Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCV00360, Date: 2024-10-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV00360    Hearing Date: October 25, 2024    Dept: A

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

 

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

 

ALLEGATIONS: 

 

Alex Rosales Hernandez (Plaintiff) brings this action against Ford Motor Company (Ford). Plaintiff alleges that Ford sold him a defective 2022 Ford F-150 (Subject Vehicle) and thereafter refused to repurchase the vehicle in violation of the Song-Beverly Act.

 

Before the Court are two motions to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for the Production of Documents (RFPD) and Special Interrogatories. Ford opposes the motions and Plaintiff responds.  

  

ANALYSIS: 

 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

 

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories

 

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that the responses contain: (1) answers that are evasive or incomplete, (2)¿an unwarranted or insufficiently specific exercise of an option to produce documents in lieu of a substantive response, or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. §¿2030.300(a).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections thereto. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21.)

  

Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFPD

 

A motion to compel further responses to RFPD may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (C.C.P. § 2031.310(c).) 

 

A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See C.C.P. § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  

 

If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

 

II.                 MERITS

 

A motion to compel further responses to a request for production must include a meet and confer declaration consistent with C.C.P. § 2016.040. (C.C.P. § 2031.310 (b)(2).) In turn, Section 2016.040 requires that the moving party have made “a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (C.C.P. § 2016.040.) C.C.P. § 2030.300(b)(1) contains an identical provision as regards motions to compel further responses to interrogatories.

 

“A single letter, followed by a response which refuses concessions, might in some instances be an adequate attempt at informal resolution, especially when a legitimate discovery objective is demonstrated. The time available before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which the responding party was complicit in the lapse of available time, can also be relevant. An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.)

 

Upon review of the parties submissions, the Court finds the meet and confer efforts of Plaintiff were insufficient. The timeline of Plaintiff’s meet and confer efforts are documented below.

 

·         On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff served her RFPD and Special Interrogatories on Ford’s counsel. (Armando Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.)

 

·         On June 25, 2024, Ford served its responses. On July 8, 2024, Ford served its verifications (Armando Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B.)

 

·         On July 25, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter to Ford’s counsel addressing perceived insufficiencies in Ford’s responses. (Armando Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. C.) This letter requested response by August 2, 2024. (Id.)

 

·         On July 31, 2024, Ford’s counsel responded with a meet and confer letter of their own. (Armando Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. D.)

 

·         On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff sent another meet and confer letter, requesting response by August 16. (Armando Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. E.)

 

·         On August 16, 2024, Ford responded to the second meet and confer letter. (Armando Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. F.)

 

·         On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed these motions to compel further responses.

 

The Court’s determination that the meet and confer requirements were not met here is primarily based on the contents of Plaintiff’s meet and confer letters as concerns a proposed protective order. Many of Ford’s responses to Plaintiff’s RFPD and Special Interrogatories agree to produce responsive documents subject to the entry of a protective order. In this Court’s experience, the entry of a protective order prior to discovery is a routine matter in actions brought under Song-Beverly. Autmobile manufacturers and plaintiffs frequently agree that the information requested in discovery would likely reveal trade secrets or proprietary information if not subject to a protective order.

 

Here, the July 25 meet and confer letter discusses the entry of a protective order in such a way that makes it clear Plaintiff’s counsel never saw a proposed protective order from Ford in this case. Plaintiff’s counsel states:

 

…based on our previous discussions, I understand that Ford will propose a protective order that deviates from the LASC model protective order. We have discussed Ford’s proposed changes to the LASC model on numerous occasions including at hearings on Ford’s previously filed motions for protective order.

 

(Armando Decl. Exh. C, p. 4.) 

 

From this statement it appears that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in the meet and confer process based on prior interactions with Ford, rather than facts attendant to this case. While the Court understands that Plaintiff’s counsel has brought several Song-Beverly actions against Ford, these experiences do not justify approaching the meet and confer process as a foregone conclusion. Without even seeing the proposed protective order, Plaintiff’s counsel rejects the assumed deviations from the LASC model order and proceeds to assert that Ford has provided no information to substantiate the need for a protective order. (Armando Decl. Exh. C, p. 3.)

 

From the outset of the meet and confer letter, Plaintiff’s position on the lack of necessity of a protective order is clear. Plaintiff’s letter is adamant that if Ford believes a protective order is necessary, it is incumbent upon Ford to file a noticed motion seeking a protective order. (See Armando Decl. Exh. C, p. 3 [“To that end, even though a party can seek a confidentiality order, it must promptly move for one.].) In short, Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter signals “I have not read your proposed protective order, but I disagree with its terms and that it is even necessary.”

 

The Court acknowledges that C.C.P. §§ 2031.060(a) & 2030.090(a) establish that a party seeking a protective order in response to discovery demands must do so via motion. Regardless, the purpose of meet and confer correspondence is to attempt to reach an amicable conclusion to matters without court intervention. A letter decrying the merits of a proposed protective order before it is even seen cannot serve this purpose.

 

Further, Plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to file this motion just three days after receiving Ford’s second response. The Court does not see why Plaintiff’s second letter would request a response from Ford if Plaintiff’s counsel had already determined a protective order to be unnecessary. Essentially, the meet and confer letters read as two parties stating their position to the other with no attempt at actual compromise.

 

Given the foregoing, the Court is inclined to continue these motions to December 20, 2024. The Court orders the parties further meet and confer regarding the contents of the proposed protective order. Should the parties be unable to reach an agreement on the protective order, Ford is to file supplemental briefing only as to the necessity of its protective order no later than December 6, 2024. Plaintiff is permitted to file responsive briefing only as to the issue of the protective order no later than December 11, 2024.

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RULING:

 

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

 

ORDER 

 

Alex Rosales Hernandez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses came on regularly for hearing on October 25, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

 

THE MOTIONS ARE CONTINUED TO DECEMBER 20, 2024.

 

SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY, FORD IS TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING AS TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS PROTECTIVE ORDER NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 6, 2024. PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED TO FILE RESPONSIVE BRIEFING AS TO THE ISSUE OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER ONLY NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 11, 2024.

 

PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.