Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCV04622, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV04622    Hearing Date: May 2, 2025    Dept: A

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is required and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

On September 20, 2024, Rene O. Enriquez (Plaintiff) filed the Complaint in this action against General Motors, Inc. (Defendant). Plaintiff alleged that she is currently in possession of a defective 2022 Chevrolet Volt. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to repurchase the vehicle in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The Complaint states causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranties and (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranties.

Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff to amend her Complaint in light of the recent California Supreme Court ruling in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (Rodriguez). Rodriguez held that vehicles with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty, such as Plaintiff’s, do not qualify as a ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ under Song-Beverly’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’. (Id. at 196.) Thus, Plaintiff seeks to remove her Song-Beverly causes of action entirely and instead state a single cause of action for Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312).

Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that the Rodriguez ruling has been long in development and cannot serve as an appropriate justification for Plaintiff’s amendment. Further, Defendant argues that the proposed amendment is futile, in that claims under Magnuson-Moss have been ruled to be unsustainable when they do not derive from independent warranty claims made under state law.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

The Court may, in its discretion and after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading, including adding or striking out the name of any party, or correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect. (C.C.P. § 473(a)(1).)

“Public policy dictates that leave to amend be liberally granted.” (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire &. Marine Ins. Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 32.) “Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial … this policy should be applied only ‘where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party. A different result is indicated ‘where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party’ is shown.” (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

A motion to amend a pleading must include (1) a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments and (2) a statement of what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted or added. (C.R.C. Rule 3.1324(a).)  These changes should identify by page, paragraph, and line number where the allegations added/removed are located.

The motion shall also be accompanied by a declaration attesting to (1) the effect of the amendment, (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper, (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and (4) why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (C.R.C. Rule 1.324(b).)

II.                 MERITS

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds Plaintiff has complied with the statutory procedure in moving for leave to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff has produced a proposed First Amended Complaint (FAC) as required by C.R.C. Rule 3.1234(a). (See April 24, 2025 Separate Filing) Plaintiff also included a redlined version of the original Complaint which shows the allegations she seeks to add in the FAC. (Morrow Decl., Exh. B.)

Plaintiff has also attached the declaration of her counsel, Neal Morrow (Morrow), attesting that amendment is warranted, “In light of recent legal developments that limit the scope of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act…” (Morrow Decl. ¶ 7.) While Morrow does not cite to the Rodriguez decision (either in his memorandum or declaration) it is clear from the opposition and reply papers that Rodriguez is the impetus for this motion.

Inexcusable Delay/Prejudice

Defendant argues that the Rodriguez decision should not be a reason to grant leave to amend because (1) the decision was pending for a significant enough time that Plaintiff could have already added her Magnuson-Moss claims and (2) Plaintiff had the right to assert Magnusson-Moss claims from the outset of this litigation. The Court finds neither of these arguments to be persuasive for reasons stated below.

Whether Plaintiff could have asserted her Magnusson-Moss claims in the initial Complaint is irrelevant to the determination of this motion. Magnusson-Moss is a federal statute which, when implicated, subjects Plaintiff’s action to removal from, state court if the Federal dollar jurisdiction is met. That Plaintiff elected to forego seeking a federal remedy until her Song-Beverly claims were rendered legally invalid does not mean that she unreasonably delayed asserting them. The same can be said for whether Plaintiff could have amended to add the claims while Rodriguez was pending. Defendant cannot conjure up inexcusable delay by pointing to the mere possibility that an adverse ruling would issue in Rodriguez.

Further, Defendant has not demonstrated any substantial prejudice which would result from amendment. (See Rickley v. Goodfriend (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1159 [Holding that the burden of demonstrating prejudice is held by the party claiming to be prejudiced].) Defendant’s claim of prejudice is based solely on their having to conduct additional discovery, which could have already been conducted had Plaintiff included her Magnusson-Moss claims from the outset. Plaintiff’s factual allegations appear essentially unchanged, and it does not appear on the face of the FAC that any wildly different discovery would need to be conducted. Defendant does not describe the differences between Magnusson-Moss or how these amendments would cause an undue discovery burden.

Futile Amendment

Lastly, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s amendment is futile is not properly considered here. In ruling on a motion for leave to amend a pleading, the Court does not consider the merits of the proposed amendment, because “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) While the trial court may deny a motion for leave to amend on grounds that, e.g., the party seeking the amendment has caused unreasonable delay in doing so, it probably abuses its discretion if it denies any such motion in the absence of a finding of prejudice to the opposing side.¿ (Thompson, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at 545.)

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s amendment to make a claim under Magnusson-Moss is futile because case law is clear that a claim under Magnusson-Moss cannot survive independent of a valid state law warranty claim. (See Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905.) This argument inherently asks the Court to consider the merits of the proposed amendment which, as stated above, is improper upon a motion for leave to amend.

Even were the Court to consider this argument, Dagher makes clear that leave to amend should be granted. In Dagher, the California Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s denial of leave to amend where the plaintiff sought to add a case of action under Magnusson-Moss. (Id. 927.) The Court of Appeal found denial was inappropriate because, although Plaintiff’s existing state law claims were legally invalid, there remained the possibility that they could assert facts in support of a warranty claim pursuant to the California Uniform Commercial Code. (Id. at 927-929.)

Conclusion

In short, the Court finds the requirements of C.R.C. Rules 3.1324(a) and (b) are satisfied. The Court finds that Defendant has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice such that leave to amend should be denied. Should Defendant maintain their argument that the claim in Plaintiff’s FAC is without merit, they may file a demurrer or similar motion to address these concerns. Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s FAC filed February 24, 2025 is deemed the operative pleading as of this ruling.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

General Motors, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Amend came on regularly for hearing on May 2, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND IS GRANTED.

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2025 IS DEEMED THE OPERATIVE PLEADING EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE OF THIS RULING.

DEFENDANT WILL HAVE 30 DAYS IN WHICH TO FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.

PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.