Judge: Gail Killefer, Case: 19STCV05246, Date: 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 19STCV05246    Hearing Date: April 20, 2023    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE:                 April 20, 2023   

CASE NUMBER:                  19STCV05246

CASE NAME:                        Alexandria Real Estate Equities and Joel Marcus v. Steven Marcus and Bugsby Property, LLC

TRIAL DATE:                        October 3, 2023

PROOF OF SERVICE:          OK

                                                                                                                                                           

MOTION                              Plaintiffs’ Demurrer as to the Affirmative Defenses in the First Amended Answer

MOVING PARTIES:             Plaintiffs, Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. and Joel S. Marcus 

OPPOSING PARTY:             Defendant, Steven Marcus 

OPPOSITION:                       April 7, 2023

REPLY:                                  April 13, 2023

                                                                                                                                                           

TENTATIVE:                         Plaintiffs’ demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiffs are to give notice.

                                                                                                                                                           

Background

This is an action for declaratory relief arising out of Plaintiffs Alexandria Real Estate Equities (“Alexandria”) and Joel S. Marcus’ (“Joel”) business ventures with Defendants Steven Marcus (“Steven”) and Bugsby Property, LLC (“Bugsby”).  

Plaintiffs’ Complaint for declaratory relief filed February 13, 2019, alleges that in November 2013, Joel, in his capacity as Alexandria’s CEO, asked Steven for “some suggestions” regarding Alexandria’s joint venture financing. Steven and Joel allegedly agreed that Steven would not receive monetary compensation but would be entitled to advertise the fact that he had advised Alexandria. On December 27, 2013, Alexandria and Steven alleged entered into a “Confidential Information and Nondisclosure Agreement” (“CNDA”) which memorialized the terms of their agreement. The CNDA allegedly provided that Steven would receive no compensation and allegedly included a merger clause which provided that it would be the final and exclusive agreement between the parties. 

Steven allegedly completed his work advising Alexandria by January 2014 and allegedly provided the work under the name of his corporation, Bugsby. However, the Complaint alleges that Bugsby is an alter ego of Steven. The Complaint alleges that over the years, Steven’s relationship with Joel deteriorated and that in January 2019, Steven demanded $12 million in payment for his advice contradictory to the terms of the CNDA. Joel and Alexandria seek an order from the Court declaring that Steven and Bugsby are not owed compensation under the CNDA.  

On February 28, 2020, the court denied Steven’s motion to quash service of summons. Bugsby’s motion to quash service of summons was granted.  

On April 9, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The FAC now alleges five causes of action, as follows: (1) fraud: intentional misrepresentation; (2) fraud: concealment, (3) breach of contract, (5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (5) declaratory relief.  

On September 19, 2020, Steven filed a Cross-Complaint against Alexandria, Joel and Barbara Marcus (“Barbara”). Steven’s Cross-Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract against Joel and Barbara, (2) breach of contract against Joel and Barbara, (3) breach of contract against Alexandria, (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Alexandria, (5) extortion against Joel and Alexandria, (6) intentional misrepresentation against Joel and Alexandria, (7) fraudulent concealment against Joel and Alexandria, (8) declaratory relief against Joel and Barbara, (9)  declaratory relief against Alexandria, (10) unfair competition against Joel and Alexandria. 

On January 6, 2021, Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to the Cross Complaint was sustained. On February 5, 2021, Steven filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint. (“FACC”) The FACC alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract against Joel/Barbara. 

On June 17, 2021, Joel and Barbara’s demurrer to the FACC was sustained without leave to amend.  

On August 25, 2021, Steven’s motion for summary judgment as to the FAC was denied in its entirety.

 

On February 14, 2023, the court granted Plaintiffs’ judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants’ affirmative defenses. (“February 14 Order”)

 

On March 16, 2023, Defendant filed the First Amended Answer (“Amended Answer”).

 

Plaintiffs now demur as to the Affirmative Defenses of the Amended Answer again. Defendant opposes the motion.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs request that the court take judicial notice of the following in support of their demurrer:  

1.      Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory Relief, filed February 3, 2019 (Exhibit 1); 

2.      Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, filed April 4, 2020 (Exhibit 2);

3.      Plaintiffs’ Demurrer to Defendant’s Cross-Complaint in this matter, filed October 13, 2020 (Exhibit 3);

4.      Notice of Ruling on Demurrers to Cross-Complaint in this matter, issued January 6, 2021 (Exhibit 4);

5.      Defendant Steven Marcus’s Amended Crossclaims, filed February 5, 2021 (Exhibit 5);

6.      Plaintiffs’ and Cross-Defendants’ Notice of Demurrers and Demurrers to Defendant’s Cross-Complaint, filed October 13, 2020 (Exhibit 7);

7.      Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s and Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer to Defendant’s First Amended Cross-Complaint, filed March 8, 2021 (Exhibit 7);

8.      Notice of Entry Ordering Dismissal [sic] of Defendants’ Cross-Complaint Without Leave to Amend, filed June 21, 2021 (Exhibit 8);

9.      Notice of Entry of Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, issued August 25, 2021 (Exhibit 9);

10.  Order Granting Plaintiff’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dated Feb. 14, 2023 (Exhibit 10);

11.  Defendant Steven Marcus’s Amended Answer, filed March 16, 2023 (Exhibit 11);

12.  Defendant Steven Marcus’s Notice of Demurrer to First Amended Complaint; Demurrer; and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed April 20, 2020 (Exhibit 12);

13.  Complaint for Fraud, Fraudulent Concealment, and Declaratory Relief, Case. No. 2:21-cv-08088-SB-SK, filed in the Central District of California by Defendant Steven Marcus on October 12, 2021 (Exhibit A);

14.  Order of Dismissal and Order to Show Cause re: Rule 11 Sanctions entered in No. 2:21-cv-08088-SB-SK, Central District of California, dated March 11, 2022 (Exhibit B);

15.  Order Imposing Sanctions entered in No. 2:21-cv-08088-SB-SK, Central District of California, dated May 3, 2022 (Exhibit C);

16.  Order Dismissing Appeal entered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal on October 12, 2022 (No. 22-55553) (Exhibit D).

Plaintiffs’ request is granted. The existence and legal significance of these documents are proper matters for judicial notice. (Evid. Code § 452(d), (h).) 

Meet and Confer Efforts

 

Plaintiffs submit the declaration of their counsel, John M. Sandoval (“Sandoval”) to show compliance with CCP § 430.41. Sandoval attests the parties conferred on March 23, 2023 regarding the issues raised in this demurrer and were unable to reach a resolution. (Sandoval Decl. ¶¶2-4.) The Sandoval Declaration is sufficient for purposes of CCP § 430.41.  

 

Discussion

 

I.                   Legal Standard

 

A party against whom an answer has been filed may object by demurrer.¿Unlike a demurrer to a complaint or cross-complaint, a demurrer to an answer is limited to three grounds:¿ 

 

(a) The answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense;¿ 

(b) The answer is uncertain; or¿ 

(c) Where the answer pleads a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the answer whether the contract is written or oral.¿ 

 

(CCP § 430.20.)¿¿¿ 

 

A general demurrer may be made on the ground that an answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.¿¿(Timberidge¿Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa¿(1978)¿86 Cal.App.3d 873, 880; CCP § 430.20.)¿¿“Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.”¿¿(South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen¿(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732;¿In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases¿(2011)¿201 Cal.App.4th 758, 813 (Quantification)

[“affirmative defenses cannot be pled as mere legal conclusions, but must instead be alleged with as much factual detail as the allegations of a complaint.”].)¿¿ 

 

“Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.”  (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen¿(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732;¿In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases¿(2011)¿201 Cal.App.4th 758, 813¿(Quantification)¿[“affirmative defenses cannot be pled as mere legal conclusions, but must instead be alleged with as much factual detail as the allegations of a complaint.”].)¿¿ 

 

Affirmative defenses are¿pled¿based upon facts demonstrating that no cause of action exists, notwithstanding the truth of the complaint’s allegations.¿¿(Walsh v. W. Valley Mission¿Cmty. College Dist.¿(1998)¿66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1542 n.3.)¿ “The phrase ‘new matter’¿refers to something relied on by a defendant which is not put in issue by the plaintiff.¿¿Thus, where matters are not responsive to essential allegations of the complaint, they must be raised¿in the answer as new matter.¿¿Where, however, the answer sets forth facts showing some essential allegation of the complaint is not true, such facts are¿not new matter,¿but only a traverse.”¿ (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court¿(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 721, 725¿(State Farm).)¿  

 

The¿same pleading of ultimate facts in support of such new matter, rather than legal conclusions, is required as in pleading the complaint.¿¿As a general rule, the answer must allege facts constituting the affirmative defense in the same manner as a complaint must do for a cause of action.¿¿(FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.)¿¿“Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy¿(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)¿ 

II.                Analysis

For purposes of res judicata, a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is the equivalent to a judgment on the merits in favor of the defendant who was dismissed. (Long Beach Grand Prix Ass’n v. Hunt (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1197, 1203; accord  Alpha Mechanical, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of Amer. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1330.) “A retraxit arising from a dismissal with prejudice thus operates as a legal fiction, and it is given the same finality as if the matter were adjudicated and proceeded to a final judgment on the merits.” (Id., at p. 1331.) The dismissal of a complaint with prejudice operates as a retraxit, giving the same finality as a final judgment. (See Alpha Mechanical Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1330-32. (“Alpha Mechanical”)).

Plaintiffs here, much like the judgment on the pleadings considered by this court in the February 14 Order, contend Defendant Steven’s affirmative defenses in the Amended Answer are insufficiently pled still and fail as a matter of law because of Steven’s abandonment of those claims. (Motion, 4-10.) Plaintiffs contend the Amended Answer’s affirmative defenses only re-plead the same allegations which this court has already found to fail as a matter of law pursuant to retraxit, and to be insufficiently pled. (Motion, 12-15.) Therefore, Plaintiffs yet again contend Steven’s retraxit of these claims as cross-claims also work to prohibit Steven from relitigating these claims as affirmative defenses. (Id.)

In support, Plaintiffs again have cited Alpha Mechanical to correctly explain a relitigating of “the same subject matter” which were finally resolved in a cross-complaint via retraxit is prohibited. (Id.; Alpha Mechanical, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 1331-2; citing Torrey Pines Bank v. Sup. Ct., (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 814.) Lastly, Plaintiffs again repeat no new factual allegations have been pled to support these affirmative defenses, beyond those where retraxit exists already. (Id.) Plaintiffs therefore again contend in order to promote judicial economy, the court should apply retraxit to Steven’s claims. (Motion, 15.)

In opposition, Defendant Steven again reiterates his contentions that the claims of the Amended Answer do not rely on the same subject manner as the claims of the cross-complaint where retraxit has taken hold. (9-11.) However, Defendant again fails to address any arguments of retraxit, or otherwise abandonment of claims originally pled in the cross-complaint and FACC. Pointedly, Defendant fails to address at all Plaintiffs’ reliance on Alpha Mechanical. Defendant again further fails to point to any supporting authority to suggest the preclusive prior rulings of a court cannot be enforced in the same action, as Plaintiffs here request.

Therefore, the court finds again that retraxit applies here.

 

As part of the February 14 Order, this court found:

 

“Here, Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that retraxit applies to the cross-claims alleged in Defendant’s Answer, as binding precedent shows Defendant has clearly abandoned those claims after they were sustained on demurrer. As Plaintiffs correctly point out, the lack of ‘unique facts’ pled to support the affirmative defenses infers that the allegations of the cross-complaint are made to support the affirmative defenses. As the relitigation of the cross-claims are now prohibited through retraxit, the lack of factual allegations shows the affirmative defenses to be insufficiently pled. The affirmative defenses plead only legal contentions, devoid of any allegations of fact which can be taken as true by this court at this stage. Instead, the affirmative defenses plead only conclusory claims and fail to incorporate other factual allegations made in the Answer. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima¿(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384; Quantification.) Therefore, the court finds the affirmative defenses to be defective on their face.” (February 14 Order, 6-7.)

 

Defendant’s Amended Answer has done little to remedy the issues considered and deliberated by this court in the February 14 Order. Therefore, the court again finds the Amended Answer to be insufficiently pled and to fail as a matter of law as to the affirmative defenses.

 

For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ demurrer is sustained.

 

Conclusion

 

Plaintiffs’ demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiffs are to give notice.