Judge: Frank M. Tavelman, Case: GC045468, Date: 2023-10-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: GC045468    Hearing Date: October 27, 2023    Dept: A

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK

DEPARTMENT A

MOTION FOR ORDER PURSUANT TO JUDGMENT

NOTICE:

The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) notice of intent to appear is required.  Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument will be permitted unless a “party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the party’s intention to appear and argue.  The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no notice of intent to appear is received.”  

Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.

CASE SUMMARY:

Before the Court is a motion brought by Francesca de la Flor (“Defendant”) seeking leave of the Court to allow the sale of the property known as 2305 & 2315 Oregon Rd. Versailles KY (the “Kentucky Property”). In 2011, Defendant transferred this property via quitclaim deed to Oak Knoll Meadows Farm Inc. (“Oak Knoll”). In 2013, this Court entered judgment against Defendant signed by Judge W. Stewart enjoining Defendant or Oak Knoll from selling the Kentucky Property without a prior court order. Defendant now moves for such an order and Plaintiff opposes.

Defendant submits a proposed order which would deem her transfer of the Kentucky Property to Oak Knoll void. Defendant’s order requests the Court deem the Kentucky Property as belonging to her personally, rather than to Oak Knoll. Defendant’s order also requests the Court deem that Defendant has the right to sell the property pursuant to the satisfactions of judgment filed. For reasons discussed below the Court declines to grant Defendant’s order declaring the property transfer void. However, the Court grants the motion insofar as it requests the dissolution of the injunction imposed in the 2013 judgment.

Property Transfer

Defendant states in her moving papers that the judgment in this matter declared her transfer of the Kentucky Property to Oak Knoll void as a matter of law. This is untrue.  The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Civil Code §§3439 et seq., subsequently superseded with the Uniform Voidable Transfer Act) indicates that transfers may be voidable but are not necessarily void. The judgment contains statements that each property transfer by Defendant was fraudulent. With respect to the four California properties concerned (the “California Properties”), the judgment declares those transfers void, subject to a constructive trust, and enjoined from sale without court order. (Jud. ¶¶ 5-9.) The section of the judgment discussing the Kentucky Property contains no mention of the transfer being void nor is the property included in the constructive trust. (Jud. ¶ 10.) However, the judgment did enjoin the sale of the property by Defendant and Oak Knoll without further order of the court. (Id.)

From the papers presented to the Court, it appears the Kentucky Property is still under ownership of Oak Knoll. Plaintiff’s counsel states in his declaration that he has confirmed the Kentucky Property is indeed currently owned by Oak Knoll. (Carlson Decl ¶ 5.) Defendant submits no recorded documents or any title company report attesting to the status of current ownership. As such, for the Court to enter an order declaring that Defendant may sell the property would inappropriately reflect the actual ownership.  To the extent that any party is authorized to move the Court to allow sale of the Kentucky Property, it appears that party is Oak Knoll. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the part of Defendant’s motion which asks the Court to deem the property transfer void.

Injunction

C.C.P. § 3424 provides “Upon notice and motion, the court may modify or dissolve a final injunction upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction was granted, that the law upon which the injunction was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction.”

Here, Defendant has submitted evidence of a change in material facts which would justify the dissolution of the injunction. Defendant has satisfied her judgment and thus the purpose of the injunction restricting the sale of the Kentucky Property has been fulfilled. There remains no reason to restrict the sale of this property and the injunction should be dissolved.  However, the Court takes no position as to who the current owner is nor who may sell the property.   The only action taken is lifting the injunction prohibiting the sale.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not sought such an order before transferring the enjoined California Properties. Plaintiff has previously provided satisfactions of judgment which were sufficient to allow Defendant to transfer the California Properties. (Carlson Delc. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff has offered to give Defendant another satisfaction so that the Kentucky Property may be sold, which Defendant declined as she believed it insufficient to satisfy the requirement in the judgment. (Mot. p. 3.)  While it may be true that Defendant did not seek an order dissolving the injunction before selling the California Properties, that matter is not before the court and even if true does not preclude her from bringing such a motion now for the Kentucky property.

Plaintiff further opines that Defendant seeks this order for the purposes of evading business taxes on the sale of the Kentucky Property. Plaintiff attaches a declaration of a certified public accountant, Michael Milam, which attests that Defendant serves to save approximately $533,887 if she were to sell the property rather than Oak Knoll. (Milan Decl. ¶ 9.)

The Court need not delve into such matters. Defendant’s motivation for bringing this motion has no bearing on the validity of the injunction restricting the property sale. What Defendant chooses to do with the Kentucky Property after the judgment has been satisfied is outside the scope of this motion. The Court is confident that the Kentucky taxing authorities or federal government are capable of seeking any appropriate remedies in a Kentucky court or United States District Court if Defendant violates any state or federal tax laws.  Accordingly, the Court orders the injunction restricting the sale of the Kentucky Property DISSOLVED.

Conclusion

The Court finds the transfer of the Kentucky Property to Oak Knoll was not voided by the 2013 judgment.  The Court also finds a sufficient change in material facts, in the form of satisfactions of judgment, to dissolve the injunction restricting the sale of the Kentucky Property.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records. 

ORDER

Francesca de la Flor’s Motion for Order Pursuant to Judgment came on regularly for hearing on October 27, 2023 after having been continued to this date, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:

DEFENDANT’S MOTION IS DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VOID THE TRANSFER OF THE KENTUCKY PROPERTY TO OAK KNOLL IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE INJUNCTION RESTRICTING THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT 2305 & 2315 OREGON ROAD, VERSAILLES, KENTUCKY IS GRANTED..

UNLESS ALL PARTIES HAVE WAIVED NOTICE, DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

DATE:  October 27, 2023                            _______________________________ 

                                                                        F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge 

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles