Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24BBCV00379, Date: 2024-09-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24BBCV00379    Hearing Date: September 20, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Octavia Mary Carmen Whyte (Plaintiff) brings this action against Nissan North America, Inc. (Nissan) for Nissan’s alleged violation of the Song Beverly Act. Plaintiff alleges that her 2020 Nissan Kick (the “Subject Vehicle”) was manufactured as defective.

Before the Court is motion to compel Nissan’s further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for the Production of Documents (RFPD) Set One Nos. 30 and 31. Nissan opposes the motion and Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFPD”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. § 2031.310(c).) 

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  

If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

II.                 MERITS

RFPD Nos. 30 & 31

Plaintiff’s RFPD request the following:

·         All documents, in the form of a list or compilation, of other customer complaints in your electronically stored information of database(s) that are substantially similar to complaints made by plaintiffs with respect to the subject vehicle in other 2020 Nissan Kicks vehicles. (RFPD No. 30.)

·         All documents that refer to, reflect, or relate to any field service action issued, or in the process of being issued, in response to complaints experienced by plaintiff as described in defendant’s warranty history/summary and within the line items of the repair orders created at defendant’s authorized repair facility. (RFPD No. 31.)

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses to a request for production must include a meet and confer declaration consistent with C.C.P. § 2016.040. (C.C.P. § 2031.310 (b)(2).) In turn, Section 2016.040 requires that the moving party have made “a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (C.C.P. § 2016.040.)

“A single letter, followed by a response which refuses concessions, might in some instances be an adequate attempt at informal resolution, especially when a legitimate discovery objective is demonstrated. The time available before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which the responding party was complicit in the lapse of available time, can also be relevant. An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.)

Upon review of the parties submissions, the Court finds the meet and confer efforts of Plaintiff were insufficient. The Court may deny a motion to compel discovery for lack of a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer. (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1436-1439; Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 434-435.)

On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a 19-page meet and confer letter purportedly addressing perceived deficiencies in Nissan’s production. (Mot. Exh. 7.) This letter requested response by July 2, 2024 and requested a 15-day extension for Plaintiff’s deadline to file this motion. (Id.) The Court notes that this letter appears to be devoid of any specific reference to Nissan’s production/responses. Rather than brief the individual requests which require further response, Plaintiff’s letter simply identifies types of information which are typically in dispute in Song Beverly Cases. (Id.)

Where the letter does specifically address RFPD Nos. 30 and 31, it does so in the most generic terms. For example, the letter states that these RFPD seek information regarding vehicles of the same “make, module[sic], and year” as Plaintiff’s 2022 Nissan Kicks. (Mot. Exh. 7 at p. 99.) Yet RFPD Nos. 30 and 31 contain no request for information about vehicles of the same make, model, or year, instead requesting customer complaints which are “substantially similar”. Limitations to vehicles of the same make, model, and year are often imposed on such requests as RFPD Nos. 30 and 31 after the parties meet and confer to narrow the issues, but there is no evidence the parties agreed to such limitations here.

Additionally, Nissan states it has produced various documents which are responsive to this request, including recall information and warranty claims. Despite this, Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter, and to a large extent their motion, is silent on the documents Nissan actually produced.

Given the foregoing, the Court does not construe sending the June 25, 2024 letter to be evidence of a good faith attempt to meet and confer letter. Plaintiff’s letter largely consists of generic arguments applicable to any Song-Beverly action. This letter may be a good first step toward addressing discovery issues, but it is far from a substantive effort to meet and confer.

On the other hand, Nissan had failed to present any evidence that it ever replied to the June 25, 2024 letter. Nissan’s only showing of meet and confer on this matter is a request for search terms. On August 9, 2024, Nissan’s counsel reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel to request clarification on what documents were sought via the provision of search terms. (Opp. Exh. B.) This request came long after the June 25, 2024 letter and the requested July 2 reply deadline. Further, a review of Exhibit B reveals that the request for search terms was issued in reference to an entirely different Song-Beverly action. Nissan also offers a handful of meet and confer correspondence related to a number of other cases between their counsel and counsel for Plaintiffs. (Exhs. C-F.) Nothing in Nissan’s declaration shows an effort to meet and confer with respect to the case before this Court.

While the Court understands that counsel for the parties frequently work on a number of Song-Beverly cases with similar issues, the fact remains that meet and confer correspondence on other cases is entirely irrelevant to this motion. Nissan’s inclusion of these correspondence only serves to obfuscate the record. While this may not have been purposeful, the result is still increased difficulty in the Court’s reviewing of this motion.

In short, the Court finds that neither side has engaged in a good faith effort to meet and confer regarding discovery matters in this case. Plaintiff’s initial meet and confer letter did not address any specific production deficiencies and is not evidence of a good faith effort to reach an informal resolution without involvement of the Court. Nissan in turn completely failed to respond to the meet and confer letter and has instead presented the Court with a variety of exhibits which are irrelevant to the determination of this motion.

Accordingly, the motion to compel further responses is DENIED without prejudice. The parties are ordered to meet and confer to address the discovery concerns in this case. In the Court’s experience such meet and confer efforts are usually sufficient to resolve the concerns of both sides regarding discovery in Song-Beverly cases. Should disagreement persist, Plaintiff is invited to refile their motion.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Octavia Mary Carmen Whyte’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents came on regularly for hearing on September 20, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER PRODUCTION IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

THE PARTIES ARE ORDERED TO MEET AND CONFER WITHIN 30 DAYS REGARDING DISCOVERY COMPLIANCE.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: September 20, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles