Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: 24NNCV06051, Date: 2025-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24NNCV06051    Hearing Date: April 25, 2025    Dept: A

DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is required and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

ALLEGATIONS: 

Karl Young (Plaintiff) brings this action against Atlas Arcadia, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that he rented an apartment from Defendant which contained substandard living conditions. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the apartment suffered from water intrusion and mold and that Defendant failed to rectify the issue.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) states causes of action for: (1) Statutory Breach of the Warranty of Habitability, (2) Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, (3) Negligence, (4) Breach of Contract, (5) Nuisance, (6) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (7) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing, (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (9) Violation of Civil Code §1950.5, (1) Constructive Eviction, (11) Violation of Civil Code §1942.5.

Before the Court is a demurrer by Defendant to the eighth cause of action for IIED. Defendant first demurs C.C.P. § 430.10(f) grounds, arguing that the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to state a cause of action for IIED. Defendant also demurs to the cause of action as fatally uncertain pursuant to C.C.P. § 430.10(f). Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, as well as allegations alleging Defendant acted “willfully or maliciously” or with “recklessness and conscious disregard.” Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.

ANALYSIS: 

I.                    LEGAL STANDARD 

Demurrer

The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Id.)

A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.  App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318.)

Motion to Strike

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. § 435, “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. § 431.10.)

The court may also “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. § 436 (b).)

II.                 MERITS

Meet and Confer

C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) and 435.5(a) require that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer and/or motion to strike. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Vinje Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

Facts Alleged

Plaintiff alleges that he previously contracted with Defendant to rent the premises located at 865 West Huntington Drive Unit 1 Arcadia, CA 91007 (the Subject Premises). (FAC ¶ 1.) Defendant is the legal owner of the Subject Premises and, at all times, the landlord. (FAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiff moved into the property on December 4, 2023, and paid a monthly rent of $2,950.00. (FAC ¶¶ 20-21.) Shortly after moving into the Subject Premises, Plaintiff noticed water intrusion and mold. (FAC ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff further asserts that he has experienced substandard conditions including but not limited to plumbing issues, (2), damaged/cracked/deteriorated walls and ceilings, (3) sewage water within the Subject Premises, (4) unpermitted electrical wiring, (5) improper water heater ventilation, (6) unpermitted dwelling, (7) missing/broken mailbox, (8) inadequate security/locks, and (9) vermin. (FAC ¶ 23.) It does not appear that Plaintiff has alleged additional facts detailing any of these purported defects, as the remainder of the allegations only address water intrusion and mold.

Plaintiff writes that he “continuously notified the Defendant of the issues” and that Defendant “failed/and or neglected to repair said issues.” (FAC ¶¶ 25, 26.) Plaintiff asserts that he “provided actual notice to the Defendant of the issues present at” the Subject Premises. (FAC ¶ 24.) Plaintiff “specifically provided written notice to Defendant in or about December 2023.” (FAC ¶ 25.) The Court notes that no exhibits are attached to the FAC and Plaintiff’s pleadings make no reference as to when this written notice was given.

Plaintiff alleges he vacated the Subject Premises in July 2024 due to failure of the Defendant to “adequately repair” the issues with the property. (FAC ¶ 37.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to do an accounting and return his security deposit. (FAC ¶¶ 39, 40.)

Demurrer

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, [citation and ellipses omitted].)

Courts have found that allegations of refusal to remediate mold and other harmful building conditions can constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. In Burnett v. Chimney Sweep, plaintiffs repeatedly complained of a mold issue and defendant landlord refused to remediate. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057.) The trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that whether the landlord’s refusal to rectify the mold issue was extreme and outrageous presented a factual question for the jury. (Id. at 1069, citing Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903.)

To support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous, rather it must be directed at the plaintiff or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware. (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 152.) In order to avoid a demurrer, a plaintiff must allege with “great specificity” the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 926, 936.)

Applying the foregoing case law to this case, a tenant seeking to recover for IIED is required to plead extreme and outrageous conduct by the landlord which was directed at him. Burnett and Stoiber make clear that a tenant fulfills these requirements when they specifically plead defects in the subject premises which were pointed out to the landlord and which the landlord thereafter completely refused to remediate. Refusal to remediate dangerous dwelling conditions clearly qualifies as extreme and outrageous conduct directed at the tenant.

Here, the Court finds the FAC contains insufficient allegations to support a claim for IIED. To begin, Plaintiff’s allegations as to nature of the defect at the Subject Premises is impermissibly vague. Plaintiff’s general allegations of water intrusion and mold are far from the detailed allegations of heavy cockroach infestation, leaking sewage, overused electrical wiring, and broken windows alleged in Stoiber. (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at 912.) Further, Plaintiff’s generalized allegations as to notice are insufficient to allege that Defendant was aware of the nature of the property defects. Plaintiff’s allegations vaguely refer to notices he provided Defendant, but they do not specify the form of or the dates on notice given. 

Further still, Plaintiff’s FAC is completely ambiguous as to whether Defendant refused to remediate the water intrusion and mold. Plaintiff initially alleges that Defendant “failed and/or neglected to repair” the issues. (FAC ¶¶ 28.) Plaintiff proceeds to then allege at several points that Defendant failed to perform adequate repairs. (FAC ¶¶ 31, 37, 53.) It is entirely unclear from the FAC whether Plaintiff contends that Defendant outright refused to repair the premises or simply effected repairs that Plaintiff deemed inadequate. This difference is important.

In short, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts as to Defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct such that he can properly state his claim for IIED. Accordingly, the demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend. Leave to amend is granted insofar as the Court finds it reasonably possible that Plaintiff could amend his FAC to allege additional facts as to Defendant’s purported refusal to remediate.

Motion to Strike

Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and all references to their conduct as “malicious” “oppressive” “despicable” or “outrageous”. Defendant’s brief argues (1) that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged punitive damages for failure to allege oppression, fraud, or malice and (2) that Plaintiff’s allegations supporting punitive damages against them are not sufficiently particular pursuant to Civil Code § 3294(b).

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims are, at least in part, derived from his eighth causes of action. Given the Court has sustained the demurrer to that cause of action with leave to amend, Defendant’s motion strike punitive damages is MOOT.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER 

Atlas Arcadia, LLC’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on April 15, 2025, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: 

THE DEMURRER TO THE EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

THE MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS MOOT.

THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE SET FOR APRIL 28, 2025 AT 9:00 A.M. IS ADVANCED TO THIS DATE AND CONTINUED TO AUGUST 6, 2025 AT 9:00 A.M.

DEFENDANT ATLAS ARCADIA, LLC TO GIVE NOTICE.  

IT IS SO ORDERED.