none state that the entrance has ever been blocked.
(See Exh. D, pg. 35, 51.)
Also,
unlike the first three requests, Plaintiff provides no evidence that these
trucks are creating a nuisance at Defendants’ behest. While the trucks appear
to be lining up to dump onto Defendants’ property, it does not follow that the
drivers are agents of Defendants such that their behavior can be enjoined.
Lastly,
the Court finds this request also suffers from ambiguity. The request that
Defendants be enjoined from parking vehicles “which impede access” to
Plaintiff’s property can be interpreted in a number of ways. “Impeding” access is much broader than
“preventing” access. The language of
this request would enjoin the parking of any vehicle on any part of the street
that Plaintiff deems obstructs their enjoyment of the land. This language is
too vague to be permissible.
In
short, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated the likelihood of
prevailing on its nuisance claims as concerns Defendants’ alleged parking of
trucks on Branford Street. Even if Plaintiff had made this showing, the
language of their request is too vague for the injunction to be granted.
Accordingly,
the motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED as to request number five.
Request
No. 6
As with requests numbers four and five, the Court finds the
language of request number six to be too vague. The use of the phrase of “including,
but not limited to” encompasses a much larger range of behavior than those
complained of by Plaintiff. Enjoining Defendants from any violation of the
LAMC would inherently incorporate provisions that have nothing to do with Plaintiff’s
claims of nuisance. By way of example, this language would necessarily involve
violations for unapproved construction, over-height storage, open storage, or
trash on the premises, all of which may be unrelated to the nuisance claim.
To the extent that any violation of the LAMC causes a nuisance on Plaintiff’s
property, such behavior will already have been enjoined by requests one, two,
or three. If Plaintiff wishes to enjoin Defendants’ noncompliance, they must
identify specific LAMC sections they seek compliance with. As it stands, the
proposed language is too vague.
Accordingly,
the motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED as to request number six.
---
RULING:
In the
event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed
order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the
following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and
entered into the court’s records.
ORDER
PMC Global, Inc.’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on regularly
for hearing on June 21, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the
minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the
premises, did then and there rule as follow:
THE
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED AS TO
REQUESTS NUMBER ONE, TWO, AND THREE
THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS DENIED AS TO
REQUESTS NUMBER FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX.
THE COURT
WILL SIGN A REVISED ORDER INCORPORATING THE ABOVE.
PLAINTIFF
TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
DATE: June
21, 2024 _______________________________
F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of
Los Angeles