Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCV00535, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT PER CRC 3.1308

The Court will attempt to post all Tentative Rulings at least the day prior to the hearing by 3:00 p.m.; however, the Court does not post Tentative Rulings for all matters.  

The Court will indicate in the Tentative Ruling whether the Court is requesting oral argument.  For cases where the Court is not requesting argument, then the Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) where the Court requests notice of intent to appear.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, a party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  
 

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

Notice of the ruling must be served as indicated in the tentative.  Remote appearances are permitted for all law and motion unless otherwise indicated by the Court.  

 


Case Number: 24NNCV00535    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

 

TENTATIVE RULING

MARCH 21, 2025

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 24NNCV00535

 

MP:  

Sunshine Inn, LTD & Rosemead Sheraton, Inc. (Defendants)

RP:  

Gloria Del Toro, Anthony Del Toro, and Dolores Del Toro (Plaintiffs)

 

NOTICE:

 

The Court is requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

 

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

 

ALLEGATIONS: 

 

Gloria Del Toro (Plaintiff), Anthony Del Toro (Anthony), and Dolores Del Toro (Dolores) bring this action against Sunshine Inn, LTD and & Rosemead Sheraton (Defendant) in connection with a fall Plaintiff suffered on Defendants’ property. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was negligent in their installation of a dance floor utilized at her son’s wedding, causing her to fall and be seriously injured.

 

Plaintiff states two causes of action for (1) Premises Liability and (2) Negligence as against each Defendant. Anthony and Dolores state a single cause of action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgement brought by Defendants. Defendants contend that Plaintiff is unable to show the essential element of causation required for both her Negligence and Premises Liability claims. Defendants further argue that Anthony and Dolores are unable to demonstrate the negligence element, as their claim is predicted on the success of Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants reply.

 

ANALYSIS: 

 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

 

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) C.C.P.¿§ 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing¿FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)¿ 

¿ 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (C.C.P.¿§437c(p)(2);¿Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ 

¿ 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v.¿Paetkau¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿ 

 

II.                 MERITS

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

Defendants’ evidentiary objection to the declaration of Brad Avrit (Avrit) is SUSTAINED for lack of foundation.

 

“Even when the witness qualifies as an expert, he or she does not possess a carte blanche to express any opinion within the area of expertise. For example, an expert's opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support, or on speculative or conjectural factors, has no evidentiary value and may be excluded from evidence.” (Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 155 [citations omitted].) “These rules apply to expert witness declarations submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment.” (Id.)

 

Here, Avrit’s declaration sets forth his opinion that Defendants were negligent in the construction of the dance floor.  In making this declaration, Avrit states there are four common factors causing failure of dance floors like the one at issue. (Avrit Decl. ¶ 6.) Avrit concludes that the first of these factors, “Improper initial assembly”, was to blame for Plaintiff’s fall. (Avrit Decl. ¶ 7.) This issue in Avrit making these statements is that he provides no explanation or evidentiary basis for these factors. While Avrit may be an experienced accident reconstructionist, it does not follow that he serves as an authority for the proper installation of a portable dance floor. Avrit’s opinion as to the improper installation is based on nothing more than photos and the testimony of two of Defendants’ employees. As will be discussed later, neither of these employees were involved with the installation of the dance floor. As such, Avrit has failed to create foundation for his opinion that the floor was improperly installed.

 

Facts Alleged

 

On December 30, 2022, Plaintiff was a guest at her son’s wedding held at 888 Montebello Blvd., Rosemead, California 91770 (the Subject Premises). (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 5.) The Subject Premises is a hotel owned by Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that, at approximately 3:30 p.m., she was walking to the dance floor to participate in the cake cutting when she suddenly fell. (Compl. ¶ 13.)

 

Plaintiff alleges that the edge of the dance floor lifted and broke apart, catching her shoe and causing her to fall forward. (Compl. ¶13.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that the dance floor constituted a dangerous condition which was created by Defendants’ improper installation. (Compl. ¶ 21.) It is alleged that Defendants, “[d]id not properly install the dance floor as the edge broke away and as it lifted, it caused a dangerous condition and trip hazard to the guests.” (Compl. ¶ 21.)

 

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains an excerpt from a witness statement made by Murilla Rivera (Rivera). (Compl. ¶ 23.) Rivera is alleged to be Defendants employee and was working as a server for the wedding. (Id.) Rivera is alleged to have seen the fall and to have observed that it was caused by the trim of the dance floor being moved out of place. (Id.) The Complaint also contains a statement by Luz Ortega (Ortega), who is alleged to be Defendants’ Catering and Sales Manager. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that, in her statement, Ortega stated she was told by guests of the wedding that they had put the moved piece of the floor back in place after the fall. (Id.)

 

Discussion

 

To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff's damages or injuries. (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.) The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

 

The Court begins its discussion by observing that Defendants’ motion appears to lump several distinct legal concepts under the single element of “causation” Defendants move for summary judgment specifically on grounds that no triable issue of fact exists as to the essential element of causation. This is at odds with the arguments and evidence they present, which appear to be primarily concerned with whether Defendants breached their duty of care as landowners.

 

Although framed as a matter of causation, Defendants’ argument is that their, “…employees inspected the dance floor shortly before the incident is alleged to have occurred and found nothing dangerous nor defective.” (Mot. at 2.) This argument, bolstered by the testimony of Defendants’ employees, appears to be that no dangerous condition existed. This is different than arguing that the defective condition was not the legal or proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury. In the Court’s view Defendants’ argument speaks more to the element of breach. If the Defendant’s argument that no dangerous condition existed is correct, then there is no breach and no liability.

 

Regardless, the Court has endeavored to analyze the merits of the motion as to both elements. For reasons set forth below, the Court finds Defendants have not satisfied their burden as to either.

 

Landowners Liability for Dangerous Condition

 

In order to properly explain why Defendants have not met their burden, it is necessary to briefly review the case law as concerns a landowner’s liability to guests.

 

Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Civ. Code, § 1714(a); Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37; see also, e.g., Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is "under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their [customers'] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm." (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)

 

Case law regarding dangerous conditions is split into two broad categories: (1) cases where the dangerous condition is allegedly created by the landowner or their employee and (2) cases where the source of the dangerous condition is unknown.

 

Where the source of a dangerous condition cannot be shown, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the owner had either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in order for liability to attach. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.) Alternatively, the plaintiff can demonstrate that the owner or was able to discover the condition by the exercise of ordinary care but failed to do so. (Id.) This requires the plaintiff to show that the dangerous condition persisted for long enough that it should have been discovered by the owner’s reasonable inspection of the premises. (Id.)

 

Conversely, a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual or constructive knowledge when there is evidence to indicate that a dangerous condition has been created by the negligence of the property owner or an employee acting within the scope of their employment. (Hatfield v. Levy Bros. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798, 806; see also Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 501, 259 P.2d 1010 [“When an unsafe condition ... has been created by the owner of the property himself or by an employee ..., the invitee need not prove the owner's notice or knowledge of the dangerous condition”].)

 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the dangerous condition of the dance floor was the direct result of Defendants’ improper installation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew the dance floor was a dangerous condition because they negligently constructed it. Plaintiff’s allegation is not that Defendants’ should have discovered a dangerous condition for which the source cannot be identified. At trial, Plaintiff will be required to demonstrate evidence of such improper installation. On summary judgment however, Defendants bear the burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff is unable to do so for lack of a triable issue of material fact.

 

In satisfaction of their initial burden on this point, Defendants offer the deposition of Luz Ortega (Ortega). (See Exh. B.) Ortega testified that she did not notice any wear and tear on the dance floor and that she inspected the dance floor to ensure the pieces were not damaged. (Exh. B. at 18-19.) Ortega also testified, “…every time there's an event, I walk the room, and I check the dance floor to make sure every piece is connected. I personally on December 30th was at that event making sure that everything was set for the bride and groom, and I walked the dance floor and personally checked that it was all in order.” (Exh. B. at 20.)

 

Defendants do not explain in their memorandum, declaration, or separate statement who Ortega is. It is alleged in the Complaint that Ortega is the Catering and Sales Manager for Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Defendants have provided no confirmation of this fact, though it appears from Ortega’s deposition testimony that she was involved in the logistics of the wedding. (Exh. B. at 18-19.) The fact remains that Defendants have failed to establish the foundation for Ortega’s testimony. Without an understanding as to who Ortega is and what she does, the Court cannot evaluate whether her testimony shows there is no triable issue of fact.

 

Even assuming Ortega is the Catering and Sales Manager, Defendants do not explain how her testimony is relevant to the installation of the dance floor. Ortega testified specifically that she did not know when the dance floor was constructed, because she does not set them up. (See Exh. B. at 21:13-14.) Ortega’s testimony that she did not observe any issues during her installation only serves as circumstantial evidence that the trim of the flooring was not out of place at the time of her inspection. Ortega’s inspection by “walking the room” does not necessarily preclude that the trim of the dance floor was improperly installed.

 

Defendants also offer the testimony of Rivera. Rivera testifies that she does not recall any wear and tear on the dance floor on the date of the incident, though she was not present when it was set up. (Exh. C. at 14:17-23.) Rivera also testified that she had never witnessed anyone trip on the dance floor in her time working for the hotel. (Id. at 16-17.)

 

Again, Defendants do not identify who Rivera is. Assuming that Rivera was a server at the wedding and a witness to the fall, as alleged by Plaintiff, her testimony does not speak to the adequacy of Defendants’ installation of the dancefloor. Rivera admits she was not present when the floor was installed and makes no statement that she conducted any inspection of the dance floor.

 

Defendants also offer the testimony of Plaintiff from her deposition. It appears this testimony is offered for the purpose of showing that Plaintiff has difficulty ambulating and is only relevant as to the dangerous condition in that she testified that she did not notice anything wrong with the floor before she fell. (Exh. D. at 52.)

 

Lastly, Defendants offer two photos of the floor shortly after Plaintiff’s fall. (Exh. E.) Defendants state these photos were produced by Plaintiff in discovery. (Tesfai Decl. ¶ 7.) The photos depict the dance floor and Plaintiff’s legs. It is unclear from these photos what piece of trim Plaintiff is alleged to have tripped on, though none of the trim pieces appear to be askew. Regardless, these photos do not satisfy Defendants’ burden. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that Rivera’s witness statement claimed the trim of the dance floor completely moved away. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff has also alleged that Ortega’s statement specifically acknowledges that other guests at the wedding put the loose piece of floor back into place shortly after the fall. (Compl. ¶ 24.) The photos contain no time stamp and are accompanied by no testimony as to when they were taken. As such, the photos do not preclude the possibility that the photo was taken after the wedding guests replaced. 

 

In short, none of the evidence proffered by Defendants forecloses the element of breach. Whether Defendants had constructive notice of the dangerous condition is irrelevant because Plaintiff has specifically alleged their direct role in creating the dangerous condition. None of the evidence submitted by Defendants establishes that there is no triable issue of fact that they improperly installed the floor. The testimony of two employees who were ostensibly uninvolved with the installation is insufficient. Defendant has produced no evidence which negates Plaintiff’s allegation that the floor was improperly installed such that her foot could be caught on the trim pieces.

 

Causation

 

Given that some of the evidence offered by Defendants speaks to actual and legal causation, rather than breach, the Court will address this element. The Court finds that Defendants evidence is insufficient to establish that no triable issue of fact exists as to causation.

 

To demonstrate actual or legal causation in negligence action, plaintiff is required to show that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. (Sandoval v. Bank of America (2002) 94 Cal. App. 4th 1378, 1385.) Framed another way, the plaintiff must show that it was "more probable than not" that the defendant's conduct was cause in fact of the result. (Id. at p. 1384.) “The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal. App.4th 853, 864.)

 

Defendants offer the deposition testimony of Plaintiff for purposes of establishing that her limited movement, rather than the dance floor, was the cause of her fall. Plaintiff indeed testified that she has mobility issues as the result of knee replacement in 2015. (Exh. D at 25.) Plaintiff also testified that she has a history of issues with balance and has difficulty bending her legs to go up curbs or stairs. (Exh. D at 30: 1-3 & 27:9-15.)

 

The deposition of Plaintiff certainly creates doubt as to her ability to show the floor’s condition was a substantial factor in her fall. At the same time, her testimony does not establish that her mobility and balance issues were the only reasonable causes of her fall. it does not establish that this is the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn. Plaintiff’s mobility issues may make it difficult for her to establish the floor as a substantial factor at trial, but they do not conclusively establish that she will be unable to do so.

 

Conclusion

 

The Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate the lack of a triable issue of fact as to whether they created a dangerous condition. The Court finds Defendants have similarly failed to establish that there is no triable issue of fact as to causation. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

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RULING:

 

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

 

ORDER 

 

Sunshine Inn, LTD & Rosemead Sheraton, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on March 21, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

 

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.

 

DEFEDANTS SUNSHINE INN, LTD TO GIVE NOTICE.  

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.