Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCV01110, Date: 2024-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV01110    Hearing Date: August 30, 2024    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Karen S. Darling (Plaintiff) brings this action against the Estate of Desiree Marie Meguerditchian (Decedent), Hovig Meguerditchian (Hovig), individually and in his capacity as administrator of Decedent’s estate, and Joanne Martinez (Martinez).

Plaintiff alleges that she was an attorney for Foothill Law Group (FLG) from 2017 to 2022. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 35.) FLG was owned and operated by Decedent until her death in 2022. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that around July 2021 FLG stopped paying her. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff states that she was not paid from March 2021 to March 2022, though she continued to work for FLG and bill hours. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-35.) Plaintiff alleges that Decedent was either not around or on medical leave during most of this time. (Compl ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges she was eventually paid $32,000 in 2022 but maintains that she is owed in excess of $250,000 for her billed hours. (Compl. ¶¶ 39, 60.) Plaintiff brings claims against Decadent’s estate and its administrator Hovig.

Plaintiff has also included Martinez, FLG’s administrator, as a Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that she submitted her billed hours and time sheets to Martinez regularly. (Compl. ¶36.) Plaintiff alleges she notified Martinez that some invoices incorrectly listed the handling attorney as Decedent. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff alleges Martinez inputed these incorrect invoices regardless of being advised of the error. (Compl. ¶ 42.)

Plaintiff previously submitted a creditor’s claim in the administration of Decedent’s Estate which was denied. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Hovig purchased a home in Lake Havasu with funds from the FLG account. (Compl. ¶ 50.)

Plaintiff now seeks an injunction restraining all assets of Defendants in Decedent’s Estate as well as any real or personal property in Defendants’ names and a right to attach order over the same. (Mot. pgs. 10-11.)

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

As a threshold matter, preliminary injunctions may be granted only after the moving party shows there is no adequate remedy at law. (Wilkison v. Wiederkehr (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 822, 832-833.) “The rule in this state is that injunctive and declaratory relief will not be granted where there is a plain, complete, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.” (Rickley v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

A preliminary injunction's main purpose is to preserve the status quo pending trial. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.)

“The trial court's decision rests on the consideration of two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that [moving party] will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that [moving party] is likely to suffer if the injunction is denied, compared to the harm the [opposing party] is likely to suffer if the injunction issues.” (Perez v. Hastings College of the Law (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 453, 456 [citing Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286].) These factors are applied on an inverse sliding scale: the greater the likelihood of success on the merits, the less that must be shown for interim harm, and vice versa. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)

A trial court has broad discretionary powers to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction so long as it does not act capriciously. The court should exercise its judgment in favor of the party most likely to be injured. (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205.) If the denial of an injunction would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendant would suffer little harm if it were granted, then it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant the preliminary injunction. (Id.)

II.                 MERITS

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the lack of an adequate legal remedy such that injunction should issue.

Injunctions will rarely be granted (absent specific statutory authority) where a suit for damages provides an adequate remedy. (See Thayer Plymouth Ctr., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110.) In considering the “adequacy” of damages as a remedy, the court may consider whether the party against whom the judgment is sought is able to respond in damages, i.e., if the defendant is shown to be insolvent, a monetary judgment may be inadequate. (West Coast Const. Co. v. Oceano Sanitary Dist. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 693, 700.)

Here, Plaintiff’s claims are entirely for monetary damages. Plaintiff’s claims are for unpaid wages resulting from breach of contract. Plaintiff’s Complaint simply does not seek any remedy in equity.  Even where Plaintiff pleads for restitution or the creation of constructive trust, the result is still a request for monetary damages. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that she would not be able to collect on a money judgment such that injunctive relief is appropriate, she provides no evidence that this is the case. Plaintiff’s self-serving declaration in support of this motion contains nothing related to Defendants’ solvency.

Plaintiff never claims to have had a possessory interest in the any FLG bank account. Further, this action does not imply the transfer of any property rights such that monetary damages would be insufficient. (See Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1380 [holding that monetary damages are generally unavailable when the situs of a claim was in the transfer of real property.].)

Although the lack of legal remedy alone is fatal to Plaintiff’s motion, the Court also notes that the scope of her requested injunction is far too broad. Plaintiff seeks an order enjoying the alienation of any real or personal property currently in possession of any Defendant. Such an order would effectively result in Defendants being unable to do something as simple as pay bills, as any money they possess would be restrained. Such an order would impose such a massive detriment on Defendants that the Court cannot conceive of a scenario in which Plaintiff’s potential harm would outweigh it. This is exacerbated by the fact that Plaintiff has made no showing that there is any risk to her should an injunction not issue. As previously mentioned, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of Defendants’ inability to pay the appropriate remedy of damages.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary judgment and right to attach order is DENIED.

--- 

RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Karen S. Darling’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on regularly for hearing on August 30, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS DENIED.

UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.  

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE:  August 30, 2024                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles