Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCV04595, Date: 2025-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV04595    Hearing Date: January 24, 2025    Dept: A

DEMURRER

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is required and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Byron Ceron (Plaintiff) brings this action against American Honda Motor Co. Inc. (Honda) and Jose Arredondo Enterprises, Inc. dba Bakersfield Acura (Bakersfield Acura) (collectively Defendants) in relation to his purchase of a 2019 Acura MVX (the Subject Vehicle). Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle is defective, and that Honda has refused to adequately repair the Subject Vehicle or compensate him for the defect. Plaintiff states causes of action for (1) Violation Of Song-Beverly Act - Breach Of Express Warranty, (2) Violation Of Song-Beverly Act - Breach Of Implied Warranty, (3) Violation Of Business & Professions Code § 17200, and (4) Negligent Repair.  

Honda now demurs to the third cause of action on grounds that the Complaint contains insufficient facts to allege a violation of Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200. The Court notes that although Honda reserved a hearing for a Demurrer with Motion to Strike, no Motion to Strike was ever filed. Honda’s notice for the demurrer makes no mention of the Motion to Strike, nor does its memorandum in support of the demurrer. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and Honda replies.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

Demurrer

The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Id.)

A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.  App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318.)

Pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.)

II.                 MERITS

Meet and Confer

C.C.P. § 430.41(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met here. (Silva Decl. ¶¶ 2-7.)

Discussion

Honda demurs to the third cause of action on grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege any purported “unlawful,” “unfair,” or “fraudulent” business practices with the required specificity. For reasons stated below, the Court agrees.

Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 states that unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 is written in the disjunctive, meaning allegedly violative conduct may be classified as unlawful, or unfair, fraudulent, or some combination of the three. (Berryman v. Merit Property Management, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554.) A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 618-619.)

As concerns unlawful practices, the Court finds the factual allegations of the Complaint to be deficient. “By proscribing any unlawful business practice, section 17200 borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable. A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 618-619.) Plaintiff has failed to state with reasonable particularity any facts or if the basis for the violation is conduct that is unlawful, or unfair, fraudulent, or some combination of the three. Defendant is left to speculate as to the alleged reason for the violation.  While Plaintiff discusses their theory in their opposition, it is not alleged in the Complaint with sufficient particularity. 

The only fact particular to Plaintiff’s dispute in the Complaint is the vehicle which Honda allegedly sold him, a 2019 Acura MVX. (Compl. ¶ 7.) As concerns the sale of the vehicle, the Complaint does not allege when this occurred, where it occurred, or who sold the vehicle.  They do not allege what the defect was, when repairs were attempted or other facts to support the claim. While it might be assumed the vehicle was purchased from Bakersfield Acura, given they are named as a Defendant in this action, the Complaint does not so state.  

The Complaint is also silent as to what defect the Subject Vehicle allegedly suffered or any facts as to Honda’s attempts to repair a defect. The Complaint states in conclusory fashion that Honda failed to repair or compensate Plaintiff for the defect, but it alleges no facts as to when or how many times the vehicle was presented to Honda for repair. (See Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff’s allegations do not “parallel” the Song-Beverly statutes so much as they restate them verbatim unaccompanied by any facts particular to his case. Honda cannot read these allegations and reasonably ascertain the nature of the claims against which it must defend.

In essence, the only reasonably particular fact alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint is that he owns the Subject Vehicle. This allegation is insufficient to allege a violation of the law, Song-Beverly, upon which Plaintiff’s Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 cause of action is based. Further the Complaint contains no factual allegations speaking to any “unfair” or “fraudulent” practices by Honda unconnected from the Song-Beverly claims. As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead any basis upon which an action under Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 may be brought.

Accordingly, the demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend. The Court finds leave to amend is appropriate as it appears the current deficiencies could be easily rectified upon amendment.

On a separate note, the Court is uncertain lawsuit related to a vehicle which was purchased in Bakersfield, located in Kern County, California is being heard in a Los Angeles County court.  Plaintiff may need to address the venue of this matter at a later date. (See generally C.C.P. §§392-403).

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

American Honda Motor Co. Inc.’s Demurrer came on regularly for hearing on January 24, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE DEMURRER TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.  

HONDA TO GIVE NOTICE.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.