Judge: Fumiko Wasserman, Case: 21STCV37845, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling

“INSTRUCTIONS:
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court
appearance on the matter, the moving party must:

1. Contact the opposing party and all other
parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the
tentative ruling.

2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day
before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties
will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and

3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all
parties entitled to receive service.

If this procedure is followed, when the case is
called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its
tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then
no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing.
If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may
either be taken off calendar or ruled on. 

Case Number: 21STCV37845    Hearing Date: August 17, 2023    Dept: B

I. CONCLUSION

Having fully considered the arguments of the parties, both written and oral, the Court exercises its discretion and rules as follows:

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Complaint, (2) the request for dismissal filed in this action on April 12, 2023, and (3) the Defendant’s Answer. Pursuant to Evidence Code, section 452, subdivision (d), the Court may take judicial notice of records of any court of this state. The Court will take judicial notice of all three documents. The Court will not take judicial notice of the facts alleged in the Complaint or Defendant's Answer as the allegations are reasonably subject to dispute and thus not proper for judicial notice. (Evid.

Code, section 452, subd. (h).)

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication, is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

Defendants request for summary judgment is DENIED. “A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) Here, Defendant is not contending that the entire action has no merit, but instead is arguing that certain causes of action have no merit. Summary judgment is thus improper.

The request for summary adjudication is GRANTED. The third cause of action is for products liability based on (1) count one – strict liability, (2) count two – negligence, and (3) count three – breach of warranty. Plaintiffs allege that the seatbelt assembly, which was in the same condition as it was when it left Defendant’s control, failed because it did not remain locked when Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident. (Complaint, p. 14.) The failure of the seatbelt assembly allegedly caused or contributed to the injury of Plaintiff Celestial Chaidez, a minor. (Complaint, p. 15.)

“ ‘ “[A] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.” ’ [Citation.] The elements of this cause of action are as follows: ‘(1) the product is placed on the market; (2) there is knowledge that it will be used without inspection for defect; (3) the product proves to be defective; and (4) the defect causes injury to a human.’ [Citation.] …[¶] Turning to the negligence cause of action, our Supreme Court has explained, ‘the plaintiff in order to recover in strict liability in tort must prove that he was injured by a defect in the product and that the product was defective when it left the hands of the retailer or manufacturer; whereas to recover in negligence the plaintiff must prove the same two elements plus an additional element, namely, that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant.’ [Citation.] … [¶] The essential elements of a warranty cause of action are: ‘1. There was a sale of goods; the defendant was the seller, and plaintiff a buyer; [¶] 2. Defendant [expressly] [or] [impliedly] warranted the goods sold; [¶] 3. There was a breach of warranty; [and] [¶] 4. The breach of warranty caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm[.] [; and] [5. The plaintiff gave defendant timely notice of the breach of warranty.]’ [Citation.]” (Scott v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 404, 415–416.)

Defendant has the burden to demonstrate that each cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements of each cause of action cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Here, Defendant has shown that the element of breach, as to breach of warranty, and the element that the product was defective, as to strict liability and negligence, cannot be established.

Defendant presents evidence that, prior to the accident in question, there is no information regarding the maintenance of the seatbelt assembly and, during the time Plaintiffs owned the Subject Vehicle, the seatbelt assembly was able to latch properly. (Plaintiffs' Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Opposition to Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (“P-SSUF”), ¶¶ 1 through 7.) Defendant demonstrates that right after the accident, Detective Henkes inspected the seatbelt assembly, but Detective Henkes was unable to determine what the condition of the seatbelt assembly was before the accident. (P-SSUF, ¶¶ 25 through 33.) The seatbelt assembly was not subsequently preserved after the accident, so the product is not available for inspection. (P-SSUF, ¶ 34.) Through discovery, Plaintiffs have stated they are unable to identify how the seatbelt assembly was defectively manufactured, Plaintiffs stated that Defendant was not liable on a theory of negligence, and Plaintiffs stated the breach of warranty theory was withdrawn. (P-SSUF, ¶¶ 35 through 38.)

Because Defendant has satisfied their burden, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to “show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Of the facts relied upon by Defendant, Plaintiffs do not dispute any of the facts nor present any evidence to create a triable issue of material fact. (P-SSUF, ¶¶ 1 through 7, 25 through 33, 34, and 35 through 38.) Plaintiffs only contest P-SSUF, ¶ 10, stating that Plaintiff Romelia Chaidez did not run the seatbelt through the stroller seat where Plaintiff Celestial Chaidez was seated but rater the stroller seat was placed on top of the seat, and

P-SSUF, ¶ 13, stating that the stroller seat did not latch to anything in the vehicle. Neither of these disputed facts create a triable issue of material fact that the seatbelt assembly was defective.

Of note, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they withdrew the breach of warranty theory. (P-SSUF, ¶ 38.) Plaintiffs do not dispute they are unable to identify how and in what manner the seatbelt assembly is defectively manufactured. (P-SSUF, ¶ 36.) Finally, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Plaintiffs responded to discovery by indicating that Defendant is not liable under a negligence theory. (P-SSUF, ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs have thus failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact.

The Court finds that the products liability cause of action on (1) count one – strict liability based on a manufacturing and design defect, (2) count two – negligence, and (3) count three – breach of warranty have no merit.

Plaintiffs request that the Court address certain ‘undisputed factual issues’ is DENIED. “The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the issues but merely to discover, through the medium of affidavits, whether there are issues to be tried and whether the parties possess evidence which demands the analysis of trial. [Citations.]” (Melamed v. City of Long Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 70, 76.) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

The moving party is ordered to prepare a proposed judgment consistent with the Court’s findings and reasoning expressed herein, serve the proposed judgment upon opposing counsel, and lodge the proposed judgment with the Court within 10 days of this order.