Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24BBCV00489, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24BBCV00489    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE

ALLEGATIONS: 

Tatiana Burdyuzha (Plaintiff) brings this action against Tatiana Vinokurova (Vinokurova) and Avalonbay Communities, Inc., Tishman Speyer Archstone-Smith Studio City III-A, LLC, Tishman Speyer Archstone-Smith Studio City III-B, LLC, & Tishman Speyer Archstone-Smith Studio City III-C, LLC (collectively AVB Defendants). Plaintiff alleges that, on December 27, 2022, she underwent an unlicensed dermatological procedure performed by Vinokurova. (FAC at p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Vinokurova illegally converted her apartment at 10945 Bluffside Dr, Apt 404, Los Angeles, CA,91604 (the Subject Premises) into a dermatology practice. (Id.) The Subject Premises is alleged to be a residential apartment leased by Vinokurova and owned by AVB Defendants. Plaintiff further alleges that she suffered permanent damages from the unlicensed operation, including permanent vision loss in her left eye. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges a single cause of action against all Defendants for General Negligence. AVB Defendants now demur to this cause of action, asserting plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts. AVB Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s request for exemplary and punitive damages. (See FAC ¶ 11(g); FAC p. 7, Exhs. 2,3.) AVB Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s allegation speaking to AVB Defendant’s Constructive knowledge.  (See FAC at p. 5, GN-1.)

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and AVB Defendants reply.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                LEGAL STANDARD 

Demurrer

The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Id.)

A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.  App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318.)

Pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)

Motion to Strike

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. § 435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. § 431.10.)

The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. § 436 (b).)

II.              MERITS

Meet and Confer

C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) and 435.5(a) require that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer and/or motion to strike. Upon review, the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Williams Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.)

Discussion

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

“Landowners under California law are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.” (Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 654, 663, citing Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674.) “One well-established limit is that there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” (Williams supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at 663 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

There exists an exception to this limit where a party has shown a special relationship between the injured party and the landowner. (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 531.) “Courts have found such a special relationship in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees. In addition, such “special relationships triggering a duty to protect another from foreseeable injury caused by a third party have been found in other contexts, including those of (i) common carriers and passengers, (ii) innkeepers and their guests, and (iii) mental health professionals and their patients.” (Id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

Liability for nonfeasance is limited to situations in which there is a special relationship that creates a duty to act. (Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202.) In determining the scope of property owner’s duty to protect from third-party harm the Court looks at “…the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Ann M. supra, 6 Cal.4th 666 at 675.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to hold AVB Defendants liable for the tortious act of Vinokurova. Despite this, Plaintiff’s FAC contains no facts alleging a special relationship between herself and AVB Defendants such that a duty to protect Plaintiff from the acts of Vinokurova could be established. Plaintiff merely asserts that AVB Defendants “knew or should have known” that Vinokurova was performing illegal medical procedures out of her apartment. (FAC at p. 5.) This statement is conclusory and unattended by any facts speaking to AVB Defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge. Alleging that AVB Defendants owned the building is insufficient to state that they are liable for the alleged conduct of Vinokurova.

Plaintiff argues in opposition that AVB Defendants had a duty to inspect the premises and thereby discover Vinokurova’s unauthorized practice. The court finds this argument unpersuasive. Plaintiff cites to no authority establishing that a landlord of a residential building owes third parties a duty to inspect the premises to safeguard against the unlicensed practice of medicine by a tenant. Instead, Plaintiff cites to Garcia v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to Garcia, a landlord can owe a duty to a third party where they have reason to know of a need to take remedial action. (Garcia supra, 242 Cal.App.4^th at 604.) Garcia is factually inapposite to this case, as it concerned liability of a landlord for a dangerous condition of the property, not for the criminal conduct of a third party. (Id. at 602.) Garcia is thus unhelpful to Plaintiff in arguing that she has alleged sufficient facts to establish a duty owed by AVB Defendants.  

Accordingly, AVB Defendants’ demurrer to the sole cause of action for Negligence is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

Given the Court has sustained the demurrer to the sole cause of action stated against AVB Defendants with leave to amend, the motion to strike portions of the FAC is MOOT.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

This Demurrer and Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on April 11, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

AVB DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO THE SOLE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR GENERAL NEGLIGENCE IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS MOOT.

DEFENDANT AVALON BAY COMMUNITIES TO GIVE NOTICE.