Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCP00724, Date: 2025-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24NNCP00724 Hearing Date: April 18, 2025 Dept: A
PETITION
TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD
Los Angeles Superior Court
Case # 24NNCP00724
|
MP: |
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
(Petitioner) |
|
RP: |
Daniel Duong (Respondent) [No
Response Rendered] |
The Court is not
requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by
California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear
is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling,
no argument is required and any party seeking argument should notify all other
parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the
party’s intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become
the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice may be given
either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ALLEGATIONS:
Charles Schwab & Co.,
Inc. (Petitioner) brings this petition to confirm an arbitration award pursuant
to C.C.P. § 1285. Petitioner asks the Court to confirm an award achieved at
arbitration by Petitioner as against Daniel Duong (Respondent). Petitioner
states that the underlying dispute was related to a self-directed brokerage
account Respondent opened with Petitioner. Petitioner sought arbitration as to
the resolution of an outstanding $466,689.03 debit balance on Respondent’s
account.
On August 7, 2024, an
arbitral panel with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), issued
its final award. (Wynne Decl. Exh. C.) The award notes there was no appearance
or response to the arbitration from Respondent but found that service was
sufficient to bind Respondent to the panel’s decision.
Petitioner has made
no response to this petition.
ANALYSIS:
I.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Any party
to an arbitration award may petition the court to confirm, correct, or vacate
the award. (C.C.P. § 1285.) “If a petition or response under this chapter is
duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether
rendered in this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter
it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or
dismisses the proceeding.” (C.C.P. § 1286.) A petition to confirm a binding
arbitration shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may
name any other parties to be bound by the award. (C.C.P. § 1285.) The petition
shall (1) set forth the substance of or have attached a copy of the agreement
to arbitrate unless petitioner denies the existence of such an agreement; (2)
set forth the name(s) of the arbitrator(s); and (3) set forth or have attached
a copy of the award and written opinion of the arbitrator. (C.C.P. §
1285.4(a)-(c).)
The
petition to confirm must be served and filed no later than four years after the
date of service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner (C.C.P. § 1288)
but may not be served and filed until at least 10 days after service of the
signed copy of the award upon the petitioner. (C.C.P. § 1288.4.) Where the
arbitration agreement does not provide the manner in which service shall be
made and the person on whom service is to be made has not previously appeared
in the proceeding and has not previously been served in accordance with C.C.P.
§ 1290.4(a), the petition and notice of hearing must be served in a manner
provided by law for the service of summons in an action. (C.C.P. § 1290.4(b).)
II.
MERITS
The Court finds the
petitioner should be denied without prejudice on grounds of ineffective
service. As stated above, service of a petitioner to confirm an arbitration
award is proper (1) when rendered pursuant to a method specified in the
arbitration agreement or (2) when rendered pursuant to the method for serving a
summons and complaint. (C.C.P. § 1290.4(b).) Here, the arbitration agreement
does establish a method of service for this petition. The arbitration agreement
provides only the following:
All notices from one party to the other involving arbitration
shall be considered to have been fully given when so served, mailed by
first-class, certified or registered mail, or otherwise given by other
commercially accepted medium of written notification.
(Wynne Decl. Exh. B at p.
11.)
Accordingly,
Petitioner is required to serve its petition in the same manner as a summons
pursuant as outlined in C.C.P. §§ 415.10, 415.20. Here, it appears that
Petitioner attempted to serve Respondent with this petition via substitute
service. Ordinarily, the declaration of a process server is usually sufficient
to establish a presumption of effective service. (See American Express
Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199¿Cal.App.4th 383, 390 [internal citation
omitted]; Evid. Code § 647.) However, the Court finds that there are
conflicting details as to service which prevent the creation of that
presumption here.
Petitioner
submits the declaration of process server Anthony Yanizzi (Yanizzi) (See February
26, 2025 Proof of Service.) Yanizzi states he effectuated substitute service on
February 20, 2025 at 1706 Laurel Drive, Monterey Park, CA 91755. Yanizzi states
he thereafter mailed a copy of the documents served to that same address. Despite
these representations, further explanation by Yanizzi casts doubt on whether
proper substitute service was made. As
discussed below, the Court is uncertain whether the address is a valid address
for service.
Yanizzi
states that his attempts at service were preceded by four attempts at service
by the Los Angeles County Sheriff at the Monterey Park address. (See February
26, 2025 Proof of Service p. 7.) Yanizzi states that, on February 13, 2025, he
waited outside the Monterey Park residence waiting for anyone to leave the house,
but no one appeared. Yanizzi states that on February 15, he observed a person
leaving the residence via what appeared to be Petitioner’s automobile (a white
Tesla). Yanizzi attempted to serve the person as he entered the vehicle, but
the person entered the vehicle and sped off. On February 20, 2025, Yanizzi
returned to the Monterey Park residence where he observed another person
leaving the residence via a different automobile (a gray Honda Odyssey). Yanizzi approached the person who identified
himself as Jason Sov (Sov). When asked Duong’s whereabouts, Sov responded “He
is not here.” When Yanizzi attempted to serve Sov, Sov verbally refused
service. When Sov entered his vehicle, Yanizzi placed the papers on Sov’s lap
and told him he was sub-served. Sov refused and threw the papers into the
street before departing. Yanizzi does not state whether the papers were
retrieved or left at the residence.
Substitute
service upon an individual is properly effectuated by leaving a copy of the
papers to be served at the person’s office or mailing address the person who is
apparently in charge thereof. (C.C.P. § 415.20(a).) In instances where personally
delivery cannot be made with due diligence, a summons may be served by leaving
a copy at the persons dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of
business, or usual mailing address in the presence of a competent member of the
household or a person apparently in charge. (C.C.P. § 415.20(b).) In either
case, completion of service requires the papers be mailed to the same address
of substitute service thereafter.
Here,
Yanizzi’s declaration does not state that the papers were left with a competent
member of the household. The papers appear to have been thrust upon Sov, who
was not identified as a member of the household, and who thereafter ejected
them into the street. This is not a condemnation of Yannizi’s attempt at
service, merely an observation that the papers were not “left” with a competent
member of the household as required.
The
declaration of the Sheriff’s prior attempts is also a case of concern. The last
attempt by the Sheriff to serve at the Monterey Park address states “Per Sandy,
Defendant no longer living at location.” Petitioner has not explained who Sandy
might be, nor is she referenced in Yannizi’s declaration. There is no
information in the petition explaining why substitute service was attempted at
the same address after the Sheriff’s were told Defendant no longer lived there.
It may be that Petitioner has evidence Respondent does still live at the
Monterey Park residence, but they do not provide it here.
In short,
the Court finds service of the petition was inadequate. While the Court
understands the difficulties serving Respondent has presented, the proof of
service shows a failure to comply with the requirements for substitute service.
As such, the petition is DENIED without prejudice. This permits Petitioner the
opportunity to properly serve and refile this petition.
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RULING:
In the
event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed
order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the
following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and
entered into the court’s records.
ORDER
Charles Schwab &
Co., Inc. Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award came
on regularly for hearing on April 18, 2025, with appearances/submissions as
noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised
in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC. TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.